This PSET should <u>not</u> be turned in.

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1 (100 PTS.) REPLICATOR DYNAMICS

Two species of butterflies are coevolving in a population. Species S1 has frequency x, and species S2 has frequency $1-x$. Their fitnesses are frequency-dependent with payoff matrix

$$
\begin{array}{c@{}c}
 & \begin{array}{cc} S1 & S2 \end{array} \\
\begin{array}{c} S1 \\ S2 \end{array} &
\left(\begin{array}{cc} a & b \\ c & d \end{array} \right)
\end{array}
\tag{1}
$$

1.A. Write down the replicator equation for $\dot{x}$. Prove that adding an arbitrary constant to either column of the payoff matrix would have no effect on the dynamics of the system.

1.B. Derive the condition under which neither pure S1 nor pure S2 is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). In this scenario, what are the frequencies of S1 and S2 in the long run?

1.C. In the case of constant selection where $a = b$ and $c = d$, the two species' fitnesses are no longer frequency-dependent. Fisher's Fundamental Theorem states that, in this special case of constant selection, the time rate of change of the average fitness ϕ across species is equal to the variance in fitness across species (which implies that the average fitness ϕ will not decrease over time). Verify that this theorem holds for the case of two species.

1.D. When selection is not constant, selection can sometimes act to decrease average fitness over time. Choose a set of payoff values a, b, c, d and initial frequencies x_0 and $1-x_0$ for which the average fitness decreases. Using your favorite programming language, plot the average fitness ϕ over time to show that it indeed decreases for your chosen parameters.

1.E. When there are more than two species, the species abundances and average fitness can oscillate over time in interesting ways. Consider the three-species payoff matrix

$$
\begin{array}{c@{}c}
 & \begin{array}{ccc} S1 & S2 & S3 \end{array} \\
\begin{array}{c} S1 \\ S2 \\ S3 \end{array} &
\left(\begin{array}{ccc} r & -1 & 1 \\ 0 & r & -1 \\ -1 & 1 & r \end{array} \right)
\end{array}
\tag{2}
$$

where r is the strength of cooperation within a species. For $r = 0$, use your favorite programming language to plot the species frequencies (x_1, x_2, x_3) over time, as well as the average fitness ϕ over time, from $t = 0$ to $t = 60$. Set the initial species frequencies to $(.8, .1, .1)$. Then repeat this for $r = -.5$, $r = .5$, $r = 1.5$. What differences do you see?

2 (100 PTS.) INFECTION DEFECTION

Bacteriophage $\phi6$ is a virus that infects the *Pseudomonas phaseolicola* bacteria, using special phage enzymes to replicate intracellularly, degrade the cell membrane, and spread phage to nearby bacterial cells. Phages with the cooperator genotype C produce a full complement of enzymes which diffuse throughout the cell and can be used by other phages infecting the same cell. Phages with the defector genotype D produce much less of this resource, instead relying on the enzyme produced by nearby cooperators.

In this problem, you will use the tools of evolutionary game theory to interpret phage fitness data and to make predictions about the fate of the phage strains. You may assume that the phage population infecting each cell is very large and resembles the phage population overall. Given two phage strains, C and D, suppose we have the following linear payoff matrix:

$$\begin{array}{c} \\ C \\ D \end{array} \begin{array}{c} C \quad\;\; D \\ \begin{pmatrix} R & S \\ T & P \end{pmatrix} \end{array} \tag{3}$$

where $T > R > P > S$.

For example, if a single D particle infects a cell otherwise inhabited entirely by C phage, the expected number of D particles released from the cell that will later infect another cell is T.

2.A. Calculate ϕ, the average fitness of the phage population, in terms of x, the fraction of the phage population that is strain C. Then suppose we design a simple experiment to measure ϕ for various x, and a regression analysis reveals that ϕ increases linearly in x. What relationship can we deduce must exist between the entries of the payoff matrix?

2.B. If the benefit of cooperation is $b = R - S > 0$ and the cost is $c = P - S > 0$, explain why the payoff matrix above can be written equivalently with only two free parameters:

$$\begin{array}{c} \\ C \\ D \end{array} \begin{array}{c} C \quad\;\; D \\ \begin{pmatrix} b - c & -c \\ b & 0 \end{pmatrix} \end{array} \tag{4}$$

where $b > c > 0$.

Then determine what proportion of cooperation x maximizes the population fitness ϕ.

2.C. Write down the replicator equation for the dynamics of x over time t, and solve for $x(t)$. What happens to $x(t)$ as $t \to \infty$? What happens to the population fitness ϕ as $t \to \infty$?

2.D. If the initial phage population is evenly split between the two strains, how long will it take the population to become 95% dominated by a single strain, in terms of b and c?

2.E. Now let there be a finite number N of phage in each cell. Given that a phage interacts with all other coinfecting phages, including itself, calculate the new difference in strain fitnesses, $f_C - f_D$. Argue that the cooperating strain C will survive if and only if $b/c > N$. Is cooperation more likely in host cells with few phage or in host cells with many phage?

3 (100 PTS.) SUBOPTIMAL COEXISTENCE

Two species are evolving over time with frequencies x and $1-x$, and with fitnesses $f_1(x)$ and $f_2(x)$ respectively, according to the standard replicator dynamic

$$\dot{x} = x(1-x)(f_1(x) - f_2(x)). \tag{5}$$

You discover that both species stably coexist at frequencies x^* and $1-x^*$ where $0 < x^* < 1$, yet the average fitness $\phi(x)$ is minimized at this ESS, such that $\phi'(x^*) = 0$ and $\phi''(x^*) \geq 0$. Show that

$$\frac{d}{dx} \ln \left| \frac{df_2}{df_1} \right| \geq 8 \tag{6}$$

at $x = x^*$. It may help to compute $\frac{f_2(x^*)}{f_1(x^*)}$ and $\frac{f_2'(x^*)}{f_1'(x^*)}$ in terms of x^*, and to verify that $f_1'(x^*) < 0 < f_2'(x^*)$.