

Wargame Design

VOLIV, Nr. 2 \$8.00
Spring 2018

BUMPS ON THE ROAD TO BAUTZEN

“Bautzen was the fourth biggest battle after Leipzig, Wagram and Dresden.
I was involved in a *big* project. No wonder it took us seven months
to finish the Orbat!”



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Wargame Design Vol. IV, Nr. 2

Editor-Publisher: Kevin Zucker

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NEXT GAME:**NAPOLEON RETREATS, 1814**

Publication Date: 14 February 2019

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 Bautzen*



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EDITORIAL

This Thing Called "Realism"

Realism and Playability are two sides of one coin; two prime ingredients of a good game. Enjoyment is 50% realism and 50% ease of play. OSG's goal is a perfect balance between the two. If you wish to increase realism, ease of play could begin to suffer. How can this be done without burdening the player?

"Realism" means the actions you take on the map bear some resemblance to history, with the same twists of fate. You want to see that line moving forward and back, towns changing hands repeatedly. Realism is 1/3 OrBat, 1/3 map, and 1/3 mechanics.

A game design is a window on the past, that can open up a whole world. Some gamers look at the game and just see cardboard squares and colored spots of ink. From that point of view, what we are doing is merely an intellectual exercise.

One purpose of this magazine is to explain why the rules are as they are in the first place. We gamers are so logical, we tend to look for answers *in the rules themselves*. Use your imagination and your knowledge of history and play the game to see how it all comes together!

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David Collins

by Kevin Zucker

We lost a long-time friend just as *Resurgence* went to press in mid-February.



Back in 1979, at the age of 18 and still in high school, Dave walked into OSG's office loft at 1261 Broadway, sat down and started working on the *Napoleon at Leipzig* game set up on one of the large tables. Dave was friends with Tony Merridy and Mark Edwards; the three of them had played a lot of

NLB, and through the years, Dave was able to help me with the development of ideas for the games based upon it. Sometimes his influence was more subtle. We might be discussing a rules change, and Dave would mumble, "ice cream."

Five minutes later, I'd turn to Dave and say, "Dave why don't you go buy us some ice cream?"

He came to visit me after I moved from NYC to Baltimore, in November of 1980, and—October Sur-



prise!... ended up staying. We were boon companions and often met for lunch at our favorite deli or Chinese restaurant. I could always call Dave with any design problems and he would sit down and work through it. Or we would meet for coffee near his home in Catonsville and work through it together.

One of Dave's countless contributions is the current victory process which is a multi-faceted solution that fits all situations, allowing us to just plug in the victory process without designing special conditions for each game. Dave worked this out originally for OSG's 1806 game, *Rossbach Avenged*. By indexing a number of variables, the process gives a more well-rounded view on who won, and avoids the cheap victory—for example, the French might win *NLB* by holding a key hex at the last turn, even if nearly the entire French army has evaporated.



Wargames were just one of Dave's interests. For many years he acted in the outdoor theater in Ohio, in shows such as *Te-cumseh* and *Blue Jacket*. He worked with the horses, played a native American, and

sported a Mohawk for more than a decade. He acted as stage manager, calling the show, and managing the fireworks, such as flaming arrows.

<https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1299585>

Dave was a world traveler, hiking in parts of Asia rarely frequented by westerners. He taught English in Taiwan and South Korea for several years. When he had enough dough, he would go to the airport and see which airline had the best deal, choosing his ticket by price rather than destination.

Dave was a good cook. When he cooked he managed to use every dish in the kitchen. He even signed-on as a ship's cook plying the Mediterranean for a year. He was good at combining whatever ingredients were around to make something tasty. As a designer he worked the same way, combining ideas from different games and re-purposing anything that worked from one genre to another.

When I ran into a major hurdle organizing the itinerary for last year's Spanish Tour, Dave helped me by taking a map of the who war from David Gates's *Spanish Ulcer*, enlarging it and mounting it on cardboard. I stuck it on the side of my fridge and it stayed there for months as I familiarized myself with the terrain and made up possible travel routes. The problem was not to spend more than 2.5 hours on the road in a given day; the solution was to end the tour in Lisbon and have folks fly out of there instead of Madrid.



Mr. Boss

The last time I spoke with Dave he had a new idea for completely re-vamping Recovery and Reorganization in TLNB. In that conversation he reminded me of the Pope's visit to NYC in 1979, when John Paul got a ticker-tape parade down Broadway.

The Secret Service didn't trust a bunch of hippie game designers (with our Chinese propaganda poster of Lenin on the wall), posting not one but two agents in our loft for the duration of the parade.

I have files on my computer of Dave's work on the battle of Castiglione which have been there for 15 years. So we'll be hearing from Dave for a while yet.

Bumps on the Road to Bautzen

By Jean Foisy


According to Diégo Mané, a French military historian and specialist on the battle, Bautzen was the fourth biggest battle in the Napoleonic era after Leipzig, Wagram and Dresden. Then it struck me... I was involved in a *big* project. No wonder it took us seven months to finish the ORBAT.

What was I getting into!

I was involved in map research, ORBAT research, development of the Königswartha-Weissig scenario, even “designing” part of it. I also gave a hand with the counters, TRCs, and even wrote Design notes and playtesting.

It was intensive work—we used 4 or 5 ORBAT sources that didn’t always agree, but I loved that part very much because I love researching.

Figure 1 What we found at first



We started with an ORBAT for the French on 25th of April. Not far from the Lützen battle (May 1st and 2nd). That was a start.

We tried to use it for Bautzen allowing for losses for battles, attrition and reinforcements (see chart on page 27). Kevin and I found these other sources helpful.

- P. J. Foucart, *Bautzen 20-21 mai 1813*.
- C. Lanrezac, *La manoeuvre de Lützen 1813*.
- G. Nafziger, *Lützen and Bautzen*.
- S. Bowden, *Napoleon's Grande Armee of 1813*.
- D. Mané, various Orbats on his French website

We now had a workable French ORBAT. As for the Coalition the resources were scant. The clincher was Diégo Mané’s Coalition “Ordres de

batailles” for Lützen, Bautzen and Luckau. That was it. The information we had from the other sources fell into place.

“Not so fast!” says Kevin “it’s Reconciliation time.” We needed to verify if our numbers made sense, so we checked them against the attrition, combat losses and reinforcements Kevin calculated.



Figure 2 La Bataille de Bautzen. Picture: Gallica

Figure 3 Struggle of Nations map with III Corps route to Bautzen. Used to calculate attrition and arrival date




Figure 3 Route taken by Marshal Ney's III Corps on its way to Bautzen. From May 16th to 20th his divisions marched 88 miles. The head of the column made the following schedule.

- 11. Crossed Elbe
- 15. Reached Herzberg
- 16. Luckau (20 mi.)
- 17. Kalau (16 mi FM – 24 mi for any troops which marched first to Lubben.)
- 18. Spremberg (20 mi)
- 19. Maukendorf (16 mi FM)
- 20 . Klix-Drehsa (16 mi)

"FM" = Forced March; i.e., two long marches in a row. We estimated III Corps attrition as 3856 for this period. After the battle Ney was accused of being slow to attack.

At that time my main difficulty was that I had not taken notes of how I had done my calculations. I worked backward to find how. I was then able to reproduce the same results. The Reconciliation ran into trouble; adjustments and corrections had to be done. Part of the ORBAT work was to find the regiments composing a Brigade. Here our sources disagreed often and we had to made decisions.

Figure 4 Game Components (right): A. Hobley



Figure 5 Examples of different ORBATs for French 9th I.D.

<u>9th Division:</u> Général de division Delmas	9e Division, GD DELMAS	4.869 h, 14 pièces
<u>Brigade:</u> Général de brigade Anthing	<u>Brigade GB Grillot</u>	2.344 h
2nd Provisional Légère Regiment	2e Léger provisoire	2 bataillons 460 h
3/2nd Légère Regiment	III/2e Léger et IV/3e Léger	
3/4th Légère Regiment	I/29e Léger	1 bataillon 619 h
1/29th Légère Regiment	I à IV/136e de Ligne	4 bataillons 1.265 h
1/,2/,3/,4/136th Line Regiment	<u>Brigade GB Anthing</u>	2.525 h
<u>Brigade:</u>	I à IV/138e de Ligne	4 bataillons 920 h
1/,2/,3/,4/138th Line Regiment	I à IV/145e de Ligne	4 bataillons 1.605 h
1/,2/,3/,4/145th Line Regiment	<u>Artillerie divisionnaire. CdB Charvet</u>	797 h
<u>Artillery:</u>	2° et 11° Cies du 9e d'ARP	14 pièces 254 h
1/9th Foot Artillery (6-6pdrs & 2-24pdr howitzers)	Dét 4° Cie/3e Bis, 4° Cie/6e Pal, 4° Cie/12e Pal du Train	
11/9th Foot Artillery (6-6pdrs & 2-24pdr howitzers)	2° Cie des Sapeurs espagnols, Ximenez	1 compagnie 85 h
4/3rd (bis) Train Battalion	2° Cie du 6e Bon du Train des Equipages	1 compagnie
4/6th Principal Train Battalion		
4/12th Principal Train Battalion		
<u>Engineers:</u>		
Spanish Sappers (1 coy)		

Some of our sources were in French and other in English. Russian names translated in French were quite often not the same as in English.

With the ORBAT done, we had the counter mix. Have you taken the time to see how much information can be found on every counter? I did count nine to eleven items. Open your rulebook on page 2. Check the combat unit counter. You should add to the list the background color, the initiative color for Bautzen only unit and the nationalities in the unit type symbol. And sometimes the flag on the back! Every counter sheet had to be checked for errors. With two sides per counter sheet (French front and back, Coalition front and back) we had four files to check. I discovered that I should use a hard copy of every file in lieu of computer or tablet screens.

While the result was sent to the printer, it was time for me to work on the Königswartha-Weissig scenario (scenario 30.0).

There were two forces moving under the overall command of Barclay. Barclay's own army with Tschaplitz's AG, Langeron's Corps, Sass' Reserve and attached Yorck's II Corps with a march order to Hermsdorf, supported by the Russian III Grenadier corps (Raevsky).

I reviewed the following sources to be able to follow Yorck's route to Hermsdorf. Here's what the sources said about Yorck's route taken. (N refers to Bau-N map. K refers to Kön map)

- Clément; Campagne de 1813: Gleina (N3708), Gottau/Gottamelda (N3503), Klix (N2604) and Hermsdorf (K0419).

- Lanrezac; La manoeuvre de Lutzen: Gleina (N3708), Gottau/Gottamelda (N3503), Liska/Liske (Off map), Hermsdorf (K0419).

- Leggiere; Napoleon and the struggle for Germany, volume 1: Gleina (N3708), Gottau/Gottamelda (N3503), Klix (N2604) and Hermsdorf (K0419).

- Nafziger; Lutzen and Bautzen 1813: Brosa, Gottau/Gottamelda (N3503), Lewischau, Liske/Liska (Off map), Hermsdorf (K0419).

- Langeron; Memoires de Langeron: Gottau/Gottamelda (N3503), Lehmisch, Liska/Liske (Off map) and Hermsdorf (K0419).

- Petre; Napoleon's Last Campaign: nothing about Yorck's whereabouts

As you can see there are three sources (Lanrezac, Nafziger and Langeron) showing Yorck's forces going through Liska/Lieske. That town is to the east of Hermsdorf and off the KÖN map.

Figure 6 Probable Prussian II Corps from Gutttau to Hermsdorf



We think that it did make sense to take that route since Barclay's forces moving to Wartha were using the road Klix, Milcket, Opitz, Johns Dorf and Königswartha to Wartha. The only way to move fast was to use another route to avoid traffic jams with Barclay. As you can see on the map it took almost four hours to trek that route as of today. 200 years ago, it did take longer, the path being more difficult. We concluded that K0117, somewhere between Lippitzsch and Hermsdorf, is a valid entry point to reach Hermsdorf without getting bogged down in a traffic jam with their Russian friends.

While the project was closing I playtested the Bautzen scenario to help find the right balance.

