Writings on Standing Armies

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Writings on Standing Armies

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Selected, Edited, and with
an Introduction by
David Womersley, General Editor

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THE THOMAS HOLLIS LIBRARY

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Thomas Hollis (1720–74) was an eighteenth-century Englishman who devoted his energies, his fortune, and his life to the cause of liberty. Hollis was trained for a business career, but a series of inheritances allowed him to pursue instead a career of public service. He believed that citizenship demanded activity and that it was incumbent on citizens to put themselves in a position, by reflection and reading, in which they could hold their governments to account. To that end for many years Hollis distributed books that he believed explained the nature of liberty and revealed how liberty might best be defended and promoted.

A particular beneficiary of Hollis's generosity was Harvard College. In the years preceding the Declaration of Independence, Hollis was assiduous in sending to America boxes of books, many of which he had had specially printed and bound, to encourage the colonists in their struggle against Great Britain. At the same time he took pains to explain the colonists' grievances and concerns to his fellow Englishmen.

The Thomas Hollis Library makes freshly available a selection of titles that, because of their intellectual power, or the influence they exerted on the public life of their own time, or the distinctiveness of their approach to the topic of liberty, comprise the cream of the books distributed by Hollis. Many of these works have been either out of print since the

eighteenth century or available only in very expensive and scarce editions. The highest standards of scholarship and production ensure that these classic texts can be as salutary and influential today as they were two hundred and fifty years ago.

David Womersley

INTRODUCTION

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On 9 December 1767 Thomas Hollis presented Harvard College with a volume of tracts which he had assembled for his own personal use, made up of pamphlets on the related subjects of a standing army and a militia.[1] It contains the following five items, all of which (together with the most important pamphlets written in favor of the creation and retention of a standing army) have been included in the present Liberty Fund edition:

1. John Trenchard, *An History of Standing Armies in England*. London, 1739.

2. Anonymous, *Reasons Against a Standing Army*. London, 1717.

3. "Cato" [Thomas Gordon], *A Discourse of Standing Armies*. London, 1722.

4. [John Toland], *The Militia Reform'd*. London, 1698.

5. "C. S." [Charles Sackville, second Duke of Dorset], *A Treatise Concerning the Militia*. London, 1752.

Hollis's purpose in sending books to Harvard as well as to Switzerland and elsewhere in Europe was to promote the public understanding of liberty.

1. Houghton Library, Harvard University, press mark HOU GEN *ED75. H7267.Zz753t. The date of the donation is recorded on a Harvard College library bookplate pasted into the volume.

Why did Hollis think these tracts had a role to play in that project of political education? To understand the thinking which lay behind Hollis's decision to donate this very personal book to Harvard we must begin by reviewing the circumstances that led up to the composition of the earliest of the tracts included in the volume, John Trenchard's *A Short History of Standing Armies in England*, first published in 1697 in the course of a controversy which had begun earlier the same year.

The "Standing Army" Crisis of 1697–1698

Together with his wife Mary, William III had been crowned on 11 April 1689. Only a few weeks later, on 5 May, England declared war on France, thus initiating a conflict that would be known by a variety of names: the War of the League of Augsburg, or the War of the Grand Alliance, or the Nine Years War. Over the coming months William put together a coalition of nations (Scotland, Austria, Spain, Savoy, and some German states) to frustrate what he saw as the ambitions of Louis XIV toward European hegemony and universal monarchy.

The ensuing war was contested principally in the Low Countries and proved to be "a prolonged, bloody, and frequently discouraging struggle."[2] Early French successes by sea and land only began to be reversed by William as late as 1694 with the capture of Huy. But by 1696 France, England, and the Low Countries were all exhausted by the financial strain of such a protracted conflict.[3] Secret negotiations for a peace had begun as

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2. Claydon, *William III*, p. 1.

