

THE MEDITATIONS OF THE EMPEROR
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS

NATURAL LAW AND
ENLIGHTENMENT CLASSICS

Knud Haakonssen

General Editor




Francis Hutcheson

NATURAL LAW AND
ENLIGHTENMENT CLASSICS

*The Meditations
of the Emperor
Marcus Aurelius
Antoninus*

Translated by Francis Hutcheson and James Moor
Edited and with an Introduction by James Moore
and Michael Silverthorne

*The Collected Works and Correspondence
of Francis Hutcheson*



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Frontispiece: Detail of a portrait of Francis Hutcheson by Allan Ramsay (ca. 1740–45), oil on canvas. Reproduced courtesy of the Hunterian Art Gallery, University of Glasgow.

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INTRODUCTION

On May 31, 1742, Francis Hutcheson in Glasgow sent to Thomas Drennan in Belfast some copies of *The Meditations of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. Newly translated from the Greek: With Notes, and an Account of his Life* (Glasgow: Printed by Robert Foulis and sold by him at the College: 1742).¹

The letter that accompanied the dispatch of the books contained the following intriguing account:

The bearer Mr. Hay takes over some copies of a new translation of Antoninus, the greater half of which and more, was my amusement last summer, for the sake of a singular worthy soul one Foulis;² but I don't let my name appear in it, nor indeed have I told it to any here but the Man concerned. I hope that you'll like it; the rest was done by a very ingenious Lad one Moore.³ Pray try your critical faculty in finding what parts I did & what he did. I did not translate books in a suite, but I one or two, & he one or two. I hope if you like it that it may sell pretty well with you about Belfast I am sure it is doing a publick good to diffuse the Sentiments & if you knew Foulis you would think he deserved all encouragement.⁴

1. *The Meditations* were reprinted in Glasgow by Robert and Andrew Foulis in 1749 (2nd ed.), 1752 (3rd ed.), and 1764 (4th ed.). Another "4th ed." was printed in Dublin for Robert Main in 1752.

2. Robert Foulis (1707–76) was appointed printer to the University of Glasgow in 1743. In partnership with his brother Andrew, he was responsible for the publication of many attractive and accurate editions of classical texts.

3. James Moor (1712–79) was appointed university librarian of the University of Glasgow in 1742 and professor of Greek in 1746. He edited many of the classical texts published by Robert and Andrew Foulis. Robert Foulis married Moor's sister Elizabeth in September 1742. Moor and the Foulis brothers witnessed Hutcheson's will on June 30, 1746.

4. Letter of Francis Hutcheson to the Reverend Mr. Thomas Drennan in Belfast, Glasgow, May 31, 1742. MS: Glasgow University Library, MS Gen 1018 no. 11.

Hutcheson's letter raises a number of questions: (1) Which books of *The Meditations* contain Hutcheson's translations and notes and which books should be attributed to Moor? (2) What considerations prompted Hutcheson to undertake this translation and edition, apart from his announced desire to be of assistance to Robert Foulis and the Foulis press? (3) What might be the significance of Hutcheson's notes to the text? Do they make up a coherent set of ideas concerning human nature, morals, politics, and religion? And what may be the relevance of these notes for our understanding of his other writings? (4) Why was Hutcheson determined that his name should not appear in the volume and that no one in Glasgow and its environs apart from Foulis should know the identity of the persons responsible for the translation and the notes? (5) And, finally, what was the significance of Hutcheson's adaptation of *The Meditations* for the Enlightenment in Scotland?

1. Hutcheson and Moor: The Division of Responsibility

There is a *prima facie* problem concerning the respective contributions of Hutcheson and Moor to *The Meditations*. There are three pieces of external evidence, and they do not agree. The first is Hutcheson's letter to Drennan, with his claim that he had done "the greater half . . . and more"; a claim complicated by the circumstance that Hutcheson originally wrote "the first half and more" and then struck through "first" and substituted "greater." Clearly Hutcheson was reluctant to be specific and preferred to make a game of it with Drennan. The second bit of evidence is found in *The Foulis Catalogue of Books* (Glasgow, 1777), where it is reported that the first two books were by James Moor and the remainder by Hutcheson.⁵ This record of the matter has been accepted by many later scholars.⁶ It has the merit of consistency with Hutcheson's claim that he had done "one or two books," and Moor, "one or two"; and it leaves Hutcheson with responsi-

5. Duncan, *Notices and Documents*, 49.

6. Scott, *Francis Hutcheson*, 144; Hutcheson, *On Human Nature*, 176.

bility for the “greater half,” although not for the “first” half, as he had originally written.