In conclusion, the most fascinating parts were the research, getting to know the units and

generals. Most of the facts we were looking for were out of the ordinary—roads taken, camps—that the officers at the time never failed to record, but these details are of less interest to the lay reader than the dramatic moments.

All the guys involved are so competent and knowledgeable that I felt like an impostor at times. They patiently coached me, specially Kevin, to find the skills needed to be part of the project. The skills of file discipline and clarity of expression, are just as important as the ability to research through old documents.

Finally, somehow, it all came together into the finished product now in print.

It was fun, fulfilling and a great education.

Integrating TNG Vedette House Rules into the Campaigns of Napoleon Exclusive Rules

(Paragraph reference numbers are for the Sun of Austerlitz Exclusive Rules)

by the THURSDAY NIGHT GAMERS

VEDETTES

[69.] no change

MOVEMENT OF VEDETTES

[70.] The Movement Allowance of all vedettes is 9 Movement Points. Vedettes pay cavalry MP costs. Vedettes move in every way like real Forces until their identity is revealed (except as outlined in 1 through 5, below). A vedette may only enter an enemy Zone of Control if it is scouting (73). A vedette, once revealed, remains revealed until the next time it moves (regardless of the phase or segment in which it next moves). Vedettes differ from real forces as follows: 1) Vedettes do not require an Initiative Roll to move - nor do they suffer attrition. To disguise them, a player ought to sometimes make Initiative and Attrition die rolls for them. 2) Vedettes cannot damage bridges, cannot capture pontoons or cut Lines of Communications or the like (72); 3) A Vedette cannot create its own Major General, and has no track on the Organization Display; 5) Vedettes do not count against stacking limits.

[71.] Up to 2 Vedettes may be moved from the vedette pool to the map each time a force enters the map as a reinforcement, receives a movement order, or successfully rolls its initiative during the Initiative Movement step. New Vedettes are stacked with the force that caused their entry and may immediately move (they may not remain stacked). Vedettes may be voluntarily returned to the vedette pool during the organization and consolidation phases and become available for placement with moving forces.



Vedettes and Lines of Communications

[72.] no change

Vedettes and Scouting

[73.] If a vedette ends its move in the zone of control of one or more hidden enemy forces, it must scout one of those forces. A vedette may never end its move in the zone of a revealed force or vedette. Vedettes cannot scout during the Forced March phase or when retreating. Vedettes are removed (78) after scouting. To scout, roll 1d6:

- 0-1 The scouted unit remains hidden
- 2-3 The scouted unit is revealed
- 4-5 The scouted unit also gives an estimate of its strength
- 6 The scouted unit also gives its exact strength and composition

Modifier: if the unit being scouted contains at least 1 SP of cavalry, subtract -1 from the roll.

[74.] When scouting reveals an enemy vedette, the enemy vedette is not removed. This represents the army's light cavalry screen preventing enemy scouts from reporting on forces beyond it.

VEDETTES IN COMBAT

[75.] Vedettes are not combat units. They do not participate in combat. Their 1/2 Strength Point rating is ignored.

Vedettes and Moving Enemy Forces

[76.] The moment an enemy force moves into the ZOC of a vedette (after the moving force declares repulses) the vedette is revealed if hidden, and retreats 1 hex. There's no movement cost to the moving force. If the vedette cannot retreat, it is removed. The moving force is not revealed. A vedette is removed, rather than forced to retreat, when a force composed entirely of cavalry SP's enters its ZOC.

Vedettes and Pursuit or Retreat

[77.] Vedettes cannot interfere with retreats or pursuits. If a pursuing or retreating force's movement would take it past or through a vedette, the owner must reveal and retreat it (75). Vedettes play no role in determining retreat priority (178).

Removal of Vedettes

[78.] Vedettes are never eliminated, but they may be removed. When a Vedettes is removed, it leaves play until the following turn (place removed vedettes on the turn track as a reminder). During the Weather Determination Step of each turn, returning vedettes are placed back into their owner's vedette pool, and become available for placement with moving forces (71).

[79.-82.] *Ignore the existing paragraphs and replace with the following rules for 2X Series Games (Habit of Victory, Napoleon at the Crossroads) only.* These rules sections are ignored in the 1X Series Games.

Inactive ZOC

[79.] Vedettes which end their move in an EZOC must scout, but vedettes may move through EZOC's without scouting. Vedettes only scout once they have completed their movement. Likewise vedete forces only trigger paragraph

Freikorps & Cossacks

(Napoleon at the Crossroads only)

[82.] With the following exceptions, Freikorps & Cossacks behave like vedettes:

Cossacks: These units are not removed when outside of dispatch distance. They may only be created by forces containing Russian units. Cossacks are only removed after scouting if the target force contains 1 or more SP's of cavalry. Otherwise, after scouting, they retreat one hex and end their move.

- *Freikorps:* These units are not removed when outside of dispatch distance. They may only be created by forces containing Prussian units. When interfering with a French LOC, a Freikorps behaves like a normal force. The owning player states that he is cutting the LOC at that point, and does not reveal the vedette. When a Freikorps is removed from play, it is placed 2 turns down the turn track instead of 1.

76 above if they end their move in a vedette's ZOC.

ZOC Bonds

[80.] Vedettes may neither enter a hex, nor cross a hexside which constitutes an enemy ZOC Bond (even if one or both units creating the bond is a vedette).

French Vedettes *(Crossroads only)*

[81.] French units only create 1 vedette each time a force receives a movement order or successfully rolls its initiative. French vedettes receive a -1 DRM, in addition to other modifiers, when scouting.

Vedettes out of Dispatch Distance

[83.] Vedettes that cannot trace a Dispatch Distance to a Center of Operations, Supply Source or active friendly Depot during the Administrative Segment of the Player-Turn, are immediately removed (78).

[134.] remove reference to Vedettes "flexible ZOC". Begin with "Enemy Forces may enter..."
138.] Remove reference to Vedettes.

CHATS BY THE CAMPFIRE

Marches and Maneuvers

Vince Hughes

An order is easily given, but consider the trouble it takes to carry it out!

—Napoleon to Eugène

Manoeuvring your army on those wonderful Charles Kibler maps, be sure to economise your MPs. Decide where you are going and go there by the shortest route. Use March Orders whenever possible—that's a free Movement Command. The workings of March Orders are mostly common-sense, but can at times perplex players entering the system for the first time. The different rules sections intertwine with each other intricately.

The Basics. The movement increments called Movement Points are shown by the numeric on the bottom right of each counter—infantry and foot artillery 4MP, light cavalry & vedettes 7MP, all other cavalry (plus some vedettes) and horse artillery 6MP. If the cards are being used, movement rates may be adjusted by cards played. Weather can also affect movement rates of some units, as can Night movement—2MP for infantry and 3MP for cavalry. Terrain also affects movement and the terrain charts should be studied as they do provide a number of easily missed changes and effects in both movement, combat & supply. Another important rule to remember is that the movement of one counter *or* stack must end before another is begun (7.1). This is particularly important when carrying out a 'Repulse' action (9.0).

ZOC's play a large part in Movement. As soon as a valid EZOC is entered (taking into account terrain that negates EZOC such as Major rivers), the unit must stop and its movement is ended for that player-turn (4.31). Even though EZOC's do not extend into Chateaux, a unit must still stop moving if it enters a chateau that an enemy unit is adjacent to (15.11). There are some card play antics that can override these rules, but here I am referring to general everyday play. (On EZOC



also remember where they *are* negated – a Chateaux adjacent to an enemy unit can prove a useful safe Retreat route!).

The Sequence of Play (2.0). The order of decisions you have to make during play makes planning ahead even more important. At 2.1C, the order of sequence for Movement is listed. Movement follows the Command segment (which was addressed in the last issue of WDM Vol. IV, Nr.1). The first thing to take especial note of is that only units and Officers that are In-Command, Reinforcements entering that turn and/or units under a March Order will be allowed to move initially (2.1C1). An Out-of-Command Officer will not move at all unless he passes the Initiative roll to put himself in Command during the Command Segment (6.2). That means that all of these units must have completed their movement before the player can turn to and enact any of the Initiative Movement section for those eligible Out-of-Command units referenced at 2.1C2. The very important factor here and not to be missed is that In-Command units are going

to be moved without any knowledge of whether the Out-of-Command units will be joining them in support. So trying to deploy the In-Command units without that knowledge can be something of a fudge or gamble dependent on where they are moved to. Obviously a look at the Initiative ratings of the Out-of-Command units that are planning to move will at least give the player a sense of their probability of doing so, but never with any assuredness.

Once all In-Command units (and leaders' In-Command) have completed their moves, the next part of the sequence is to now try and get eligible Out-of-Command units to move. Out-of-Command units that were not in a 3 hex range of their formation officer that tried to put himself In-Command and failed may actually move (see italics at the end of rule 2.1C2). There are two ways the Initiative die-roll can be made. Units can be rolled for individually, or, where there is a stack with divisional integrity (3.22 remember, division not formation), the player can opt to roll for all three units with just one die-roll using the unit's Initiative with the highest value. An important process rule within this section is that when carrying out these die-rolls, it is ONE die-roll and then MOVE the unit/div.stack (if successful) *immediately* after the roll. Once they have been moved, only then is the die rolled again for the next unit or divisional stack. The player cannot carry out all his die-rolls first and then move all the successful units afterwards in some quest for speeding up game-play. By design, this process again means there is some uncertainty for the player as to which Out-of-Command units will actually get to move, even after committing the first Out-of-Command unit(s). It follows therefore, that the order you choose to roll for the units should be chosen very carefully.

Consider carefully the order that units are moved. Before jumping in and moving the counters that come first to hand, take a good look instead at which ones would most usefully be moved first. It really does need looking at on the map and does make a difference. That's because of reconnaissance opportunities (8.3) but also that pesky +1 MP cost to stack (3.1). So it makes

sense on many occasions for the player to move his units that are furthest back *first!* This will then allow units that are closer to the destination hex to be able to stack with those that moved from further back. If it is carried out the other way around, the most distant units will be at least a point short of being able to stack with the advanced units. In a solo game, the player may decide that it is okay to allow them to stack as it was merely a process error and pretend he moved those more distant units first. But in a two-player engagement, the opponent would be quite within their rights to object at such a practice during the Initiative Movement segment. The moving player could claim process error during the Command Movement segment, but definitely not so in the Initiative Movement segment. This is because the moving player would not have been aware as to which units he could move before each die-roll was made for Initiative Movement. That choice can only be made with each individual roll and leaves the player to make some hard choices and gambles. So be sure to choose carefully in which order your units will move.

I covered March Orders (20.0) in the last issue of WDM in regards to Command & Leadership. March Orders are either scenario assigned at the start of play, or if not, each side gets one each. Reinforcements may enter under a March Order and a March Order can also be despatched during one of the Night turns (be sure to check the TRC for exactly when). As useful as March Orders can be, they don't come without a restriction or two. March Orders are a great way to get formations and forces moving across swathes of map without worrying about using Command points and/or worrying about the location of the commander counter in relation to the force using the March Order. Any force under a March Order moves at the rate of the slowest unit of that force. The slowest unit is the unit of a force that has the least MP's available that turn, or moves the fewest hexes after any weather penalties. See example of how the 'slowest unit' can change from one turn to the next in picture 1. The other thing to remember with troops under a March Order is their status when they have reached

their destination. They may first of all use up any MP's they might have remaining to move freely in any direction (20.22). Also, for the **player-turn** that they come out of March Order, they will be marked with a 'Demoralised' counter (20.23). So if planning any attack with them during the Combat segment, these troops will not be able to advance after combat to capture ground and will suffer a -1 Initiative modifier on any Shock Combat (21.2).

The picture shows a French formation in March Order. It consists of 2 x infantry brigades with 4MP's and a Horse Artillery unit with 6MP's. In clear weather, the infantry will move the slowest along the road and so the horse artillery unit will have to move at their speed. In mud weather conditions, the horse artillery unit, because of a x2 cost for terrain to artillery would become the slowest unit meaning the infantry will have to slow down to the artillery unit's pace.



