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# NAVGUARD

Advanced Galileo PRS resilience for EU Defence

# NAVIGATION WARFARE

## GNSS INTERFERENCE IN MILITARY CONTEXT



*Image: Mobile truck-mounted EW station (Source GPS Spoofing report)*


# GNSS

## IMPORTANCE

- **GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System)** is a network of satellites orbiting the Earth providing geolocation and time information globally, free of charge
  - GPS, Galileo, GLONASS, BeiDou, NavIC, QZSS
- **Radio receivers** specifically designed to receive those satellite signals and **decode** the **signal message contents**
- With the contents of the messages from at least 4 “visible” satellites, the position can be calculated using a mathematical process known as **trilateration** (x, y, z, and t)

### ▪ Diverse applications:

- Maritime, land, and air navigation
- Time synchronization
- Telecommunications
- Agriculture
- and many more...



### ▪ Vulnerabilities:


- Signals traveling over 20.000 km
- Signal propagation delay
- Multipath effects
- Vulnerable to Jamming and Spoofing

# GIDAS – GNSS QUALITY ASSURANCE

## WHAT IS GNSS INTERFERENCE?


### Out-of-band and unintentional interference

This type of interference can be caused by services using neighboring frequency bands or environmental influences [e.g., multipath]. It usually occurs in the vicinity of other infrastructure using radio frequency links.




### Jamming interference

The intentional attempt to disrupt the GNSS service by broadcasting higher-powered signals. With the interruption of GNSS time & positioning, the on-board system must fall back to alternative navigation systems.



### Spoofing interference

The intentional attempt to force a GNSS receiver into a false position/track can be challenging to detect. Spoofed GNSS receivers output false time & positioning information, increasing the possibility of collisions against the ground or other objects.



# FACTS & FIGURES

## NAVGUARD




|                  |  |
|------------------|--|
| Project Name     | Navguard (Advanced Galileo PRS resilience for EU Defence)  |
| Duration         | Dec 2022 – Nov 2026 (4 years)  |
| Total Cost       | 56.2 M€  |
| EU Contribution  | 24.37 M€   |
| Coordinator      | FDC S.à r.l.   |
| Consortium       | 31 companies from 11 countries   |
| Main Objectives  | Enhance Galileo PRS resilience, detect GNSS threats, geolocate interference sources, provide situational awareness |
| Key Deliverables | Ground sensors, space payloads, in-orbit demo, information management subsystem, mobile PRS receivers              |



FDC (Coordinator, France), AEROSPACELAB (Belgium), ANTWERP SPACE (Belgium), BEYOND GRAVITY AUSTRIA (Austria), BEYOND GRAVITY SWEDEN (Sweden), DIEHL DEFENCE (Germany), ELETTRONICA (Italy), FRAUNHOFER (Germany), GMV (Spain), HISDESAT (Spain), INDRA (Spain), IABG (Germany), LEONARDO (Italy), OHB AUSTRIA (Austria), OHB SYSTEM (Germany), QASCOM (Italy), SAAB (Sweden), SAFRAN (France), SPECTRACOM (France), TECNOBIT (Spain), TELESPAZIO (Italy), THALES ALENIA SPACE FRANCE (France), THALES ALENIA SPACE ITALIA (Italy), THALES AVS FRANCE (France), THALES SIX GTS FRANCE (France), TOTALFÖRSVARETS FORSKNING SINSTITUT (Sweden)


# PROJECT ORGANIZATION

## SCOPE OF WORK



# SCHEDULE

## WORK PACKAGES



Dec 2022 – Nov 2026 (4 years)

# AUSTRIAN CONTRIBUTIONS

OHB AUSTRIA + BEYOND GRAVITY



## GROUND-BASED SURVEILLANCE

- Interference monitoring from ground (jamming + spoofing)
- 1 Ground Sensor to be demonstrated and delivered
- Integration of innovative technologies:
  - CRPA antennas
  - PRS receiver
- Customization due to national user requirements



## SPACE-BASED SURVEILLANCE

- 2 space payloads, 1 operational space payload
- Parallel subconsortia working on the PRS receivers and spaceborne payload
- In-orbit demonstration
- Interfacing with Information Management Subsystem

**beyond gravity**

# GROUND-BASED SURVEILLANCE

HERITAGE: GIDAS SYSTEM FROM OHB AUSTRIA


## CIVIL OS GROUND-BASED INTERFERENCE MONITORING SYSTEM

- GIDAS system architecture consists of
  - One or multiple **Monitoring Sensors (MS)**
    - Antenna and monitoring receiver
    - Detection and alert generation
    - Classification
  - **Monitoring Centre (MC)**
    - Localization (in case of multiple stations)
    - Data storage and reporting
  - **Graphical User Interface (GUI)**
    - Monitoring station and user control
    - Visualization of results
    - Post-processing and detailed analysis features



# DEPLOYMENT EXAMPLE

GIDAS AT A EUROPEAN AIRPORT – DEVELOPED WITH SUPPORT FROM ESA



# CHALLENGES AND BEST PRACTICES



## MAIN CHALLENGES

- Large, distributed consortium
- Export restrictions and handling of sensitive and classified data

## BEST PRACTICES

- Keep the classification level of deliverables as low as possible
- Strict project management rules from the very beginning
- Focus on subgroups for specific tasks instead of involving the whole consortium
- Clear contributions assignments for WP contributors, internal review from WP manager
- Strong coordination with MoD

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# THANK YOU!



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