There is another account of the matter. Thomas Reid entered the following note in his own copy of the 1764 edition of *The Meditations*: “Dr. Moor translated the 9th and 10th books. Dr. Francis Hutcheson the rest. Dr. Hutcheson wrote the Preface and Dr. Moor collected [*sic!*] the Proofs. This information I had from Dr. Moor.”⁷ We believe that Reid’s note is the most authoritative of the three versions of this matter. Books IX and X differ from the other books. The style of the translation of books IX and X lacks the characteristic flow of Hutcheson’s prose. These two books also contain a number of phrases not found elsewhere in the text. “Nature” or “the nature of the whole” is referred to as “she” (for example, bk. IX, art. 1, pp. 107–8)—the Greek *phusis* is a feminine noun—whereas elsewhere in *The Meditations* nature is referred to as “it.”

In the notes for books IX and X there are a number of references to Greek terminology and to Thomas Gataker’s translation of *The Meditations* from the Greek into Latin. A preoccupation with the original Greek of Marcus and with the quality of the translation by Gataker is not a conspicuous feature of the notes found in the other books. It is a concern, however, that might be expected of someone like Moor, who was renowned for the accuracy of his command of ancient Greek. In every one of the other books there are extensive notes that expand upon and interpret the philosophy of the Stoics, with the exception of the first book, which is concerned not with ideas but with individuals who influenced Marcus (many of them Stoics). The term *Stoic* is never used in books IX and X. Finally, in books IX and X, there is an abundance of citations to writers of the New Testament: fourteen in all; twice as many as are found in the notes to all of the other books combined. In light of these considerations, we conclude that Reid’s record of his conversation with Moor may be taken as the most authoritative of the three pieces of external evidence: books IX and X by Moor; the rest by Hutcheson.

7. Bodleian Library, Oxford, Vet A4 f. 505 (9). See Stephen, “Francis Hutcheson and the Early History of the Foulis Press,” 213–14. The editors are grateful to Dr. Daniel Carey for bringing this item to their attention.

2. The Glasgow Edition in Context: Other Editions and Influences

What prompted Hutcheson and Moor to undertake this translation and edition of *The Meditations*? One of their expressed motivations was stylistic. They were dissatisfied with the two translations then available in English. One was the translation by Meric Casaubon (1599–1671) published in 1634,⁸ described by Hutcheson as “the old English translation”: it “can scarce be agreeable to any reader; because of the intricate and antiquated stile” (“Life of the Emperor,” p. 3). The other translation, published in 1701 (and reissued in 1714 and 1726), was by Jeremy Collier (1650–1726), a nonjuring Anglican clergyman best known for his attack on the English stage.⁹ This edition was described by Hutcheson as an exercise that “seems not to preserve the grand simplicity of the original.” Hutcheson tells us that his translation is “almost intirely new” and has been made “according to Gataker’s edition of the original, and his Latin version” (“Life of the Emperor,” p. 4). Thomas Gataker (1574–1654) was an Anglican clergyman with Puritan sympathies, who maintained good relations with Presbyterians and was a member of the Westminster Assembly. Gataker’s edition of *The Meditations*¹⁰ in Greek, with a translation and commentary on the text in Latin, has been described by a modern classical scholar as “a monument of vast and fastidious erudition,” which “has long been and will always remain, the principal authority for any one undertaking to study or edit the *Meditations*.”¹¹ An enlarged version was published in London in 1697,¹² with a dedication by George Stanhope (1660–1728) to Lord John Somers and a translation into Latin by Stanhope of a life of Marcus Aurelius, composed in French, by André Dacier (1652–1722).

It is this 1697 edition of *The Meditations* that Hutcheson and Moor used as the basis for their edition. Hutcheson informs the reader that the “short abstract” of the life of the emperor prefaced to his edition is “taken from

8. *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus the Roman Emperor, His Meditations Concerning Himself*.

9. *The Emperor Marcus Antoninus His Conversation with Himself*.

10. *Markou Antoninou tou Autokratoros tōn eis beauton biblia 12* (1652).