Repulse (9.0) is a function of the Movement segment and not Combat segment. Units that decide to Repulse need a 5:1 advantage to successfully enact the Repulse AND must pay the MP's of the enemy occupied hex ahead of the Repulse attempt. The value of a Repulse in many circumstances is to 'road-bump' enemy units out of the way of your advancing troops that you otherwise might end up in combat with. Its other value is to allow your own troops freedom of movement where a stronger enemy would have prevented. When should it be 'risked'? Well, there is no 'risk'

for the player that already knows what the enemy force consists of ahead of the LOS. They may already be known due to being in a revealed state, having been revealed before and remembered. They can also be revealed during the Movement segment by light cavalry or Vedette units carrying out Recon (8.3) before other units even try a Repulse. Obviously, once the SP total of the enemy unit is known, Repulse becomes a simple and guaranteed mathematical procedure. If the situation arises where a Repulse is still attempted against an unknown enemy, then the player should be aware of the consequences of failure. A failed Repulse will result in the Repulsing unit having to carry out a mandatory attack in the Combat segment on the units it failed to Repulse with a -2 column modifier attached to the attack.

Some downsides to remember during Repulse.

- The unit wishing to Repulse MUST have enough MP's to pay for the entry cost of the enemy hex. If it does not have enough, it cannot Repulse at all.
- Units in Road March that crash into an enemy force MUST attempt Repulse. Remembering rule 7.1 that all units must finish their movement before another unit moves. The Road March unit will attempt the Repulse on its own! You cannot move it adjacent, wait for others and then try a combined Repulse.
- Road March units cannot even Road March up to a friendly unit that is not in Road March but adjacent to an enemy and combine with them for Repulse. That is because Road March units cannot stack (3.3 & 7.53). Also, if in Road March, due to the compulsory nature of the Repulse requirement, the unit Road Marching cannot enter the hex adjacent to the enemy if it then does not have enough MP's to also pay for the potential entry into the enemy force's hex. It would therefore have to remain two hexes away.

Remember the power of light cavalry and to a lesser extent, vedettes. These troops are able to massively assist your decision making in the choice of battle deployment and whom to attack, by whom and from where. So executing their


movement early in the segment can prove to be the key in achieving your own successful assaults. When light cavalry or vedettes move adjacent to any Hidden enemy unit (8.2) they instantly carry out a Reconnaissance check on the adjacent hidden units (8.3). If the recon unit be light cavalry they will reveal any enemies *unless* the enemy can show a light cavalry unit of his own from the recon'd stack. By completing as many useful Recons as he can, the moving player will already know what he is up against before the Combat segment LOS step. That will allow the phasing player to set up his attacks along with the required number of attacking units either exactly how he wants to or, the best he is able to muster. It is one of the features of the game where light cavalry have an opportunity to perform one of the historical roles for which they were used.

It is the French player's movement segment and he is faced with three hidden allied units ahead.



The French player sends his light cavalry unit forward to recon the centre and left allied unit. It reveals a 1-4 infantry unit on the left and a 3-4 infantry unit in the centre.

(Photo at right) By using the Recon followed by a successful Repulse, the French have been able to set up a promising attack whereby if they force the allied unit on the right to just DR, they will be in a position to remove the allied centre unit with any form of the likely successful attack die-roll during the imminent Combat segment.



The French units now advance with their 5-4 strength unit aiming straight at the Russian 1-4 in order to Repulse it and gain a better attack position. The 5-4 French unit will pay 3MP's to reach the adjacent hex and then another 1MP to pay for the Repulse in a clear hex.



DESIGNER'S NOTES

Column Halt! Step back over the hexside!

How training and experience affected units abilities to drill and maneuver.

David Demko and Kevin Zucker

It helps me to design a set-up if I remember that there aren't any actual hexagons on the battlefield. In the real event I am trying to portray there is no such thing as two units "stacking," and a unit can morph into an untold number of shapes that flow over the hexside. The locating of a given unit "in" a given hex is merely a convention to make the game playable. The challenge is to look at a map printed with hexagons and yet see the reality behind the grid. —WDM Summer 2013

Players might wish to know, "Why the peculiar stacking limits in TLNB?" Why this seemingly arbitrary number of five units with a leader? Why does an extra brigade fit in a stack when all three are from the same division? This reflects being under of the same general, but specifically, "Why 3 units in this case and not 4 or 5"?

The stacking rules, after all, are very different in this game than the predecessors, where the rule was "flatten everything out and take the average."


Being able to make a stack of five units is very helpful to the player who wishes to make a hole in the enemy line, so why is it like this?

You could theoretically fit up to 43 battalions, or almost six brigades of infantry, in a clear hex, in parade ground formation. A crowd of 43 battalions is, however, just not manageable. They would be unable to fight in that kind of dense mob, but it gives A starting place if we begin by thinking in terms of fitting a number of units in a given space. Our game only allows five units in a stack, and only two or three of them can be infantry.

Morand's division at Auerstadt furnishes a good example of a division of three brigades (8

battalions) deployed with plenty of space between columns, and taking up a whole hex.

A hexagon is just a convenient shape for tiling the plane after all. The hexagonal shape doesn't fit well with the tactical formations of the time, which were rectilinear; a checkerboard formation. The units actually fit themselves into squares and rectangles, and they positioned themselves with large alleys in between, large enough for a unit to pass through.



Morand's Division at Auerstadt (about one hex in size). The 1/13 is not visible, deployed in line at the top, and the 1/61 is to the right of the four 8 pounders. Credit: Napoleon's Finest, Journal of Davout's III Corps, from Military History Press

A stack is stronger with plenty of maneuver space between units. If units are good at maneuvering, they can redeploy more quickly through those aisles to meet a threat to the flanks, than a single continuous body of troops.

If the available space, then, is not the limiting factor in a stack, what is? It's the corps officer. At three-hex range on flat terrain, everyone can see him, haranguing the troops from his horse, encouraging, guiding, and directing their coordination. Brigade level maneuvers weren't possible for the average French troops in 1813, but were still performed in some excellent units. The added complexity and mass of troops under foot makes it necessary for an officer to appear at certain choke points or defiles, simply to direct traffic. When you have that many troops in one place, a traffic jam can easily ensue, causing the units to break formation, which then takes time and many officers to reform.

In reality they are all in visual contact with the officer in the stack and, for trained troops, well-rehearsed on what to do—maintaining those aisles and moving through them, maneuvering when more than one brigade is in motion at once. What pulls everyone together as a functioning military formation are the regimental and brigade level officers are somewhere “inside” the hex, using their swords and pikes like a drum-major's baton to dress the lines, indicate direction, and give stop/go signals. Troop handling at that level is an echelon below the player's control. If the drum-major's actions are included in the game at all, they appear in the units' initiative ratings. As input to the Shock table, these values show how good the units are at the shot & bayonet level, and how well a unit can redeploy through those aisles to meet a threat, or counter one.

Another micro-effect of what's going on inside the hex is in the movement point cost for entering and staying stacked in a friendly-occupied hex (rule 3.1). The difference between passing through another unit and forming a stack is the difference between routine drill and deliberate coordination. Pass-through is a matter of using those “large alleys” or of not encroaching on the other unit's plot of ground. The additional movement point for forming a stack reflects the time it takes for the brigadiers to agree on how to deploy collaboratively. This might be as simple as “you form up on my right,” but it still requires attention. The player enjoys this level of coordination “for free” whenever two units stack.

Rule 3.22 shows how the division CO, with the help of his traffic cops—tough MPs backed up by a few colonels—has authority in a patch of

ground. This divisional commander is usually invisible in TLNB. At a three-hex range, influence belongs to the corps officer. His units can be ordered and directed more efficiently than units from different formations. The division general tells his brigadiers how to share the space. Players use their divisional commanders by taking advantage of the divisional integrity rule, 3.22. Similarly, rule 3.23 gives the same effect from higher up the chain of command, with the corps commander or his staff guiding the “in-hex” arrangement of units in his command. Players position officer counters to keep their formations in command and to exploit the option to stack five units together. It's a definite “Design Note” and something to keep in mind when designing a set-up. Should three units stack together or spread out?

The stacking rules, show how higher echelons of command enable greater numbers of troops and formations not only to occupy a given piece of ground but to accomplish something tactically useful.

Rule 3.23 also reflects a quicker cycle rate for implementing the corps leader's orders. Within the hex he can consult directly with his subordinates, share a map, and observe the same ground and troops. At greater distances he would have to send orders by an aide de camp trotting off, with a longer C³ delay and greater risk of misunderstanding. Having the right leadership in a hex yields better inter-unit coordination, which in turn allows for denser stacking. It's not a question of how many soldiers you can fit on a patch of ground, but how many different formations are capable of maneuvering through the space.



In the diagram above each block represents one of Morand's battalions. Let's make a guess as to how many French troops could perform this pass-through maneuver in 1813... 100? 70%?

(Cont'd on p. 00)


(Cont'd from p. 00)

Many recruits received only minimal training on the march to Germany. Nonetheless, an educated guess is that 100% of French and Allied troops could perform this kind of simple maneuver, if only one brigade is moving and the other is standing still.

Except for the regiments of the Old and Middle Guard, as well as the 1st Regiments of the Young Guard Tirailleurs and Voltigeurs which were reconstituted with the instructional battalions of Fontainebleau, and veteran 3rd Regiments of the Young Guard Tirailleurs and Voltigeurs, the entire army went to war in late April, 1813, with its infantry only being able to maneuver by battalion. — Scott Bowden

Now let's imagine them forming a square, starting again from the formation on the left. Everybody in the corners just moves left or right. The middle ranks are required to march on the diagonal to fill-out the line. The following diagram shows a very simple deployment from column to line.

Figure 16. Forming line from a *colonne par pelotons* — Régiment de 1791; *Ecole de Bataillon*, Part IV, Article II, 3-39-52 & Plate XVII, Figure 2.



That is clear; each peloton swings to the correct 45° facing, then marches and returns face. But what about two or even three brigades moving at the same time? Some really good regiments, such as belonged to Davout's Corps in 1806, could perform wonderful feats of precision marching.

These evolutions are as well-coordinated as a ballet, the band keeping everyone in step. Upon contact with the enemy, while the lead brigade with light infantry deploys and creates a smoke-screen with their fire, the remaining two brigades arrive and fan-out in a rehearsed chorus line.

Napoleon's Resurgence

Bautzen Mini-Campaign

LAST MINUTE UPDATES

28.65 Hexes that do NOT count: On May 19th, all VP hexes EXCEPT locations on the Königsvartha map. After May 19th, VP locations on the KÖN map are not counted—even if using the Spoiling Attack (28.68).

28.67 Undeclared Truce Day. On May 19th and the AM turns of May 20th (only), no forces which start on the BAU-N or -S maps may cross the River Spree. EXCEPTION: Any unit which finds itself within 5 hexes of an enemy unit may move, attack and defend normally thereafter. Forces which begin on the KÖN map or which enter as reinforcements on May 19th may move, attack and defend normally.

HOUSE RULE:

28.17 Improved Positions at Start: Use only the six I.P.s with assigned hexes for the Coalition—N3027, etc. In addition, allow the Coalition player to set up 14 Roadblocks, borrowing the markers and the rule from Napoleon's Quagmire (see below).

25.72 Roadblocks (Optional Rule)

A roadblock represents a physical obstruction plus some hundreds of men. A roadblock blocks all movement—friendly and enemy—along a road or trail (including retreats). Does not affect Command Radius. A unit may enter the hex but may not proceed along any road or trail in that hex until the roadblock is cleared (25.74). EXCEPTION: The unit may depart by the same hexside as it entered the hex.

25.73 Roadblock Construction: Roadblocks may only be placed in a road or trail hex at either end of a bridge, in a town hex, slope hex, or woods hex. Each army can construct up to 2 Roadblocks at start and 2 each Night PM turn, not in EZOCs, within 2 hexes of a friendly infantry unit. Roadblocks are deployed like hidden units. Construction is automatic—simply place the Roadblock Marker on a road or trail hex. Guerrillas may be used to build additional roadblocks (25.86).