3. "The Nine Years War is estimated to have cost £49,320,000, about £5,500,000 per annum, that is, over three times the average level of government expenditure during James's reign. All forms of taxation were sharply increased, including poll taxes and a new regular direct tax, the aid or land tax (which brought in over £19 million during the war). But total revenue from all sources during the war years amounted to only £32,766,000, leaving a gap of over £16 million that had to be borrowed" (J. R. Jones, *Country and Court: England 1658–1714* [London: Edward Arnold, 1978], p. 65). See, for a corroborating contemporary perception, Blackmore, *History*, pp. 9–10. Michael Braddick provides a helpful longer perspective: "During the Nine Years War there were on average nearly 117,000 men in military service each year (more than 40,000 in the navy and over 76,000 in the army). This necessitated annual average spending of nearly £5.5m. Thus, even though

early as 1692, but by the middle years of the decade they had been given added urgency by economic pressures. Formal negotiations for peace began in May 1697, and were concluded in September. The principal terms of the resulting Treaty of Ryswick—all territories captured by any side since 1688 were to be handed back; the Dutch were to be allowed to garrison eight "barrier" fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands; Louis promised not to aid William's enemies and finally recognized him as the rightful king of England; and the town of Orange was to be handed back to the House of Nassau—made it clear that this was a truce, not a genuine peace. It offered a pause in which all protagonists could draw breath. But it placed on the table no durable resolution of the underlying problem of mastery in Europe that had precipitated hostilities.[4] In the event, it was a truce that lasted for less than five years before it was interrupted by the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession in May 1702.

Nevertheless, the signing of the Treaty of Ryswick was popular with William's new subjects. In England there was little public appetite for war, and only the most sharp-sighted could have glimpsed in the nation's new-found ability to launch and pursue military operations on the Continent the harbinger of an imperial future. So when in the winter of 1697 William returned to England from the negotiations in the Low Countries, he was met with acclamation:

> He returned to *England*, and upon the 16th of *November*, at the Citizens request, made His Publick Entry thro' *London*, being attended by all the Men of Quality in very great State, and never, (I am sure,) in one Day saw so many People (and all of them His own Subjects) in all His Lifetime; and in whose Affections He Triumphed as much as ever he had done at any time over His Enemies; and may He always

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taxes produced £3.64m per annum, the government quickly ran into debt. The War of Spanish Succession saw over 135,000 men in arms (about 43,000 in the navy and 93,000 in the army), at a cost of £7.06m per annum. Tax revenues now reached £5.36m per annum but even this could not save the government from accumulating still larger debts. By the end of the Nine Years War the debt was £16.7m. It was reduced to £14.1m by the outbreak of the War of Spanish Succession, but by 1713 had climbed again, reaching a dizzying £36.2m" (Braddick, *State Formation*, p. 265). See also Claydon, *William III*, pp. 13, 233.

4. *ODNB*, s.v. "William III."

do the first, and never have occasion for the second, but may we long live under the Benign Influence of His Reign, who hath Rescued our Religion and Liberties out of the Jaws of Hell, and Destruction, so intrepidly Fought our Battles for us, and now at length restored unto us the Comforts, and Blessing of a Firm and Honourable Peace.[5]

However, no one knew better than William that the present peace was anything but firm. Therefore he was privately determined to retain his army of at least 87,000 experienced soldiers in preparation for the next—and imminent—round of his unconcluded struggle with Louis XIV.[6] But a coalition of Tories and radical Whigs—the New Country Party—which had come into embryonic existence as early as 1693, and which had on occasion already successfully resisted the measures of the ruling Whig Junto, was preparing at the same time to reactivate a long-standing topic of anti-Stuart resentment by agitating both within and without doors for the disbanding of the army.[7]

The leaders of the New Country Party were the dissident Whigs Paul Foley and Robert Harley.[8] Their achievement had been to exploit their extensive personal connections in the House of Commons to open up channels of communication and cooperation not only with disaffected Tories such as Sir Thomas Clarges and Sir Christopher Musgrave but also with "Old" or radical Whigs displeased by the compromises of stance and principle that had been inevitable in the evolution of the Whigs from a party of protest and revolution to a party of government.[9] As Toland would

5. Jones, *History of Europe*, sig. Xx1ʳ⁻ᵛ; see also Jones, *Theatre of Wars*, p. 98.

6. The estimate is Macaulay's (*History*, 6:2731). It is broadly in line with more recent assessments: see above, pp. x–xi, n. 3.

7. On 28 September 1697 James Vernon, one of the secretaries of state, had warned that Parliamentary pressure for the disbanding of the army was to be expected (Schwoerer, *Armies*, p. 163). On the New Country Party, see J. P. Kenyon, *Robert Spencer, Earl of Sunderland 1641–1702* (London: Longmans, Green, 1958), pp. 247–48; Claydon, *William III*, pp. 195–96, 202–3; and Hill, *Harley*, pp. 25–28.