11. *The Meditations of the Emperor Marcus Antoninus*, ed. Farquharson, xlvi, xlix.

12. *Markou Antoninou tou Autokratoros tōn eis beauton biblia 12* (1697).

the collections made by Dacier and Stanhope.” The “Maxims of the Stoics,” appended to the Hutcheson and Moor edition, was excerpted from Gataker’s “Praeloquium”:¹³ it had been included in the 1697 edition and, in English translation, in the 1701 edition. An abbreviated version of the 1697 edition was published in Oxford in 1704, with emendations by R. I. Oxoniensis (thought to be Richard Ibbetson).¹⁴ This edition, with the Greek text and Latin translation by Gataker on facing pages, was republished by Robert and Andrew Foulis, in Glasgow, in 1744.¹⁵ It was one of a dozen classical texts, published by the Foulis Press, that Hutcheson donated to the University of St. Andrews in 1746.¹⁶

While Moor’s particular talent was his mastery of ancient Greek, Hutcheson was also sensitive to the challenge of translating the technical Stoic vocabulary employed in *The Meditations*: such terms as *hegemonikon* (“ruling principle”) and *hypexairesis* (“reserve clause”) were part of this vocabulary.¹⁷ Hutcheson called attention to the difficulty of finding English words that would convey the meaning of these terms. He translated *hegemonikon* as “the governing part,” and in a note to bk. IV, art. I, p. 47, he wrote of the term *hypexairesis*: “The word here translated reservation, is a noted one among the Stoics, often used in Epictetus, Arrian, and Simplicius.” As Hutcheson explained it, the governing part of the mind may exercise a reservation upon desires for external things and then redirect the mind to the pursuit of “our sole good,” which “is in our own affections, purposes, and actions.”

It will also be evident that the language of Hutcheson’s translation remains very much his own. A. S. L. Farquharson, the editor of *The Medi-*

13. In Jeremy Collier’s English translation (1726 ed., pp. 1–30) the title of Gataker’s “Praeloquium” reads: “Gataker’s Preliminary Discourse, In which the Principles of the Stoics are compared with the Peripateticks, with the Old Academicks, and more especially, the Epicurean Sect: The remaining Writings likewise of the Stoick Philosophers, Seneca, Epictetus, and particularly those of our Emperour Marcus Antoninus, are briefly examined.”

14. *Markou Antoninou tou Autokratoros tōn eis heauton biblia 12* (1704).

15. *Markou Antoninou tou Autokratoros tōn eis heauton biblia 12* (1744).

16. See Moore and Silverthorne, “Hutcheson’s LLD,” 10–12.

17. Hadot, *The Inner Citadel*, 52, discusses the significance of these technical terms in the vocabulary of the Stoics.

tations,¹⁸ renders the first sentence of bk. II, art. I, as follows: “I shall meet today inquisitive, ungrateful, violent, treacherous, envious, uncharitable men.”¹⁹ Hutcheson translates the same sentence in his own idiom: “to day I may have to do with some intermeddler in other mens affairs, with an ungrateful man; an insolent, or a crafty, or an envious, or an unsociable selfish man” (p. 33).

As Hutcheson presents *The Meditations*, Marcus’s reflections are designed to directly affect the sensibility of the reader and excite a desire to contribute to the happiness of others. Marcus’s soliloquies, he tells us, “contain some of the plainest, and yet most striking considerations, to affect the hearts of those who have any sense of goodness”; they cannot fail to inspire in us “a constant inflexible charity, and good-will and compassion toward our fellows, superior to all the force of anger or envy, or our little interfering worldly interests” (p. 3). Marcus’s language, in short, posed no obstacle to Hutcheson’s discovering in *The Meditations* a moral philosophy very much congenial to and in harmony with his own. His reading of *The Meditations* may also have been influenced by the recognition that moralists whom he very much admired had discovered in the reflections of Marcus Aurelius insights of great relevance for themselves.