25.74 Clearing roadblocks: A roadblock may be revealed by recon (8.3). To clear a roadblock an infantry unit must enter the roadblock hex or attack a unit stacked with it (25.75). It costs an infantry unit +1 MP to clear a roadblock that it is stacked with.

25.75 Defending a Roadblock: Infantry units stacked with a roadblock are doubled in strength. The roadblock is automatically cleared when the unit(s) defending the hex are removed by combat.

Commanding the Allied Rearguard at Lützen

At the Battle of Lützen, the cavalry commander Winzingerode was harshly criticized for doing nothing. So, the fact that he cannot command his disparate force is historically accurate!

TIM CARNE

Commanding the allied rearguard is a bit of a problem. If we only have Winzingerode he can only put a single unit in command unless the corps commander, Eugen, is present to extend the command. Eugen was considered the Infantry commander of Winzingerode's Corps. Also does anyone have any information about Wittgenstein's locations on the 1st Ma. Diebitsch is identified as writing the orders for the army from Zwenkau so I am minded to put Wittgenstein here for the day.

Vince Hughes

After reading some of the discussion on this, I raised the matter of Winzingerode's vacillation throughout Lützen combined with the composition of his cavalry force on the Allied left. I pointed out that this cavalry force is composed of brigades drawn from a number of formations (at least 3). So you are right in saying that without Eugen being present, Winzingerode will only be able to place one of these disparate units In-Command. But I mentioned that given his vacillatory behaviour at Lützen and in game terms not putting any brigade under command for positive action, his '1' rating seems quite right for the situation. It is also possible in game terms that he could still combine all the brigades to attack. That would mean putting one In-Command and others having to pass their Initiative Movement die roll. Those succeeding could join his In-Command unit and fight, but only the In-Command unit would be allowed to Advance After Combat. My view is that given his historical performance at Lützen, these OSG system rule induced curbing of his ability seem to fit the picture for the 2nd May?

On the matter of Wittgenstein's location, I have tried to find something, anything! But without luck. Wittgenstein managed to put out some very detailed orders on 1st May for what

each formation leader should do in the coming battle. This led to some complaints & grumblings of orchestration and neutering from leaders stating it threatened to stop them using their own initiative. If Wittgenstein was able to disseminate these directions pre-battle, I wonder whether he was at Zwenkau with Diebitsch or whether he was 11 miles away with the Kaiser & Czar at Borna? I could quite believe the CinC of the impending battle dining with the kings on the eve of battle. It just seems to me that with the detail he put out and then received by Blücher et al, he must have been somewhere near Diebitsch to input that amount of minutiae and topographical detail (albeit based on erroneous maps!).

Regarding Wittgenstein's whereabouts, I think we can conclude that he was not with the Royals, certainly not through night of the 29th, based on Nafziger's page 140, "Allied Fumbling Continues."

"During the day of 29 April Wittgenstein studied the effects of his orders of 27 April. He also learned that day that his plans had been overturned by a communication from the Czar, who had by now adopted Toll's plans. ...

"Toll... was surprised to read Wittgenstein's instructions of the 27th. No one in the general headquarters understood why Wittgenstein had modified the dispositions previously ordered by the Czar...

"When the Czar learned of Wittgenstein's orders of the 27th, he persisted in advocating Toll's plans. During the evening of the 29th this was communicated to Wittgenstein Winzingerode is said to have fallen back from Meyhen, close to Lützen.

(page 145).

"Winzingerode's movement backwards was a great surprise for Wittgenstein. He had counted on the advanced guard maintaining itself in Meyhen and holding the line of the Flössgraben. This would have permitted Yorck and Berg to safely cross the Elster at Zwenkau. Now the plans were totally disrupted."

For the first of May, there seems plenty about the very detailed orders Wittgenstein put out (and then Diebitsch penning them) but little to none that I could find on his actual location on that one day.

Nafziger says (page 151). "The Czar and King of Prussia left their headquarters in Borna at 2 AM and rode from Lobstädt to Pegau, where they arrived at 5 AM. From there they watched Blücher's corps pass through the village."

No mention of Wittgenstein until page 156: "The Opening Shot: Wittgenstein saw before him only weak elements of a French advance guard and ordered his forces to take the villages of Klein and Gross-Görschen, Rahna, and Kaja." Can we guess from this that Wittgenstein was now on the Monarchenhügel?

Nafziger also mentions on page 156 that the 39th Division (Marchand) was moving on Leipzig, but had been stopped where the road from Dürrenberg joined the main road (either 3219 or 3222 is my guess). Bad Dürrenberg is north of Ellerbach, on the Saale.

TIM CARNE

My interest in locating Wittgenstein is the he is a [1] commander so he can ensure that Berg or Tormassov can move (whilst Yorck has a high chance for initiative). The only other allied commander is Blucher and he has enough to do with his own corps. (assuming Winzingerode is busy with the cavalry screen).

Kevin Zucker

In the past I have always placed the commander where he is most needed, regardless of his actual location. My reasoning for this is that the game limits the command radius to 4 hexes, but that might not be true always.

Put Wittgenstein where he will do the most good! Petre has the info... (page 70). "It was not till 11 AM that Wittgenstein arrived at the Monarchen Hügel." 2 May

<https://archive.org/stream/napoleonslastcam00petr#page/n7/mode/2up>

Napoleon's Last Campaign in Germany.

TIM CARNE

I am thinking of making him a reinforcement in the AtB coming in on the Rotha road late in the evening so that he can set Berg and Yorck off on MO for the night move to Pegau. The player may of course tried to move these two by initiative in the meantime, perhaps they deserve a late start (or early finish on the 1st).

Kevin Zucker

You can do that or you can add a Special Rule for the battle - a pre-programmed March Orders for those two, to cross at Pegau and Carsdorf.

PRE-PROGRAMMED MARCH ORDER

The Coalition Player has a pre-programmed March Order for Berg and Yorck and their formations to march to hex 1532.

TIM CARNE

That would be done most easily by crossing the bridge at Dohlen avoiding the logjam with Blucher. I would prefer destination Pegau (0733) via Audigast.

Kevin Zucker

You don't want to legislate something that will prevent the historical situation! You wouldn't want to render a historical battle impossible, or less likely. As a "what if", you could specify another destination, but not for the historical battle.

TIM

I am trying to reflect the historical story first before any what-if. I will work through the historical bottleneck hour by hour and line up the narrative from the research sources. As I understand the allies kept Winzingerode's forces around Werben to act as a flank guard to the forces crossing at Pegau. Any forces using the Dohlen crossing would be too much at risk if attacked.

Crossing the Elster

Tim Carne

During the 1st of May, 1813, the allies concentrated their forces to the south of Leipzig with Yorck joining up with Berg's corps around Zwenkau. Blücher was approaching from the East concentrating his corps at Rotha on the Pleisse river, in the late evening. Tormassov moved up from the South arriving around Groitsch in the early hours.

These columns marched overnight, crossing each other, resulting in delay and fatigue. The sources describing the night march and crossing of the Elster on the night of 1st May 1813 and early morning of 2nd May are not as clear as they could be. This is important as it makes it difficult to work out the gameplay representing the historical events and to ensure that the Allied forces arrive in their placements for the battle of the 2nd on time.

The terrain.

The Weiße Elster flows in the plain southwards from Leipzig. The area to the west of the river is typically marshland and features other water-courses that run parallel to the Elster. To the east of the river rise low hills with villages perched on the crest.

The river is crossed in two places nearby. The northern crossing is at the village of Dolhen to the west of Zwenkau. The road passes through Wiederau, then across the Muhlgraben to Gross Storkwitz before turning South crossing the Flossgraben at Carsdorf and then in to Pegau. From Gr Storkwitz there is a road to the West to Werben and then after a bridge crossing a different leg of the Flossgraben and on towards the deployment area between the Sternhugel and Monarchen Hugel. Any troops taking this route would be vulnerable to an attack from the north through Zitzchen where the crossing of the Elster could be prevented if Wiederau was taken. Any troops across the river would be forced to cross at Carsdorf and on to Pegau perhaps leaving considerable numbers of prisoners forced back against the Elster.

The southern crossing is approached on the highway from Zwenkau to Pegau. From Audigast the road traverses the Rathsholz wood before crossing a short plain to arrive at the bridge over the Elster at Pegau. From Pegau the troops would move westwards crossing branches of the Flossgraben to arrive behind the Sternhugel or to the Monarchen Hugel.



Whilst the Flossgraben is crossable without a bridge it can be expected that the bridges will form defiles for large body of troops as will the route through the Rathsholz.

There is also a bridge connecting Zwenkau and Oesdorf.

Narrative according to the sources.

Lanrezac – Quotes the orders issued at 23:30

Le corps de Winzingerode, moins un détachement de 1500 hommes environ affecté à la garde du pont de Zwenkau, prendra position à Werben pour couvrir le débouché du gros de l'armée au delà de l'Elster et du Flossgraben; Le corps de Blücher marchera en deux colonnes, qui franchiront l'Elster, celle de droite à Storkwitz, et celle de gauche à Pegau; Le corps d'York passera l'Elster à Pegau derrière la colonne de gauche de Blücher ; le corps de Berg à Storkwitz, derrière la colonne de droite; La garde suivra les corps d'York et de Berg. L'armée se formera au delà du Flossgraben, la droite appuyée à ce canal près de Werben, et la gauche au Grünabach près de Sôhesten. Le corps de Blücher devra commencer à passer l'Elster à 5 heures du matin, de façon que le mouvement de l'armée soit terminé vers 7 heures.

Winzingerode's corps less a detachment of 1500 men guarding the Zwenkau bridge will take up a position at Werben to cover the movement of the bulk of the army across the Elster and Flossgraben.

Blücher's corps will march in two columns, the right one to Storkwitz and the left to Pegau. York's corps will cross at Pegau behind the left column of Blücher, Berg's corps to follow Blücher's right column.

The Guard will follow the corps of Yorck and Berg. The army will form itself across the Flossgraben the right resting on the canal near Werben, the left on the Grunabach near Sohesten

With no orders for the approach march to the river there was confusion when the columns of Yorck and Blücher ran into each other resulting in the loss of two hours. This resulted in Blücher's troops only beginning to cross the Elster at 07:00. It was only by 11:00 that the army had completed crossing the Elster.

At the end of the battle the allies retreated by the bridge at Pegau and also by the fords at Ostrau and Predel.

In his analysis Lanrezac observes that the collision of the columns essentially delayed the Allies by 4 hours in completion of their deployment.

He also suggest that the Allies could have opened the battle while the guards were coming into line "as soon as the heads of the columns of Russian Guards had reached Stontzch and Werben.

Notes

1 These orders refer to two crossings, the one at Pegau which is well understood but what is meant by the order for the column to march to Storkwitz. Is this supposed to mean the bridge at Dohlen?

2 Winzingerode is to guard the Zwenkau bridge, is this the one at Dohlen or does this mean one lower down the river towards Oesdorf?

3 Clement is broadly similar and does not get into much detail.

Petre

Petre uses Lanrezac as one of his sources but Petre's work is certainly more than mere translation. Petre gives the following timings.

Yorck commences crossing the Elster at 09:00, crossing Roder's (part of Blücher's corps) column who was delayed until 10:30. It was only after that when the Russian Guard that had been waiting at Groitzch since 07:00 could begin to move, clearing Pegau by 14:00 or 14:30.

Leggiere.

Orders drafted by Diebitsch between 22:30 and 23:30 at Zwenknau. Some errors in geography due to the map sources used but none relevant to this analysis.

Leggiere claims that the orders required Blücher's left column to cross the Elster at Carsdorf rather than Pegau. This is clearly incorrect as the 1808 map shows no sign of any other bridge across the Elster

The head of Blücher's column reached Audigast by 05:00 on the 2nd May. Blücher sent his lead brigades Ziethen 2nd and Klux 1st to Storkwitz as the right wing. These collided with the lead units of Yorck at Audigast.

Yorck cleared his troops from the road and allowed Blücher troops to pass. Once Dolffs reserve cavalry struck the road to Pegau then Yorck followed. (note to Pegau no mention of Carsdorf).

Roder forming part of the left wing column coming up last in Blücher's corps was far behind needed to wait for Yorck and Berg to pass.