8. Paul Foley (1644/45–99), commonwealth Whig; Exclusionist; Speaker of the House of Commons, 1695–99. Robert Harley (1661–1724), first Earl of Oxford and Mortimer; initially a Shaftesburian Whig, later an idiosyncratic Tory; statesman. See Macaulay, *History*, 6:2743. For the broad moment of the attack on the army, see Claydon, *William III*, pp. 216–17.

9. The classic account of this transformation remains John Kenyon's Ford Lectures, published as *Revolution Principles: The Politics of Party 1689–1720*

in a few years gloatingly put it (referring to William III's eventual rejection of the Junto Whigs in 1700): "see the Instability of human Councils; some of those surly Whigs grew by degrees the most pliant Gentlemen imaginable, they could think no Revenue too great for the King, nor would suffer his Prerogative to be lessened; they were on frivolous Pretences for keeping up a Standing Army to our further Peril and Charge . . . so these Apostates were abandoned by their former Friends, and left to the Support of their own Interest, which appeared to be so very little with any Party, that the King did wisely cashier them."[10]

The current crisis over the size of the land force was well chosen for the assembly of this checkered coalition of divergent interests and discordant sentiments, for (as Macaulay would remark) resistance to standing armies was a banner under which even the most unlikely allies could unite: "One class of politicians was never weary of repeating that an Apostolic Church, a loyal gentry, an ancient nobility, a sainted King, had been foully outraged by the Joyces and the Prides: another class recounted the atrocities committed by the Lambs of Kirke, and by the Beelzebubs and Lucifers of Dundee; and both classes, agreeing in scarcely anything else, were disposed to agree in aversion to the red coats."[11]

The first blow in their campaign, John Trenchard and Walter Moyle's *An Argument Shewing that a Standing Army Is Inconsistent with a Free Government, and Absolutely Destructive to the Constitution of the English Monarchy*, was published in October 1697, some two months before the debate proper began in Parliament.[12] J. A. Downie has described the behind-the-scenes collaborations that produced the first wave of anti–standing army pamphlets:

> John Trenchard was the opposition *chef de propagande* during the standing army controversy. His role can be documented. He coordinated the writing, printing and publishing of all the important contributions. Harley was the opposition leader in parliament. But their

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). For a contemporary response, see, e.g., Charles Davenant, *The True Picture of a Modern Whig* (1701).

10. John Toland, *The Art of Governing by Parties* (1701), pp. 31–32.

11. Macaulay, *History*, 6:2732.

12. Below, pp. 1–50.

roles merged from time to time. . . . Contact between the two men was extensive and prolonged.[13]

An Argument was swiftly answered by writers supportive of the position of the king and advocates of the retention of at least a fraction of the army, and two of these immediate replies—John Somers's *A Letter, Ballancing the Necessity of Keeping a Land-Force in Times of Peace: with the Dangers that May Follow On It* and Daniel Defoe's *Some Reflections on a Pamphlet Lately Published*—are reprinted in this volume.[14]

So the ground of the subsequent quarrel was to some extent already staked out and the lines of engagement already defined when, on 3 December 1697, William opened Parliament and in the course of the speech from the throne remarked that England's safety would be endangered "without a land force." When it transpired that the majority in Parliament against a standing army was not to be moved and that accordingly at least some of William's forces would have to be stood down—including the elite "Blue Guards" that William had brought with him in 1688 from the United Provinces—the king's dignity was undoubtedly damaged. Swift would list among those "who have made a mean contemptible Figure in some Action or Circumstance of their Life" "King Wm 3rd of England, when he sent to beg the House of Commons to continue his Dutch Guards, and was refused."[15]

The course taken by the ensuing debates in Parliament was summarized by Abel Boyer in his *History of William III*, so there is no need here to rehearse the mere circumstances of 1697–98.[16] We can turn instead to the intellectual background to the quarrel, and consider how the

13. Downie, *Harley*, pp. 32–33. Harley, however, had not been one of the first movers in the controversy, although he did provide advice to Trenchard as the controversy developed (pp. 29 and 32).

14. Below, pp. 51–67 and 69–109. For a bibliography of the controversy, see Schwoerer, "Chronology" 382–90; supplemented by J. A. Downie, "Chronology and Authorship of the Standing Army Tracts: A Supplement," *Notes and Queries* 221 (1976): 342–46.

15. Swift, *Prose Writings*, 5:85. William's Blue and Dutch Guards had to be either disbanded or sent overseas because the Parliamentary resolution stipulated that only natural born Englishmen could serve in the retained land force (Downie, *Harley*, p. 35).