Shaftesbury declared that he had discovered the proper meaning of *sensus communis*, as that phrase had been used by Roman moralists and satirists, in the notes and commentaries on *The Meditations* by Meric Casaubon and Thomas Gataker.²⁰ It was in the glosses of those commentators on the term translated by Hutcheson as “an unsociable, selfish man” that Shaftesbury recognized that *sensus communis* had been used by Juvenal, Horace, and Seneca “to signify sense of public weal and of the common interest, love of the community or society, natural affection, humanity, obligingness, or that sort of civility which rises from a just sense of the common rights of mankind, and the natural equality there is among those of the same species.”²¹ In the same essay, Shaftesbury went on to account

18. See n11, above.

19. *The Meditations of the Emperor Marcus Antoninus*, ed. Farquharson, vol. 1, p. 21.

20. Shaftesbury, “Sensus Communis, an Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour,” in *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*, 48–49, n19.

21. *Ibid.*, 48.

for the origin of families, societies, clans, and tribes in a manner similar to Marcus (bk. IX, art. 9, pp. 109–10). Shaftesbury did not draw the conclusion formed by Marcus, however, that there is a universal happiness or good that all mankind may share. Instead, he thought that “Universal good, or the interest of the world in general, is a kind of remote philosophical object. That greater community falls not easily under the eye.”²² In this respect, Hutcheson’s concern for “universal happiness” has more in common, as we shall see, with Marcus and with Stoic ideals. Shaftesbury elsewhere considered Marcus “one of the wisest and most serious of ancient authors.”²³ And he cited sayings of Marcus, together with excerpts from the works of Epictetus and Horace, to urge readers to withdraw their admiration and desire from objects that are merely pleasurable and direct them instead to “objects, whatever they are, of inward worth and beauty (such as honesty, faith, integrity, friendship, honour).”²⁴

Another moralist whom Hutcheson held in high regard, Henry More, cited sayings of Marcus repeatedly throughout his handbook of morals, *Enchiridion ethicum*.²⁵ More was particularly impressed by Marcus’s concept of the rational soul, of the idea that there is a divinity within us: “that every Man’s Mind is a God, and had its Original from him”;²⁶ that “in the Judgment of that wisest Philosopher . . . to acquiesce in Nature’s common Law, is . . . to obey the common Reason, that is in God; nay, which is little less than God himself. For he is the living Law”;²⁷ “that it was highly estimable to live benignly, and to practise Truth and Justice.”²⁸ More, it may be added, was attempting in these citations to reconcile Stoic and neo-Platonic ideas concerning virtue with a reading of Aristotle’s ethics in which Right Reason was ultimately nothing more than the promptings of an “Inward Sense.”²⁹

22. *Ibid.*, 52.

23. Shaftesbury, “Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author,” in *Characteristics*, 113.

24. Shaftesbury, “Miscellany IV, Chapter I,” in *Characteristics*, 423.

25. More’s *Enchiridion ethicum* (1667) was translated in 1690 as *An Account of Virtue: or, Dr. Henry More’s Abridgment of Morals*.

26. More, *An Account of Virtue*, II.5.VII, p. 120.

27. *Ibid.*, I.2.VII, p. 95.

28. *Ibid.*, II.8.XVI, p. 143.

29. *Ibid.*, I.3.VII, p. 17.

Hutcheson's earliest reference to the work of Marcus Aurelius appears in *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections with Illustrations on the Moral Sense* (1728) in the course of a response to John Clarke of Hull, who had argued, after Locke, that desire arises from the need to relieve uneasiness of some kind. Hutcheson replied: "the noblest Desire in our Nature, that of *universal Happiness*, is generally calm, and wholly free from any confused uneasy Sensation: except, in some warm Tempers, who, by a lively Imagination and frequent Attention to general Ideas, raise something of Passion even toward *universal Nature*. . . . See Marcus Aurelius, in many places."³⁰

A similar appeal to the reader to enlarge the scope of our desires was made in *A System of Moral Philosophy* (1755, but composed in the 1730s), in which Hutcheson explains the diversity of moral judgments by the tendency to confine moral approval to one's own countrymen or, worse, to members of one's own party or sect or cabal. He proposes that "we enlarge our views with truth and justice, and observe the structure of the human soul, pretty much the same in all nations; . . . we must find a sacred tye of nature binding us even to foreigners, and a sense of that justice, mercy and good-will which is due to all. . . . See this often inculcated in Marc. Antonin."³¹

Again, in *A System of Moral Philosophy*, Hutcheson drew upon the work of Marcus to explain the meaning of true piety, as he understood it. True piety was not to be found in the asceticism of the early Christians nor in the perpetuation of their "melancholy notions of sanctity" in the absurd provisions of the canon law: "piety is never more sincere and lively than when it engages men in all social and kind offices to others, out of a sense of duty to God: and just philosophy, as well as religion, could teach that true devotion, tranquility, resignation, and recollection too, may be practiced even in a court or camp, as well as in a wilderness. . . . See Marc Antonin in a variety of passages."³² In this connection it may be recalled that

30. *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections*, sec. 2, art. 5, p. 44 (1728 ed.) or p. 40 (2002 ed.).