Leggiere then analyses the movement suggesting that Yorck and Berg should have advanced due west from Zwenkenau towards Hohenlohe (Note there is no bridge for this!! Unless Leggiere means the one by Oesdorf) with Blücher passing by Storkwitz and Tormassov via Pegau. The "other" Zwenkau crossing was supposedly left for Winzingerode to retreat by, his forces being concentrated near the Schkorlop villages overnight. These troops moved to Werben arriving by 06:00.

FW and Alexander left Borna at 02:00 arriving at a point between Groitsch and Pegau at 04:30.(hex 0634) where they could review the troops as they marched on Pegau. Wittgenstein rode from Zwenkau on Pegau, joining the monarchs then moving on to Pegau "to observe the passage of the Prussians".

Notes

1 It would be interesting to see Leggiere's source map for the bridges across the Elster. There seems to be some confusion about the phantom bridge over the Elster at Carsdorf

2 It suggest Blücher's corps went first to Audigast before the right column split off for Dohlen and the bridge. The direct march from Peres to Dohlen makes more sense but it is possible Blücher received orders at Audigast (as apparently Yorck did when he arrived at Pegau)

Nafziger

05:00 Yorck and Berg commence marching from Zwenkau via Audigast on Pegau. Berg followed Yorck, turning off (at Lobschutz presumably) on Storkwitz.

"Blücher's corps moved to the right as did the left wing of the second line through Storkwitz, through Pegau, crossed the Elster then crossed

the Flossgraben by Carsdorf to Dolben". This is very garbled and non-sensical. Perhaps there is a proofing error on the page.

"Blücher moved from Rotha to Storkwitz below Pegau in order to cross the Elster." Blücher's first column on the right flank was Klux, the second column Ziethen, the Brandenburg brigade of Roder and the cavalry reserve Dolffs.

The reserve cavalry was ordered to move to the left to control the road from Weissenfels.

When the two columns (of Blücher?) arrived in Audigast the order of march was changed . only Zeithen and Berg passed Storkwitz, the rest of the army remained on the road to Pegau – passed in review before the monarchs.

Tomarassov (guard) corps moved from Lobstaedt to Groitsch in one large column.

Then it broke into 3. Konovnitzin with the Grenadier corps, Russian Guard Infantry and Yermalov's artillery moved through Pegau and crossed the Flossgraben at Stonzsch. Second column led by Gallizen V of the two cuirassier divs plus the guard light cavalry crossed the Elster by Pegau (and then where?)

Third column under Gortschakov II comprising the 8th Infantry Corps crossed at the bridges by Werben, Storkwitz, Pegau, Stonzsch and Carsdorf (this seems a strange route, makes no sense unless they were detailed off as "garrisons").

07:00 the reserve (artillery?) arrived in Groitsch and waited until other troops in the area had cleared Pegau.

Conclusions

Part of Blücher plus Berg crossed the Elster at Dohlen and on to Werben, crossing the Flossgraben and deploying as the right wing of the army, Blücher in front.

The rest of Blücher plus Yorck crossed the Elster at Pegau then on to Stonzsch crossing the Flossgraben and deploying as the left of the army, Blücher in first line. The guard followed last taking the route through Pegau, some supporting the left by moving via Stonzsch, the remainder supporting the right through Werben.

DESIGN FILES:

Get Out of ZOC Free...

Kevin Zucker, Christopher Moeller,
Aaron Tobul

We know that every wargame is really designed for two players who are both attacking. Attacking is the buzz for most gamers. However, with TLNB we are opening up the game system to battles of every kind, not just deliberate frontal attacks such as Austerlitz and Borodino.

It is difficult to show a delaying action where one side has only a few pieces and isn't attacking. His units tend to get swarmed and easily surrounded. That is exactly the situation we have to show in the Lützen Approach to Battle.

One thing that helps the delayer is hidden movement and vedettes. Cavalry retreat before combat is another. Long retreats like Dr3, Dr4 are another. However, there needs to be something to help players disengage, so that a unit may back out of combat before it gets locked "into ZOC."

It takes a greatly skilled tactician and a force of all arms to do this. Perhaps this would be a card. Right now there is card No. 19, "Mobile Defense." However, that card only works after you are already in an EZOC and locked in. Another card that might help is No. 22, "From the Jaws of Death."

The best examples of rearguard actions are the Russians in 1807. They retreated from Jonkovo to Eylau with the French following relentlessly. They had three or four rearguard units with the best troops under excellent tacticians—Barclay, Bagration, Baggovut and Markov. (See Special Study Nr. 3 on pages 55-57.) The rearguards were powerful—Bagration's had five regiments of infantry, plus artillery and cavalry. The 8th Division was posted down the road, with Barclay and Markov in support. They used defense in depth—represented by having a large stack—understood as deployed within the hex and surrounding hexes but "inside the closed watchcase" where you don't see it. They arranged regiments in checkerboard formation—"inside the watchcase"—and withdrew the first line through the second line, and then redeployed the first line behind the 2nd, repeating ad infinitum.



Bagration at the fleches

Such a stack should be capable of "retreat before combat." But it should also be allowed to "rebound" so that its ZOC becomes impenetrable. Just thinking out loud here—if you have a stack with all three arms, and a leader, then you can opt to give up ground instead of allowing the enemy to "engage" you. That means, when the enemy enters your ZOC, you immediately bound backward, up to your Movement Allowance. The net effect is that the enemy are delayed without any combat taking place. But how to design that?

Aaron Tobul

The idea of an all-arms stack being able to retreat before combat or "bound" back somehow is very exciting. I love these sort of actions but as you note, they are difficult to model. Perhaps allow such a stack to always opt to take a DR3 result, even if the attacker loses the combat? I have had rearguards gobbled up more than once when they fought too well! One other thing to consider is that all-arms stacks usually have a leader, so maybe these voluntary retreats should be exempt from leader casualty check unless the die roll indicated a Dr, exchange, or de. Maybe this concept could also apply to non-heavy cavalry unless engaged by other cavalry.

Kevin

For every advantage you give the player, you also need to include a potential hazard, something to keep him from running out of control. What would be the actual downside to using a rearguard like Bagration's?



Mortally wounded Bagration continues to give orders.

It has to be kept constantly moving. That officer is issuing a constant stream of orders. He cannot allow the enemy to swarm his flanks. He stays always just out of reach.

In fact, the rearguard is quite vulnerable to having its flanks encased. But the difference is, it has a long tail, up the road, that keeps the LOC open, so this is like the card called "Jaws."

Imagine a road lined with units. Except that, because of their leapfrogging abilities, they are actually able to retreat through a friendly unit regardless of enemy ZOCs.

A "Forced March" inside the enemy turn might be another solution. There is a card for this already too... No. 28 Forced March.

However, with 3 Forced March cards in the deck, 2 Mobile Defense, 2 Jaws of Death, that isn't sufficient to save Eugen. There is a 1/6 chance of getting one of these cards on any turn.

Even including the General Retreat card, your chance is 1/5.

I think we need to designate certain officers, especially Russians, like Eugen, Winzingerode and Miloradovich, as having a "get out of ZOC free" card at all times. They can always Force march (see Card No. 28) and Jaws (No. 22). No card needs to be played.

Another possibility: change 12.3 Retreats to "Friendly units DO negate EZOCs for purposes of a retreat.

Chris

That certainly seems reasonable. I would hesitate to rely on get-out-of-jail cards for this... spending several turns setting up a decisive attack, risking cavalry in a charge, etc... only to have it thwarted by a card is frustrating. And if the opponent doesn't have the card, it's also kind of anti-climactic. I like the escape tactical cards in general, but

they need to come out rarely or they become unsatisfying.

Kevin

I cannot remember why we originally made 12.3 NON-negating. However, if we made this change universal at 12.3 it would apply to all units, regardless of leader or combination of all arms. This would be a huge change, and would make a ZOC surround kill much more difficult to set up. MAYBE that is too huge a change at this point in the series... :)

However, we could say that any stack of all arms gets to ignore Enemy ZOCs while retreating, IF it retreats through a friendly unit. This would be the defensive counterpart to the attack advantage of all-arms stacks.

You might even require a minimum strength requirement to obtain the GOOZF*. Like, 2/3ds or more of the attacking SPs. You could require a leader, or even a CERTAIN leader, be present in the stack. What do you think?

Chris

Make it contingent upon an officer's initiative check.

25.72 Rearguard: *The most effective tacticians arranged regiments in checkerboard formation and withdrew the first line through the second line, redeploying the first line behind the 2nd, repeating as necessary.*

A Rearguard is a stack with *at least* one infantry, one artillery, *two* cavalry units, and a leader.

25.73 Retreat Through EZOCs: A Rearguard may retreat into or through **friendly-occupied** EZOCs.

Friendly units negate EZOC's for a Rearguard. A Rearguard also negates EZOC's for any friendly unit(s) retreating into the Rearguard hex. (This is an exception to 12.31.) The retreating units may move directly from EZOC to EZOC, *if* friendly-occupied. They *may* end their retreat "in contact" with the enemy (not eliminated).

25.74 Displacement: A Rearguard may pass *through* a friendly-occupied hex without displacing the friendly units. However, if the Rearguard ends its retreat in an overstacked hex, the excess units must be displaced (12.36).

25.75 Retreat Before Combat: Rearguard units (infantry, cavalry, and artillery) may make a Retreat Before Combat (10.2). Defending and then Attacking Rearguards may elect to retreat one or two hexes out of an EZOC prior to combat. The Rearguard may RBC through friendly occupied EZOCs (25.73).

Setting Limits in Wargame Design

Kevin Zucker

Someone asked why, in TLNB, there is no fixed limit on the number of SPs that can cross a bridge in one turn. After all, we know for a narrow bridge that should be around 8,400 men moving in parade ground formation in one hour.

Just because no limit is stated in the rules, doesn't mean there is no limit.

Of course, setting limits on activity is what we designers do: every factor on every counter is a limit. Further limits grow out of the terrain; sometimes the limits are of man's action. How far can you walk in one hour with a 50 lb. pack? How fast can a horse travel in an hour? Artillery in the mud? How many men can cross a bridge in one turn?

Good game design means keeping the number of artificial limits (needing to be memorized) to a minimum. After all, the nature of the hex grid together with the movement and stacking rules pretty well insure that 3 stacks will be the most that can cross a bridge in one turn—possibly way more than 16 SPs.

The question is, is this important enough for a rule? At times yes, this limit can be important. A player may be crossing in the proximity of large enemy forces. That is why we do set limits for units *retreating* across a bridge, under pressure from the enemy.

But we, as designers, have to guard against a tendency to load the design down and load the player down. Make his burden too accurate, and it won't be fun anymore. Real warfare is not fun. Wargames are not real warfare. A player will be more profligate with his Army's manpower (I assume) than he would, were those lives real.

A wargame can straddle that divide, but it isn't a comfortable place to sit. A game *must* be fun, or people won't play it. *Habit of Victory* is one very accurate game, but never received much play.

Proximity to the Enemy in Reorganization

Reorganization refers to the return of Combat Units (at reduced strength) to the map. In previous games that have Reorganization, there is a specific minimum distance allowed between reorganizing officers and the enemy (or just to enemy cavalry). After wrestling with this issue for many years, I began to see all such limits as arbitrary, and kind of rules overkill, in that the psychology of the player will produce a safe distance, considering the map situation. Player psychology plays a role here.

In TLNB there are no set minimum distances. This doesn't mean there isn't a game logic to moving back to safer terrain as a practical matter of play. The original rule was written to fit the Prussian retreat after Ligny when a whole series of games wasn't foreseen.

Since then OSG has produced titles on the majority of Napoleonic Battles. Just in the last eight years we've done 40 battles. One thing I've learned is that each battle is a different animal. If Waterloo is the Elephant in the room, just about every member of the animal kingdom is represented.

Making a set of rules that covers them all is something of a miracle. The way we have achieved that is by writing fewer rules, not more.