16. See Appendix E.

arguments mounted for and against a standing army in late seventeenth-century England compare on the one hand with apparently similar arguments in antiquity and early modern Europe, and on the other with apparently similar arguments which periodically flared up in England throughout the eighteenth century. In the case of both we will find that a superficial similarity of language and sentiment disguises important underlying discontinuities.

The Classical and Early Modern Intellectual Background

The questions of where to locate, of in whose hands to place, and of how to exercise the state's powers of military force lie behind a perennial topic in political theory, and coalesce into a recurrent problem in political practice.

The political thinkers and historians of antiquity had been acutely aware of the dangers that might arise should an army become attached more deeply to its general than to the state. Such transference would be very natural—nothing more, after all, than a reversion to a point of departure. For these thinkers suspected that civil society itself had begun in the personal loyalty felt by soldiers toward a successful commander.[17] Yet they also knew that, for a city to endure, the duty of obligation, although it may have originated in the personal ascendancy enjoyed by a charismatic *imperator* as a result of his immediate contact with the men he led, had to be institutionalized and transferred to the *urbs*—hence the strong component of city-worship in classical paganism. Were that transference ever to falter, the threat to the state would be grave. Yet such an eventuality was always to be feared. For the qualities of a good general, the Roman thinkers of the later empire well knew, were also naturally imperial qualities: *experto crede*.[18]

For historians such as Sallust and poets such as Lucan, the resurgence of the personal attachment of an army to its general, to the point where it might overwhelm their patriotism, was the herald and companion of civil

17. Polybius, VI.4–6.
18. "Ducis boni imperatoriam virtutem esse" (Tacitus, *Agricola*, XXXIX.2).

wars: those paradoxical conflicts which could not really be called *bella*, first because they were by definition unjust, and second because they were not waged against an external *hostis*.[19] It had been so in the struggles between Marius and Sulla,[20] and it would be so again in the civil wars precipitated by Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon.[21] In such terrible conflicts even the armies of the Republic might be tainted by the political heresy of a merely personal loyalty that had sprung up first among their adversaries. In book 9 of the *Pharsalia*, Lucan relates an encounter between Cato and some of the remnants of Pompey's forces after their defeated leader's assassination in Egypt. One of the Pompeians explains why they are now abandoning the cause of the Republic:

> Nos, Cato,—da veniam—Pompei duxit in arma,
> Non belli civilis amor, partesque favore
> Fecimus. Ille iacet, quem paci praetulit orbis,
> Causaque nostra perit; patrios permitte penates
> Desertamque domum dulcesque revisere natos.[22]

To which Cato replies with biting irony:

> Ergo pari voto gessisti bella, iuventus,
> Tu quoque pro dominis, et Pompeiana fuisti,
> Non Romana manus?[23]

Yet the armies—the *manus*—of antiquity, whether they remained under the control of the state or reserved their allegiance for their general, were in important ways different from the standing armies which would loom so large in the political imagination of late seventeenth- and

19. David Armitage, "What's the Big Idea? Intellectual History and the *Longue Durée*," *History of European Ideas* 38 (December 2012): 502.

20. Sallust, *Catiline*, XI.5.

21. Lucan, *Pharsalia*, I.373–88; IV.185; IV.501–2, 572–73; VII.285–87.

22. "Pardon us, Cato—it was love of Pompey, not of civil war, that roused us to arms, and we took sides out of favor for him. But he lies low, whom the world preferred to peace, and our cause has ceased to exist; allow us to return to our native homes, our deserted households, and the children of our love" (IX.227–31).

23. "It seems then, soldiers, that you too fought with the same desire as others, in defense of tyranny—that you were the troops of Pompey, and not of Rome" (IX.256–58).

early eighteenth-century England. While the *manus* of Republican Rome posed in some sense the same essential threat (namely, that deadly force designed to be directed against an external *hostis* might be redirected inward to coerce or intimidate the native population), they were however not permanently supported by the resources of the state. They might—indeed, they occasionally did—plunder the nation's treasure.[24] They might pillage their fellow citizens. But typically they did not seek to perpetuate their existence as an army. Like the nameless Pompeian soldier rebuked by Cato, their desire was to be paid, disbanded, and then given leave to return home ("patrios permitte penates / Desertamque domum dulcesque revisere natos"). The soldiery of antiquity—until at least the establishment of a permanent military force under the principate of Augustus—was thus still essentially in some respects a militia, albeit one with the potential to cause great domestic harm.