31. *A System of Moral Philosophy*, I.5.VII, vol. I, pp. 93–94.

32. *Ibid.*, III.I.XII, vol. II, p. 182.

Hutcheson was also diffident about revealing his authorship of the *System*; it was circulated only privately in his lifetime.

3. The Significance of the Annotations

How should we understand the significance of Hutcheson's notes to the text? Hutcheson's notes typically provide short explanatory discourses or exegeses of the ideas of the Stoics. It is remarkable that the same notes also illuminate Hutcheson's own moral philosophy. This will become evident as we consider his treatment in *The Meditations* of Stoic theories of human nature, the rational soul, the law, the citizen, God, and divine providence.

A central theme of Hutcheson's moral philosophy, from the earliest to the last of his publications, had been that human nature is so constituted that mankind is naturally sociable. This theme was the subject of his inaugural lecture following his appointment as Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow.³³ It was also the professed position of the Stoics, or so Hutcheson reminds the reader of *The Meditations*: "The Stoics always maintained, that by the very constitution of our nature, all men are recommended to the affectionate good-will of all: which would always appear, were it not for the interfering of falsely imagined interests" (bk. III, art. 5, p. 42, note). In a passage of the text where Marcus writes of "the peculiar structure and furniture of human nature," Hutcheson notes: "This, as it was often mentioned already, is such as both recommends to us all pious veneration and submission to God, and all social affections; and makes such dispositions our chief satisfaction and happiness" (bk. XI, art. 5, p. 134, note).

Hutcheson had maintained, in his inaugural lecture and elsewhere in his writings, that it is the presence of kind affections, a natural desire to perform good offices for others, public spirit—benevolence, in a word—that disposes us to be naturally sociable. He was at pains to remind readers, in *An Essay* and in *A System of Moral Philosophy*, that the Stoics, "the avowed enemies of the passions," had made provision for the passions and affec-

33. "On the Natural Sociability of Mankind," in *Logic, Metaphysics, and the Natural Sociability of Mankind*.

tions, for desire and aversion, joy and sorrow.³⁴ But the Stoics had also recognized that the lower passions, the appetites of the body, desires for external things, must be subordinated to the more noble desires, the kind affections, etc.³⁵ Hutcheson found a similar ordering of the passions and affections in the thought of Marcus Aurelius. Marcus had reminded himself not to be misled by the passions: “suffer not that noble part to be enslaved, or moved about by unsociable passions, without its own approbation” (bk. II, art. 2, p. 34).

Hutcheson noted that Marcus was employing “a metaphor from puppets, mov’d by others. Such are men when led by their passions against what their higher faculties incline to and recommend.” Marcus invoked the puppet metaphor later in the text (bk. X, art. 38, p. 132; bk. XII, art. 19, p. 148). The “noble part” that must direct the passions and not be enslaved by them was, in Marcus’s mind, the intellect, the spark of divinity within us, the rational soul. “Won’t you, at last, perceive, that you have something more excellent and divine within you, than that which raises the several passions, and moves you, as the wires do a puppet, without your own approbation? What now is my intellectual part? Is it fear? Is it suspicion? Is it lust? Is it any such thing?” (bk. XII, art. 19, p. 148).

The intellect or the soul was “the governing part,” the *hegemonikon*. Hutcheson, too, recognized that there was a governing part in human nature, which he called diversely the moral faculty or conscience but most often the moral sense. Hutcheson discovered this “governing part” in “the heart.” And he understood “the heart” to be the moral and spiritual equivalent of “the rational soul.”

Hutcheson had been critical in his earlier writings, notably in *Illustrations on the Moral Sense*, of contemporary rationalists who attempted to discover moral good and evil in the relations of things (Clarke), in truth (Wollaston), or in a notion of absolute and infinite perfection (Burnet, Balguy). These efforts were misdirected; they failed to focus upon the only quality in human nature that could properly be considered good: benev-

34. *An Essay* (1728), sec. III, pp. 58–59, or pp. 49–50 (2002); *A System* I.I.V, vol. I, p. 8.