Lots of people assume that a designer's job is to write rules. The truth is the opposite. He "unwrites" rules. On my first game I was constantly tempted to toss stuff in, just because it was interesting. These days, I try to minimize the rules however I can. In a way, each new rule added is a failure of design. In a perfect world, a new rule would springboard on an existing rule. The complexity of the game would be in its play, not in the extension of its rules.¹

I found that in different battles reorganization happened differently. Sometimes it took place right at the front. Often, troops would rally

¹ from the Designer's Notes to *La Patrie en Danger*.

behind their cavalry or artillery a short way back. Sometimes the troops would actually leave the battlefield; sometimes they wouldn't stop running for miles.

I don't have NLB in front of me, but the rule from an older version of NAL is as follows:

Proximity of Enemy Units

Coalition Leaders within ten (10) hexes of an Enemy Combat unit may not attempt reorgan-ization. For French units the distance is seven (7) hexes.

Seven hexes is two miles. The truth is, there is no one distance that would be valid for all battles and all armies. This is getting into the gray area of crowd psychology, a lot more amorphous than the ricochet effect of cannon shot or the effectiveness of musketry at 500 yards. John Keegan talks about this on page 172 of *The Face of Battle*, a book which I remember reading while working on *NLB*. If you wanted you could craft a rule to cover this aspect of warfare—which Napoleon classed among the most important ingredients of victory. This would take in Morale, control of VP locations at the moment, losses inflicted by both sides, the state of the overall ebb and flow of the battle and how it was perceived by the soldiers at a given moment; all the factors we already tally-up at the end of play.

The problem is, if correctly done, the side that is losing the battle will have an additional handicap— watch out for the snowball effect. It is double jeopardy; and that's the reason I took it out.

However, psychology is still in play, in the psyches of the two players. The player's action will be conditioned by his perception of the overall swing of battle and as such he will settle upon the appropriate distance in his own way—not stuck to a hard and fast limit.

Andy-

Re: minimum distance away from the frontline for the reorganization process. I would argue that if to be installed it shouldn't be the 6 or 7 hexes it was in NLB, because it is too unrealistic (your officer was either up front to manage fighting or way back to manage reorganizing).

But I read two far more interesting things out of the article, which my attention had been focused last time already:

1. Intentionally reducing odds in combat (as it was allowed at NLB). I do hate the Ex-results on the CRT (even though I think they had to be in there), so I mostly always intentionally reduce the attack strength to a 3-1 (ommiting the Ex).

2. My most favorable topic „command & control“: You started a very constructive way of „ordering system“ in the 1st edition of NaL (where Cav Charges had been introduced by you first time, just to mention) by giving the overall commanders some sort of „orders“ (defend, attack, etc.) which had been shown on the map's periphery having influence on the things Corps officers are able to do.

You left the scene of NLB/ NaL and marched off to the Days- and Campaigns-series leaving me behind while you tested all sorts of logistic and hidden movement topics which I couldn't deal with as a mostly everytime solitaire player. So my thoughts circled around the „c&c“-topic and military profession made me thinking of c(3)... Why shouldn't the first thoughts of the NaL order system not being brought into a more sustainable part of the NLB-/NaL-system without interruption or spoiling playability of the game?

3. Out of this the article brought up another item of my „old“ c(3)-thoughts. Using couriers for transmitting orders to elements far out from the frontline (out-of-command).

Thoughts to get discussed: shouldn't the number of order options of a commander [number in brackets] being transferred into the number of courier counters (if in reach of 7 MP, light cav max distance) the element (officer, unit, stack, etc) is „in command“ or gets the order issued or will get it next player phase...

Andy wrote-

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Kevin-

Of all the many variables that go into a Commander's Rating, the main consideration was how they performed. How effective was he in this battle? You are not so much looking at each commander in isolation but you are trying to show the difference in the C3 on the two sides by the total number of commands on both sides. This is the most obvious and easiest way to balance a scenario that isn't working.

A Commander has one (short) Command Radius for a battle, and a longer distance to formations that are just marching. It is easier to keep the latter in command than the former. Their orders hardly change from one day to the next. The radius for command factoring in the limitations of battlefield conditions, when your enemy is over there doing things, forcing you to react, etc.; when an officer is being ordered to do something in the battle evolving, orders could easily be outdated by the time they arrive. There are so many instances of orders going astray, arriving too late, being mis-read, and all other SNAFU's combined. There is practically one in every battle.

I don't fully agree with the suggestion that a Commander's Rating would be limited by the number of orderly officers he has available to carry messages. In the Approach to Laon, 1814, Marshal Ney is sending dispatches every ten minutes to Marmont, and all these orderlies subsequently fell into enemy hands. The Marshal is squandering his command rating on the one thing uppermost on his mind—obtaining support from Marmont—and takes his attention away from events in front of him. He could have been thinking of other solutions, taking other measures, even if of a defensive nature.

A Commander's Rating is based on more than his ability to write and think clearly; draft, process and deliver the order. He has to have a staff with an officer of engineers, who maintains the daily situation maps; a chief of artillery; an officer in charge of situation reports of each unit; he has a chief of intelligence, who provides assessments on the enemy; and plenty of gophers. (Berthier's huge bureaucracy isn't part of the essential or "battle" headquarters.) Even Corps-level commanders such as Davout have a staff of specialists headed by a Chief of Staff, working together to make their boss's reputation.

If, in the course of the game, you want the advantage to swing back and forth from one player to the other, then the commands on the two sides should be relatively balanced. If one side is on the overall defensive, they can survive with fewer. Overall we have probably given the advantage to the French by keeping the Allies commands low. If I am honest, I have a pro-French bias. I remember Derek fighting to keep the British initiative at 4.

I have no complaints about a House Rule allowing the player to intentionally reduce the attack odds. But I still stand by the Ex, even if it isn't perfectly built.

43. Louis de Narbonne
A debonair, imperturbable and gracious ancien régime gentleman, he replaced Talleyrand as the emperor's favorite confidant. Able to move with perfect ease in aristocratic circles.

He assisted in arranging Marie-Louise's marriage to Napoleon. Never concealed his misgivings about a march on Moscow, while believing it to be France's mission to restore a strong Poland from Poznan to Danzig..

Cate, *The War of the Two Emperors*.

COMBAT: Horsemanship
 Battle Sword Firearm
 Awareness 5 Analytical 4 Courtesy 5
 Magnetism 4 Intrigue 3 Oratory 5
 Glory

card no. 36

Re: "Orders" in NAL: I never got any feedback on this rule (at least that I can recall now), and I concluded the Orders System didn't work very well. I wasn't happy with some things about it. I did try to rework the orders system,

and ended up looking to role playing games for inspiration. I actually created a set of role-playing cards for the leaders, that was supposed to go into *Highway to the Kremlin*, but it was only partially sketched-out. Above is a card from that prototype. I envisioned officer ratings in Horsemanship, Sword, Firearm, Magnetism and Glory, among others.

—Kevin

Chris-

We have a *lot* of experience with couriers. We use the 14 MP speed. Because you often have to ride "the long way around" to get to your counterpart (or risk being captured by roving vedettes, house rule), we find it often takes several turns to get a message out. Trying to write a note that

Translation:

General Durosnel, you will keep after the departure of the Emperor

1- Five battalions of Westphalian troops commanded by the general Lageon forming, in presents under arms, including the detachments which they had in the places behind, and which join, 2,200 men present.

2. The depots of the 4th, 6th, 7th, 11th and 12th Army Corps.

I know only the situation of those of the 6th and 11th Corps which today are 800 men.

3. The general cavalry depot established at Dresden, whose force today is 600 men and 725 horses.

Total, not including depots of 4th, 6th, 7th, 11th – situation not yet known– 3,600 men, 725 horses.

With these forces, general, you shall keep the bridgehead, our bridges, the city and serve as the general depot for cavalry.

Second order: (parts)

Une compagnie d'artillerie avec six pièces de 12, de 6 ou de 8, et deux obusiers, va se rendre aussi de Torgau à Dresde, de sorte qu'il y aura à Dresde 800 grenadiers saxons, 12 pièces d'artillerie et 100 hommes de cavalerie saxons.

...

Vous resterez ici, général, vous aurez cinq bataillons que vous ferez camper à la ville neuve; vous confierez la garde du pont au grenadiers saxons, en y mettant aussi un poste de gendarmes français pour la garde de police.

Translation:

An artillery company with five pieces of 12, 6 or 8, and two howitzers, will also go from Torgau to Dresden, so that that there will be 800 Saxon grenadiers in Dresden, 12 pieces of artillery and 100 men of Saxon cavalry.

You will remain here, general, you will have five battalions who will camp at the new town; you will entrust the custody of the bridge to Saxon grenadiers, also putting a post of French gendarmes for the police guard.

Third order: (parts)

L'Empereur me charge de vous adresser les instructions suivantes, monsieur le général Durosnel, pour faire suite à celles que je vous ai données ce matin.

Le général Boyeldieu, adjudant général de la garde, restera à Dresde, ainsi que le régiment des flanqueurs de la garde. Vous donnerez le commandement de tout le camp de la rive droite a ce général. il aura sous ses ordres deux bataillons de flanqueurs, quatre bataillons de Westphaliens, six pièces saxonnnes. Il occupera une maison près des palissades; il veillera sur l'enceinte de la nouvelle ville, comme dans une placeforte; il aura soin que l'on n'ouvre, entre les deux soleils, les barrières qui ont été établies qu'avec les formalités en usage pour les portes des villes de guerre.

...

Le régiment des flanqueurs fournira une garde au parc et au magasin d'administration de la garde qui resteront sur la rive gauche.

Le régiment fournira aussi au pont une garde de 30 hommes commandée par un officier pour garder le pont, conjointement avec les grenadiers saxons.

Translation:

The Emperor instructs me to send you the following instructions, General Durosnel, to follow up on those I gave you this morning.

*General Boyeldieu, Adjutant-General of the Guard, will remain at Dresden, as well as the **regiment of flanqueurs** of the guard. You will give the command of the whole camp of the right bank to this general. He will have under his orders two battalions of flanqueurs, four battalions of Westphalians, six Saxon pieces. It will occupy a house near the palisades; he will watch over the precincts of the new town*

as in a placeforte; he will take care that one does not open the barricades that have been established between the two banks, only with the formalities in use for the gates of war cities.

...

The Flanqueurs Regiment will provide guard to the park and guard administration store that will remain on the left bank. The regiment will also provide a 30-man guard by an officer to guard the bridge, together with the Saxon grenadiers.

The above orders provide the relevant info to help answer the question about Dresden. No V Corps units were there; only some Westphalians, Saxons and Boyeldieu's brigade of the Garde. I will remove Boyeldieu from Bautzen and add it as an ALT.

Napoleon at the Crossroads

errata and clarifications from consimworld

1. The Army of Bohemia's first forces arrive on 20 August. Supply source should be placed in the "B" start hex (23 august)
2. Bridge trains may be left behind voluntarily prior to battle (to avoid capture if there's a retreat).
3. If a friendly force occupies/moves through an enemy depot, the depot becomes fully functional for the capturing player on the following turn (if in LOC).
4. A vedette may not "capture" (i. e. make it function for your side) a depot.
5. If a vedette occupies the same hex as a force leader it is placed on the leader portrait in the consolidation segments, unless it plans to split away in the coming turn.
6. Unemployed leaders may move in either the IIb or IIc segment.
7. Initial placement of the Center of Ops is always at the free choice of the player.
8. The errata that states, "Give Oudinot's two divisions 2 SPs each, deducting these SPs from Mortier" applies to the 19 September set up ONLY. *In the 19 Sept set-up Oudinot no longer commanded XII Corps because it was disbanded after Dennewitz. He was given two YG divisions to command instead.*
9. Blücher (*exception*): The limit on Russian subordinates doesn't apply to Blucher. He had a very good rapport with the Russians plus he was the Army commander.
10. NaC Exclusive Rules Para 53(add:) Include a modifier (+2 to die) for Artillery Fire into a Fortified Town. If there are any troops outside the Fortified Town (undoubled but in the hex), the modifier is (+1). Losses apply first to all troops outside the town (if any).
11. If the Unit Manifest shows a unit's strength above its printed max, use the number shown on the Manifest. A unit may have more SP's than its' marker's maximum in this one case.
12. Where is this limit of attacks against fortified town in the rules? Standard rules, paragraph 156.
13. When a Coalition combat unit enters a French depot hex the depot is immediately deactivated. It becomes a Coalition depot on the following turn.
14. Reinforcements have an automatic MC on their turn of entry.