During the late republic and the early principate Roman military culture changed. Caesar's *Bellum Civile* shows how in the first century B.C. "the phenomenon of continuous military service created unprecedented bonds between generals and soldiers."[25] But in one respect Caesar's depiction of the soldiery is ambiguous. Although his legions are shown to be remarkably loyal to their supreme commander, nevertheless "they still have the capacity to disobey or to behave violently. In the hands of a lesser general, we must conclude, the military hierarchy might well have deteriorated."[26] In the surviving books of his *Historiae* Tacitus showed this process of military degeneration happening during the chaotic events of A.D. 69, the year of the four emperors:

> Tacitus complicates, and in part reverses, the familiar picture of fickle soldiers who gradually assimilate themselves to the character of their commander, whether he is honourable or defective. . . . we see soldiers on all sides gradually develop a mistrust of their immediate commanding officers, which prolongs the war by fragmenting the armies and making them less efficient fighting machines.[27]

24. Lucan, *Pharsalia*, III.84–168 (Caesar's looting of the Roman treasury).
25. Ash, *Ordering Anarchy*, p. 5.
26. Ash, *Ordering Anarchy*, p. 7.
27. Ash, *Ordering Anarchy*, p. 168.

These successive developments in the classical past perhaps go some way toward explaining how it happened that, in the standing army debates in England at the end of the seventeenth century, apparently contradictory qualities were attributed to standing armies. They could be both terrifyingly effective instruments in the controlling hands of ambitious generals, but also alarmingly ungovernable hordes let loose on a defenseless society.

It was Niccolò Machiavelli who developed the Western discussion of the political problem of force beyond the formulations of antiquity. Machiavelli's interest in this question had been aroused and focused by the disturbances of the *quattrocento*, in which the Italian city-states had experimented with the use of mercenaries, generally with disastrous results. In *The Prince*, the *Discourses*, and *The Art of War*, Machiavelli repeatedly contrasted recent Italian experience with Roman history.[28] Guided by what he saw in that contrast, Machiavelli had argued that the marvelous expansion of the Roman Republic had been due to the willingness of its male population to take up arms on behalf of the state. He went on to generalize this observation about early Roman history into a political principle, insisting that a militia was always and necessarily superior to a mercenary army, and (furthermore) was an infallible symptom of free government.[29] What was the train of thought which led to this uncompromising conclusion? Those who were content to subcontract their defense to paid professional soldiers had placed their ease above their liberty, and had thereby laid themselves open to tyranny. The decline and fall of Roman power, in this civic humanist analysis, could be

28. *The Prince*, chaps. 12–14; the *Discourses*, bk. 2; *The Art of War*, bk. 1, chaps. 2–9; bk. 7, chap. 17.

29. In so arguing Machiavelli was going against some influential earlier Italian political thinkers and jurists. For instance, Bartolus of Sassoferrato (1313–57) had insisted that a true king "does not form his bodyguard of citizens" ("On the Tyrant"). On the composition of the Florentine militia, and why it is mistaken to see Machiavelli arguing narrowly for a citizen militia (an error into which I myself have fallen), see the following: Carlo Dionisotti, *Machiavellerie* (Turin: G. Einaudi, 1980), pp. 3–59; Paul Anthony Rahe, *Against Throne and Altar: Machiavelli and Political Theory under the English Republic* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 9; and Robert Black, "Machiavelli and the Militia: New Thoughts," *Italian Studies* 69 (2014): 41–50.

traced to the replacement of the militia of the Republic by the professional, and increasingly mercenary, standing armies of the Empire.[30]

Machiavelli's preference for militias over mercenaries was elaborated and fleshed out with historical detail by the thinkers who followed him. The over-running of the provinces of the western Empire in the fifth century by the northern barbarians had destroyed Roman military and political power in Europe. The constitutions of the Gothic states which replaced that empire had embraced a different principle of military establishment. The general of the conquering army was made king, and he divided the conquered lands among his principal officers, or barons. They in their turn parcelled out their lands among their tenants. Both the barons and their tenants held their lands from the king in return for the duty of military service. There was no standing army, and when military forces were required, the king summoned his barons, who repaired to his standard accompanied by their vassals.