35. *A System* I.4.VI, vol. I, p. 61.

olence or kind affection.³⁶ There were other rationalists who recognized the fundamental importance of benevolence and sociability in the general scheme of things (Cumberland, Pufendorf), but the reasoning required by these “metaphysicians” was beyond the abilities of many who were undoubtedly virtuous or capable of virtue and goodness.³⁷

The Stoic conception of reason and the rational soul was not subject to those objections: it was a faculty capable of immediate perception of virtue and vice, moral good and evil. Hutcheson provided the following note to a reference by Marcus to “that divinity which is within us”: “Thus the Stoics call the rational soul, the seat of knowledge and virtue: deeming it a part of the divinity, ever pervaded, attracted, and inspired by it to all moral good, when the lower passions are restrained” (bk. II, art. 13, p. 37, note). The rational soul was conceived by “the Stoics, after Plato . . . to be a being or substance distinct both from the gross body, and the animal soul, in which are the sensations, lower appetites and passions” (bk. V, art. 19, p. 65, note).

This article and note are cited elsewhere (e.g., at bk. VII, art. 28, p. 87, and bk. VII, art. 55, p. 90). The rational soul so conceived was the faculty that distinguished virtue and vice, perceived moral good and evil: considered in this light, “the rational soul” was synonymous with “the heart”: “they [the Stoics], and the Platonists too, . . . endeavoured to make virtue eligible, from the very feelings of the heart, . . .” (bk. VI, art. 24, pp. 75–76, the daggered note). Also, “the most important practical truths are found out by attending to the inward calm sentiments or feelings of the heart: And this constitution of heart or soul is certainly the work of God, who created and still pervades all things; . . .” (bk. XI, art. 12, p. 137, the double-daggered note).

Now the Stoics, Marcus Aurelius among them, maintained that there is a law of nature and that this law is known by reason, the intellect, the rational soul. Hutcheson had maintained, in the *Inquiry* and elsewhere, that the perception of moral distinctions, of virtue and vice, of rights of various kinds, did not depend upon a law.³⁸ But in a note on *The Medi-*

36. *Illustrations on the Moral Sense*, secs. I, II, III.

37. Hutcheson, *Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* (1725; 2004 ed.), sec. I, art. IV, p. 94.

38. *Inquiry*, sec. VII, pp. 176ff. (2004 ed.).

tations, Hutcheson acknowledged that human beings are governed by a law of nature: “all intelligent beings are, by their nature, under the same immutable eternal law of promoting the good and perfection of the whole. This, in the supreme Being, flows essentially from his nature: in created beings, it is a gift from him” (bk. VIII, art. 2, p. 95, note). Moor, too, in his notes on books IX and X refers to the “law of our nature; entire resignation to the will of God in all events, and kind affections to our fellows” (bk. IX, art. 10, p. 110, the double-daggered note); and, at bk. X, art. 13, p. 125, note, Moor refers to the “grand law of promoting the perfection of the whole, obedience to which is the supreme happiness.” In Hutcheson’s mind, how we come to know the law of nature is not problematic: it is quite simply “the law of God written in the heart.”

It may be remembered here once for all, the life according to nature, in Antoninus, is taken in a very high sense: ’Tis living up to that standard of purity and perfection, which every good man feels in his own breast: ’Tis conforming our selves to the law of God written in the heart: ’Tis endeavouring a compleat victory over the passions, and a total conformity to the image of God. A man must read Antoninus with little attention, who confounds this with the natural man’s life, condemned by St. Paul. (bk. VII, art. 56, p. 91, note)