Napoleon at Vitebsk

In early August, 1812, Napoleon held a council with his generals. He wished to bring the campaign to an end at once and bring his troops home instead of wintering in that inhospitable land. He was determined to go on to Smolensk in order to force a great battle.

The generals were pessimistic, fearing they were too far into Russia already. Napoleon dismissed them angrily.

"I have made my generals too rich. They think only of pleasures, of hunting, rolling through Paris in brilliant carriages! They have become sick of war!"

The following day, the Chief of Staff, Marshal Louis-Alexandre Berthier, and Secretary of State, Count Bruno Daru, met with Napoleon for eight hours. Daru gave his reasons for halting the advance: 8,000 horses dead so far, no fodder within thirty miles of Vitebsk itself; no forges for shoeing the cavalry, no surgical lint for the medical service, no certainty that the supply train would get through. Without fighting a pitched battle, the Grande Armée had lost a third of its force through desertion, disease and hunger.

laden with booty, would try to get the start of the army, for the purpose of selling it in France."—"What then, is to be done?" exclaimed the emperor. "Remain here," replied Daru, "make one vast entrenched camp of Moscow and pass the winter in it. He would answer for it that there would be no want of bread and salt: the rest foraging on a large scale would supply. Such of the horses as they could not procure food for might be salted down. As to lodgings, if there were not houses enough, the cellars might make up the deficiency. Here we might stay till the return of spring, when our reinforcements and all Lithuania in arms should come to relieve, to join us, and to complete the conquest."

After listening to this proposal the emperor was for some time silent and thoughtful; he then replied, "This is a lion's counsel! But what would Paris say? what would they do there? what have they been doing there for the last three weeks that they have not heard from me? who knows what would be the effect of a suspension of communications for six months? No; France would not accustom itself to my absence, and Prussia and Austria would take advantage of it*."

Still Napoleon could not make up his mind either to stay or to depart. Overcome in this struggle of obstinacy, he deferred from day to day the avowal of his defeat. Amid the dreadful storm of men and elements which was gathering around him, his ministers and his aides-de-camp saw him pass whole days in discussing the merits of some

* General Gourgaud maintains that it is impossible for any such conversation to have taken place. It is certain that the plan attributed to Daru is absurd in the extreme.—Ed.

Emperor's closest personal aides, were disquieted by this new-found determination to push on and alarmed by the thought of the army advancing as far as Moscow. When they tried to object, however, raising pertinent issues such as whether the supply system could stand the added strain of a further advance east, Napoleon remained adamant and accused them of having got too used to a soft life.

The next day, Berthier tried to dissuade the Emperor again, this time by bringing Count Daru, the man responsible for overseeing the Grande Armée's logistics, to plead with him. Napoleon listened politely as Daru raised a list of concerns. The supply system might break down entirely, he warned, if it extended much further east. Certainly, there was a limit beyond which it could not go, for the beasts of burden which pulled the wagons needed to bring their fodder with them and if the distances grew too great they would have to bring so much fodder that there would be no room for other supplies on the wagons. That problem could be solved, or at least partially remedied, by living off the land, but it was not clear how much the countryside between Vitebsk and Moscow could provide, either for men or animals. The experience in Russia so far had not been encouraging. If the supply system did break down and living off the land proved unfeasible, the repercussions, Daru warned, would be disastrous. Already, he pointed out, the army was down by perhaps as much as a third on its effectives due to disease, exhaustion, hunger and desertion, all of which were largely attributable to the difficulties of supplying such a large force.

Napoleon has often been accused of ignoring these logistical problems in deciding to advance east of Vitebsk in 1812. He did not. As he told Daru, he was well aware of the potential hazards of the situation, but he was also aware of the difficulties that would attend a policy of halting. The supply system might indeed prove incapable of sustaining an advance on Moscow that year, but was it any more likely to be able to provide for the army over the long Russian winter if it halted at Vitebsk? Even if it was able, could the army successfully defend such long supply lines against Russian attack? The risk of the army being cut off at Vitebsk was great enough for it to be wiser to retreat all the way back to the Vistula, but that would be tantamount to admitting defeat, which the Emperor was not willing to do while there was a chance that a further advance, and possibly only a short one, might bring the decisive battlefield victory that he was sure would bring the Tsar to the peace table. Besides, a retreat would make all the suffering endured so far seem worthless. There was also a possibility that the discipline and morale of the Grande Armée would break down entirely if it was ordered to trudge all the way back beyond the Niemen.

Such was the unenviable predicament facing Napoleon in early August 1812; whatever he chose to do – advance, halt or retreat –



SCENARIO DESIGN

Designing the Long Game

Chris Moeller and Kevin Zucker

In the last year I've begun to think about the long arc of the story line, as it pertains to battles and AtBs. Like the good chess players, I have rather belatedly begun to think about opening, mid-game, and end-game. Otherwise we focus too much on the outcome of one particular decisive battle and not enough on the set-up and development stages of play. Joseph L. White, in a recent Consimworld post, seems to be talking about a similar process...

...experienced wargamers tend to read the map as a whole then process the detailed moves/ decisions in chunks as they work through a turn.

How does that work, I wonder? Is there a constant scoping out and then zero-ing in? Let's say you are attacking and lining up the order of your attacks. You usually do the subsidiary attacks first, then the main ones. This implies that at different stages of the game the player is engaged at different levels, gradually scoping in on the final assault that will break the enemy line.

OPENING. *The topography and forces. Intel.*

I think of Chess, where the advantage of moving first looms so large. That is something similar you are giving out when you assign "First Player." A good opening involves intelligence goals: locate good ground to fight on, determine the size and quality of the enemy, figure out where he is and isn't strong, note anything that might constrain his movement or fighting ability (and your own).

You're looking at the whole map, determining where the main fight will occur—getting your forces to the right place is the focus of this stage. Like in Chess, you don't start with your high powered pieces but you are content to just build a position.

MID-GAME. *Execute the Plan, deception, scouting.*

The mid game comes once you've discovered those things, or waved them off as undiscoverable in the time you have. You've chosen your ground, you've committed to a strategy, now you're working on deception, speed and mass, surprise, preparing your forces for the main event. This is mostly movement, scouting, screen

ing and deception. You're acting to prevent your opponent from gaining information about you, as you increase your understanding about him.

Combats become more frequent. Getting your ducks ready before you launch the all-out assault on that one key piece of terrain. Will your risky strategy pay off or will your overconfidence get you annihilated? Or do you play it safe and suffer a thousand small cuts? Your attacks either come off as planned or they don't.

END-GAME. *The big battle*

The end game consists of the climactic battle, usually lasting several turns. Here you're looking for local advantages, shifting forces here and there as needed, managing reserves, attempting to demoralize the other player... to convince him that he can't win or retain the initiative, taking risks to that end, and exploiting any small advantage that could tip the balance drastically. These include aggressive advances after combat, charges, following up on moments of good luck, etc... Then comes the final act: La garde au feu!

ZOOM-IN AND OUT

With two-dimensional computer war-games, you can't look at the map the way you look at it in three dimensions. You have to zoom out to see the whole thing, but the details are unreadable, and confined to one perspective. You zoom in to see the details but lose your larger context. With an analogue map, if you stand up, you see the whole thing, you see all of the relationships, you can change your perspective but you still have the whole map in your peripheral vision. The details remain in context. That's very important to understanding the various relationships in play. How far are my forces from one another? How large and small are they? How does the road net affect the relationship to one another and to the enemy. Where are the choke points? I hold all of those things in my vision when I lean in to set up attacks or holding actions, to structure my stacks, vedette screens, etc... I can glance over and refer to all of those "zoomed-out" things while also zooming-in on a detailed situation.

In the game "Go," the early phase of play is *jo-seki* in which you are placing stones on a relatively empty board. The player is building a large structure, one play at a time, which will only become obvious in

the future. Go has always appealed to me because it's about shapes. My visually-attuned mind works better with shape-relationships than lines of force. A game like the Campaigns series which has vast distances and few forces is much more satisfying than a computer version of the same. The shapes, the interactions between masses, are lost when you're zooming in and out. You need the physical object to really get a feel for the interactions between the forces in play.

In our game of Montmirail, I hadn't stopped to deploy in the historical positions Sacken had taken up, flying straight from road march column directly into battle without taking time to deploy—very unhistorical. A General would want all of his troops gathered in line of battle prior to meeting the enemy. In Sacken's case, if he engages with his troops still strung out, he cannot bring his dominant power to bear and exposes his lead formations to defeat in detail.

—Chris Moeller, *WDM Vol. III, Nr. 3*

That was faulty opening play on several levels: I saw a river, but I didn't see all the bridges. I saw a map edge, but neglected to note that French reinforcements were coming in all along it. I saw a strong advanced position, but didn't notice how the road net didn't support it. I saw my own powerful force, but didn't understand its weakness relative to the French.

What was the actual General Sacken thinking?

1) I know there is going to be a battle.

2) I need to deploy far enough forward to link up with the Prussians

3) My forces are still in RM column, so I need time to develop a position.

General Nathan Bedford Forrest said "get thar the *furthest* with the mostest." Even if you don't have overall superiority, you can gain local superiority by moving quickly. With a small, compact army you can grind up a strung out column.

Elements of a Good Mid-Game:

If we want to design a close contest, where both sides have chances, and either can gain the initiative as the front lines move back and forth, how do we craft that into the mid-game?

RESOURCES: Resources for gaining and protecting information. In addition to the standard rules (vedettes, hidden forces) there are also battle-specific resources such as terrain features, unit mix and type, leadership. I.Ps, bridge trains,. For example, make sure there is least one Commander on each side at start.

OPTIONS: A variety of map and force options for players to choose. A variety of supply sources will allow for different axes of advance The way you draw the map can affect the mid-game very strongly. Include the most main roads possible, try to align map edges with some kind of difficult terrain. That way, the player isn't constrained by an artificial boundary.

One of the issues with *Sun of Austerlitz* is that it's pretty much a one-vector advance for the French... everything happens along one really optimal axis of advance. *TLS* has similar issues, but has greater variety because of the different phases of the campaign (Austrians pushing in beginning, French pushing in the middle).

Reinforcements are another mid-game element. In the Eylau advance to battle, Ney vs. L'Estocq add variability to what would otherwise be a fairly obvious end-game situation.

Crafting the Mid-Game: VPs

Look where the armies are likely to be at the end of the game. VPs bring out the important road junctions and overlooks. Usually the VPs are somewhere near where the battle is likely to be. For example, at Lützen, if the Prussians hold one of the four villages they can win a marginal victory.

Something I'm discovering (in our current game of *NaC*, playing Schwartzberg) is the value of patience. It is VERY HARD for me, as a gamer, to do nothing and wait, turn after turn. Choosing when to act and when not to act, that's tough. We think that acting is something you should be doing. "What should I do now?" I spent the first 8-9 turns of our game hovering off-map. The threat of my arrival held Napoleon in place while the other two armies advanced, and frustrated his opportunities to smash us separately and gain critical victories, but at the cost of me doing nothing. I had a similar experience retreating as the Anglo-Allies in *NLG*. Surviving and pulling back doesn't feel like much of an accomplishment. Slowing down the enemy's advance, making him pay in time, doesn't feel like a victory.

Those are valuable lessons... discover the value in frustrating your opponent's plans. Learn the value of a threat-in-being.

Playing the Spanish in *NQ* is maybe the biggest challenge in this regard. You can't just do nothing and wait, yet you can't advance and maneuver. So much of those battles involve playing with your opponent's mind. Can you scare your enemy enough that he will hesitate for an extra turn before plowing you under? You have to be both very patient and very daring, but the wrong timing can leave your army entirely destroyed.