Andrew Fletcher would describe the virtue of these feudal governments in terms of the way their military institutions secured important political benefits:

> this constitution of government put the sword into the hands of the Subject, because the Vassals depended more immediately on the Barons, than on the King; which effectually secured the freedom of those Governments. For the Barons could not make use of their Power to destroy those limited Monarchies, without destroying their own Grandeur; nor could the King invade their privileges, having no other Forces than the Vassals of his own Demeasnes to rely upon for his Support in such an Attempt.[31]

However, it was a matter of historical fact that feudal governments had expired in Europe around 1500, to be replaced by increasingly absolutist

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30. It is important to bear in mind that there is no necessary equivalence between a standing army and a mercenary army, although both share the characteristic of fighting for money. A mercenary army will fight for whoever can pay them, but may not be permanent. A standing army is permanent but is not generally for hire to the highest bidder. Nevertheless, the terms might still be used as synonyms: see *Gulliver's Travels*, p. 186.

31. *A Discourse Concerning Militia's and Standing Armies* (1697); below, p. 153.

monarchies which went on during the following century to acquire the command of permanent military forces as one of the principal instruments of their power:

> One of the hallmarks of European government in the latter half of the seventeenth century was the development and political employment of the standing army. Between the conclusion of the Thirty Years' War and the end of the wars of Louis XIV most major and minor continental states created regular armed forces for the defence of the homeland, offence against an international opponent, to repress internal political and social opposition, and in slavish imitation of the fashionable French. . . . During this period standing armies became the storm troops of the absolute monarchs who were wrestling with the problems of centralising their authority in order to make their governments more effective.[32]

How and why had this occurred? Opinions differed.

The English neo-Machiavellian James Harrington had traced the extinguishing of feudalism in England to the absolutist ambitions of the Tudors, who had undermined the power of the barons in order to secure the position of the crown. Andrew Fletcher, on the other hand, ascribed the demise of feudalism to the effects of the luxurious living which had become possible thanks to the three cardinal inventions of modernity: printing, gunpowder, and the compass.[33] According to Fletcher, the pursuit of luxury had induced the barons to emancipate their vassals in return for payment, and so effectively to convert their feudal establishments into ready cash.[34] At the same time, the pursuit of luxury had induced the common people to prefer the payment of taxes to military service. But whether you went with Harrington or with Fletcher, the result was that, in the modern world, the power of the sword had passed from the hand of the subject to the hand of the monarch, who now had at his disposal a professional, permanent standing army which was as

32. Childs, *Army*, p. 83; see also p. 203.
33. Below, pp. 154–55.
34. An argument that would be adopted and deepened by Fletcher's compatriot, Adam Smith (Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, III.iv, pp. 418–19).

convenient for the control of his own subjects as for the defense of the realm against external enemies—always provided, of course, that he could find the wherewithal to pay for it.[35]

Seventeenth-Century English Experience and the Idea of a Standing Army

The debate over standing armies that arose in England at the end of the seventeenth century can be seen as a particular and acute instance of the political problem of military force. However, the seventeenth-century English debate did not merely go over old ground. It possessed some distinctive and innovative aspects. But these new and distinctive features have been to some degree camouflaged by a linguistic anomaly.

We first encounter the English phrase "standing army" in 1603, when Richard Knolles used it to refer to the domestic policy of Tamerlane: "He kept alwaies a standing armie of fortie thousand horse, and three-score thousand foot readie at all assaies."[36] For the next forty years or so the *OED* lists no more than a handful of further occurrences of the phrase, until we reach the outbreak of hostilities between Charles I and Parliament in 1642, when unsurprisingly it became much more common. However, although a fondness for a standing army is swiftly included in the list of despotic inclinations characteristic of the Stuarts, Cromwell too had seen its attractions. Clause XXVII of the Instrument of Government of 1653 had been particularly alarming: "The Instrument had . . . provided for a 'constant yearly Revenue' for the maintenance of '10,000 Horse and Dragoons, and 20,000 Foot, in England Scotland, and Ireland, for the Defence and Security thereof, and also for a convenient

35. For a textbook example of the stages whereby this might be brought about, see adv. 29 in Trajano Boccalini, *Advices from Parnassus* (1706), p. 45. In his essay "Upon Universal Monarchy" Charles Davenant had explained how Louis XIV had weakened the French nobility as a prelude to acquiring a standing army (Charles Davenant, *Essays* [1701], p. 269). "Provided that he could raise sufficient cash for their pay and upkeep, Charles [II] could recruit troops when he chose and employ them as he wished" (Childs, *Army*, pp. xvii–xviii).

36. Knolles, *Turkes*, p. 235. Cf. Schwoerer, *Armies*, p. 2.