The law of nature is the law of God; indeed, according to Marcus, *the law is God*. In bk. X, art. 25, p. 127, he wrote of “these things which are ordered by him who governs all: Who is the law, appointing to every one what is proper for him.” Moor noted that “this passage clears up many others where the same word occurs obscurely. See, [bk.] VII. [art.] 31.” He also referred the reader to “the book de Mundo, which goes under Aristotle’s name; chap. 6. ‘For our law, exactly impartial to all, is God.’” Hutcheson agreed (bk. XI, art. 1, p. 133, note; bk. XII, art. 1, p. 144, note). But Hutcheson had earlier observed that God is also present in every human being: “such is the divine goodness that he is ever ready to communicate his goodness and mercy, in the renovation of the heart, and in forming in it all holy affections, and just apprehensions of himself, to all minds which by earnest desires are seeking after him” (bk. VIII, art. 54, p. 105, note). Hutcheson was employing the scholastic language of the communicable

attributes of the deity: that God communicates to or shares with human beings some but not all of the attributes of divinity. He was also contending that the notion that God is present in the heart or soul of everyone who, “by earnest desires,” is “seeking after him” is consistent with the Stoic idea that there is a part of God, a spark of the divine fire, that is present in every human being.

Everyone, Marcus declared, “who flies from his master is a fugitive-slave. Now, the law is our master; and so the transgressor of the law is the fugitive” (bk. X, art. 25, p. 127). Marcus also described all who live under the law that is common to all rational beings as fellow citizens of the universe or the world. “We are all fellow-citizens: and if so, we have a common city. The universe, then, must be that city; for of what other common city are all men citizens?” (bk. IV, art. 4, pp. 48–49). Hutcheson endorsed this idea of citizenship and expanded upon its implications for the relationship that should pertain between the citizens of the universe and its ruler:

This city is the universe. A mind entirely conformed and resigned to God, the great governour of this city, and persuaded of his wisdom, power, and goodness, cannot imagine any event to be hurtful to the universe; and when it is united in will with God, it must acquiesce in all that happens, and can make all events good to itself, as they are occasions of exerting the noblest virtues, which are its supreme good. (bk. V, art. 22, pp. 65–66, note)

Marcus and Hutcheson were in basic agreement concerning the obligations, the sense of duty, or devotion, the piety that should govern relations between citizens and their ruler in the city of God. Marcus had written: “Love and desire that alone which happens to you, and is destined by providence for you; for, what can be more suitable?” (bk. VII, art. 57, p. 91). Hutcheson endorsed this maxim unreservedly:

For, a man who desires only what God destines him, can never be disappointed; since infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, must always accomplish its designs; and, as he loves all his works, every event ordered by him, must be really best for the whole, and for the individuals to which it happens: An intimate and permanent conviction of this, must be the best foundation for the practice of the maxim here recommended. (bk. VII, art. 57, p. 91, note)

Hutcheson's enthusiastic acceptance of Marcus Aurelius's conception of divine providence is consistent with the views expressed in *A System, A Short Introduction*, and in "A Synopsis of Metaphysics," part III. Hutcheson had not replaced the Stoic doctrine of fate or predestination with benevolence. He thought rather that acting in a manner consistent with the divine plan was the most effective way to promote benevolence. He considered it "an amiable notion of providence, that it has ordered for every good man that station of life, and those circumstances, which infinite wisdom foresaw were fittest for his solid improvement in virtue, according to that original disposition of nature which God had given him" (bk. XI, art. 7, p. 135, note).

One may see in the Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius and Hutcheson's enthusiastic endorsement of it the possibility of a benign redescription of the predestinarian doctrine of Calvinists and the Presbyterian or Reformed Church. The crucial difference between Hutcheson and more orthodox Calvinists did not turn on predestination: it was rather that Hutcheson, unlike Calvin (and St. Augustine and St. Paul), did not think that mankind was naturally sinful. He thought that mankind was naturally kind, benevolent, good. In his inaugural lecture, he had placed particular emphasis on the state of innocence, which Reformed theologians attributed only to Adam and Eve before the Fall. In Hutcheson's mind, this "original disposition of nature" applied to every human being. Insofar as men were presently to be found in a condition of sinfulness and depravity, it was as a result of bad education, confused imaginations, the pursuit of external things, property and riches, love of fame: these were the dispositions, the passions which were productive of moral evil. Marcus had written: "Look inwards; within is the fountain of good; which is ever springing up, if you be always digging in it" (bk. VII, art. 59, p. 91). Hutcheson considered this excellent advice. "The author of this advice, had the best opportunities of trying all the happiness which can arise from external things. The dissipating pursuits of external things, stupify the nobler powers. By recollection we find the dignity of our nature: the diviner powers are disentangled, and exert themselves in all worthy social affections of piety and humanity; and the soul has an inexpressible delight in them" (bk. VII, art. 59, p. 91, note).