Comparison of March Intervals Between Adkin and LNG

By John Devereaux

In order for a game to match historical performances, march rates must be correct. At 4200 yards our game allows infantry to March 2.39 mph.¹

The fastest practical march can go a little under 8 MPs, 7.87 hexes on a road, in an hour. In an administrative march, far from the enemy, a column of 30,000 men could stretch 30 miles. Our road march is more closed up, an average of 4,000 men per mile (avg.). I have taken a marching column to be no wider than 7 men abreast to squeeze through the bridges of the time (12 ft).

To test the accuracy of the intervals in the game between units in road march, I took Mark Adkin's *The Waterloo Companion* estimates from page 35 and applied them against D'Erlon's I Corps in march mode in NLG. While I had to make a few realistic assumptions, I was pleased to see that Adkin's estimate and NLG exactly match at the equivalent of 30 hexes. Also, Adkin's comments about the tail units trailing several hours behind lead units is correctly simulated in the game.

A Corps is a very large formation. It took a considerable length of time to move from A to B and deploy for battle, and it could be several hours after the leading units moved off before the tail began to march. Once on the road there would be continual stopping, starting, and bunching up. Infantry in column of fours on the march took about 270 meters per thousand men; a thousand cavalry 750 meters; a battery of six or eight guns with all its ammunition and supply wagons between 550-750 meters. D'Elon's Corps of almost 20,000 men (17,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, 48 guns plus staff engineers, etc.) would have stretched for up to 12 kilometers if all its units marched along a single road. This endless snake would have been even longer if supply wagons were included...

Should infantry really be able to cover 8 hexes of road, turn after turn? Or is that rate unrealistic? I found this discussion of March rates on TMP.

"Speaking as an ex-infantry soldier, two and a half miles per hour is a much more realistic speed for an infantry soldier carrying his own kit. It also allows for halts, and other unexpected stops. "The average walking pace for a fit person who is not carrying any weight is about 3 mph."

When Marshal Lannes's corps marched into Poland they increased to a route March between 85 and 90 paces a minute for the 30 kilometer march to Stargard. The fastest march for troops on the march was 90 paces per minute. The halte des pipes was 5 minutes on the hour. $90 \times 55 \text{ min} = 4950 \text{ paces / hour}$ $4125 \text{ yards / hour}$ - (I take a pace as $5/6$ of a yd.) $525 \text{ yards / hex} = 7.871428 \text{ hexes / hour}$.

The game's 8-hex Movement Allowance allows troops to travel 91.5 paces per hour if they move all 8 hexes on the road. Eighty-five paces versus 91.5 doesn't sound like a great difference, but it couldn't have been maintained in unknown hostile territory, with all the incumbent delays, alarms, and confusion.

Lannes's thirty kilometers is a long march for one day; 22 was the normal day's March (Napoleon's dividers were set to 7 to 8 leagues). The men needed a whole day off every third or fourth day, or indeed as many halts as possible.

In most battle games you aren't moving at top speed very long. The 8-hex March rate was considered burst-speed, not a long-term moving average. However, if we don't have any Prussian roadblocks, then we see the French fantassins burning up the macadam... $22 \text{ km} / 13.75 \text{ miles} / 46 \text{ hexes} / 5.76 \text{ turns}$. A 22 km March will take you from Charleroi well into the Foret de Soignes. You can see that the problem becomes noticeable when you have these columns going across whole map sections.

A normal days March of 22 km could be made by our cardboard foot-sloggers Marching flat out in TLNB in under 6 hours. That is the intersection of the theoretical maximum and the practical average.

¹ $525 \text{ yds} \times 8 = 4200 \text{ yds} / \text{hr} = 2.39 \text{ mph}$

**A CORPS ON THE LINE OF MARCH
(Example: French 1st Corps at Waterloo Campaign)**

Arms Type	No. (000)	No of Gun Btys	Meter/1000	Meter/Bty	No. of Meters	Game Units
Infantry	17		270		4590	8
Cavalry	1.5		750		1125	1
Foot Art.		5		750	3750	4
H. Art.		1		550	550	1
Bag. Train					2000	1
Start/Stop					2403	
				Total	14418	15
				Game Scale/Hex	480	2
				Number of March Hexes	30	30

From Adkin's "The Waterloo Companion", p35.

Elting says, about this: "In peacetime or in the interior of the Empire troops normally marched in double files along each side of the road, leaving its middle free for vehicles. An interval of approximately 240 feet was maintained between battalions. One once in the field however, the leading division s closed up to use the entire road. When there was great urgency and the terrain permitted, it the troops moved in masses across country. Such was Napoleon's famous march to Dresden in August 183, gnus and essential trains on the one good road, cavalry and infantry through the fields on either side of it - 120 miles in four days.

There was an hourly five-minute halt... At midday there was a grande hate of one hour... The pas ordinaire (76) was the standard marching speed, though some light infantry regiments habitually marched at eighty-five steps to the minute.

The average étape varied from 10 to 22 miles; the average was approximately fifteen.

-Elting, Swords, pp. 462-63

HOUSE RULE

An infantry unit may not use the 8 hex march rate two turns in a row. For the second turn, the march rate is reduced to 7 hexes. Since each hex is about .3 miles, this works out to about 2.25 miles per hour over the two turns. This is very close to the historical maximum sustainable march rate.

Keeping track is easy. I just turn the march marker 90 degrees if the infantry unit has moved 8 hexes that turn. In that way, I know the infantry unit can only move 7 hexes in road march on the following turn.

Playing the cards with a 5 hex infantry movement result needed to be resolved as there is almost no way that a large formation could cover 10 road hexes in one turn. If there is a 5 hex card movement result, I allow the infantry to sustain an additional consecutive 8 hex road movement turn.



Napoleon's Resurgence

Study Folder UPDATE 31 March 2018

Note: The version number of the Study folder can be found in the lower right corner of page 22.

ALL EDITIONS

Use these items with all versions of the Study Folder:

COMBAT TABLES

(on back cover & Casualty Track)

- CRT (*change*): 1:1.5 column results are reordered: Dr-Dr-Sk-Ar*-Ar-Ar2
- CHARGE CRT (*change*): “reducing 1 or 2 units as indicated).”

WEATHER TABLE

- In the Trains column, remove “Pontoon: No Deploy” from the Rain row and add it to the Thunderstorm row.

COUNTERS, COALITION

- Russian II Corps/Panchulidzev. The counter is misspelled. (Ivan Davydovich Panchulidzev).
- Coalition Vedettes of Mixed nationalities: IV/Königin and IV/Oppen cavalry units—each has one Prussian and one IV/Cos Russian vedette attached.

SET-UP, COALITION

- On 5.20.13 and 5.21.13, AG/Rudzevitch and L/Scherbatov are not reduced. Set-up at full strength.

MAP

- Bau-N: 3033-3134 a trestle is missing; in similar situations, assume there is a trestle.

TRC, KÖNIGSWARtha - BAUTZEN MINI-CAMPAIGN

2PM: YORCK/II (*less Hunerbein's 3 units*)

7AM: III/Arty Tamissier and Tamissier-b enter as reinforcements on May 20th at 07:00.

STUDY FOLDER

28.65 Control: VP locations on the BAU map sections are not counted—not even if using the Spoiling Attack (28.68) option.

29.5 Hoyerswerda

French General Oudinot has a Late Start in effect at start. Place Card No. 2 face-up near the map.

29.59 Victory Conditions: VPs are earned as per 26.1. EXCEPTION: The Coalition player receives the VPs shown at the end of each French Player turn that Coalition units control that hex.

VERSIONS 3.0-3.03

Use these items with versions 3.0 & 3.03 of the Study Folder:

STUDY FOLDER

28.17 Improved Positions at Start (*add*):

In addition, the Coalition Player may place up to five more I.P.s in any Friendly-occupied hexes.

28.52 Mode Cards at Start:

Mode cards have to be drawn at the start of each day, on the first daylight turn. Apply them, as explained in 24.0. For the French, “Late Start” is in effect (28.67). Card No. 2 counts toward the total of 3 French Mode cards specified. Reshuffle the Mode Cards each night at 9 PM.

28.64 March Orders at Start (*add*): In addition, all Coalition forces on the Kön map at the end of May 19th, 8PM have a pre-programmed March order—taking effect immediately—to any location or locations, of the Coalition Player’s choice, on the BAU-N map.

28.67 French Late Start (Card No. 2):

French Card No. 2 (Late Start) is in effect at start. Follow instructions on the card. Remove card from the deck and place it beside the map face up, to denote its enduring effect. (This rule replaces “Undeclared Truce Day.”)

VERSION 3.03 ONLY

Use this item with version 3.03 of the Study Folder:

STUDY FOLDER

27.63 Replace the last part of the paragraph: “or at a point further back on the line of march at the Coalition Player’s choice,” with the following: “Since only the Coalition player can see a convergence coming, he must place his forces on the map at the moment French units would have a line of sight to them.”

VERSION 3.0 ONLY

Use these items with version 3.0 of the Study Folder:

STUDY FOLDER

25.13 French nationalities: Saxony (chamois with a white stripe).

26.3 Exiting the Map

Either Player may choose to exit his units by playing the “General Retreat” card once per day. On the Coalition side, a General Retreat Order can be given to: all forces; only the Prussian Corps; only the Russian Corps; or only Barclay’s Army at Bautzen (AG, L, and Res).

27.6 Lützen Mini-Campaign Set-up

27.63 Reinforcements: After choosing his deployment center, the Coalition player must secretly assign a March Order to all of his Reinforcement Forces scheduled to arrive before Noon on May 2nd. These forces don’t appear on the map until the deployment chit is revealed. They are assumed to be moving toward their assigned destination and are placed at a distance from their entry depending on the amount of time they have spent on the map. They may use Road March or not. The force sets up wherever it is removed from the March Order (20.23). Since only the Coalition player can see a convergence coming, he must place his forces on the map at the moment French units would have a line of sight to them.


28.2 Alternate Reinforcements

FRENCH

#1. SEBASTIANI/IIC (not V/17th I.D.—already in play)

OSG Playtester: Gene Rodek

My interest in Napoleon came from exposure to the early games: NAW, NLB and NAB. NLB was a favorite – sound game system that was easy to play, with both short and campaign scenarios, what-if situations and was, most importantly, FUN. Gave me incentive to start reading about the history and therefore a door into this era.



My enjoyment of TLNB is along the same lines. While the rules have grown, the core system still follows the original design of its ancestor. I remember while having discussions with Kevin regarding Borodino and how to handle the R&R days in a multiday battle, his mantra of “keep it simple”. So now I look at suggested rule changes particularly with that scope in mind. Every gram of chrome adds to the weight of ruleplay.

Originally, I was not a fan of the cards in 4LB, but as they developed into TCS, I saw how they added a key dimension to the system without adding complexity and layers of rules. Now it is hard to play without them. Likewise, I was concerned about the addition of the shock subroutine when it was added. I wondered what would be the added value of stopping the game to check the initiative of units, rolling a couple of dice and looking up on a table. At the 30,000 ft level, it has not added that much; the game will work fine without that added mechanism. But at ground level, there is an excitement when the “SHOCK” result comes up, since in many cases these happen to coincide with terrain of importance (by design of course). The addition of this subroutine does not distract from the overall enjoyment of the game, but adds to it.

Many times when I first start a playtest on a new battle in development, I use a stripped down version of the rules: no cards, no weather, no hidden movement, no vedettes. Just the pieces to push around to get an overall view of the game, a sense of balance, and the goals for each side. And I have to admit there is some NLB nostalgia in doing that, a reminder of the “keep it simple” mantra. At the same time, the addition of these features gives depth, flavor and uncertainty to what is otherwise a more predictable model. A careful balance needs to be struck.



What I hope TLNB gives its followers is a system that is quick to learn and fun to play, where you are able to see the grand tactics of Napoleonic warfare through the mechanics of the system, and not get lost in the game mechanics themselves. No model can completely simulate a battle with its unique events and terrain, yet alone the breadth and width of all types of battles over the course of 20+ years. But these games deliver a great simulation of Napoleonic battles at the scale designed.

It is a pleasure working with Kevin, et al, in these games and I think the product here keeps improving. Looking forward to many more Napoleonic battles with this system.