Power, Racism, and Privilege

Race Relations in Theoretical and Sociohistorical Perspectives

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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

EW fields in the social sciences have received the degree of attention from both scholars and laymen as has race relations. Writings on the subject range from those essentially polemical in nature to those that provide systematic empirical propositions designed to explain and predict racial phenomena. Some race relations analysts are criticized for being too detached and too objective, and others are denounced for their lack of objectivity and heavy value orientation. It would be difficult indeed for any scholar to be totally detached or objective when studying an emotionally laden area such as race relations. Nor is it absolutely necessary that he attempt to be so, for it is not the scientist's orientation or degree of detachment toward a subject matter that is important for the advancement of knowledge but the extent to which his arguments can withstand the test of validity, i.e., the standards imposed by the scientific community to accept or reject hypotheses or theories.[1] (Supra numbers refer to notes at the end of each chapter.) In this sense, then, the field of race relations, despite the polemics, is not unique. In addition to the proliferation of recent empirical studies, the gradual expansion of theoretical works has added impetus to a critical re-examination of many existing approaches to race relations and of many once widely accepted hypotheses.

APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF RACE RELATIONS

Much of the behavior usually defined as "race relations" could be treated as subject matter in other recognized areas of sociology, e.g., social stratification, social movements, and urban sociology. In fact, one author has maintained that the field of race has "little claim for autonomous theoretical status."[2] Certainly, when one considers that interpersonal rela-

tions between dominant and subordinate members can often be explained by theories of social psychology,[3] that minority liberation and nationalistic movements are forms of collective behavior, and that racial caste systems are instances of social stratification, it is not unreasonable to conclude that theories of race that fail to incorporate the accumulated knowledge of other relevant substantive fields tend to be too restrictive in their application and overly selective in their focus. It is because of their lack of scope that many of the traditional models of race relations are under attack by students of race. Race relations analysts were shackled for several decades by the narrow perspectives of assimilation models and by the heavy preoccupation with theories of prejudice, and therefore found themselves unprepared to predict or explain the violent confrontation of ghetto revolts, the emergence and growth of the Black Power Movement, and the rapid rise of cultural nationalism within the black community.[4]

As early as 1962, Harold Cruse discussed in prophetic words the limited perspective of earlier sociological approaches to race relations:

> Integration vs. separation has become polarized around two main wings of racial ideology, with fateful implications for the Negro movement and the country at large. Yet we are faced with a problem in racial ideology without any means of properly understanding how to deal with it. The dilemma arises from a lack of comprehension of the historical origins of the conflict.
>
> The problem is complicated by a lack of recognition that the conflict even exists. The fundamental economic and cultural issues at stake in this conflict cannot be dealt with by American sociologists for the simple reason that sociologists never admit that such issues should exist at all in American society. They talk of "Americanizing" all the varied racial elements in the United States: but, when it is clear that certain racial elements are not being "Americanized," socially, economically, or culturally, the sociologists proffer nothing but total evasion or more studies on "the nature of preju-

dice." Hence the problems remain with us in a neglected
state of suspension until they break out in what are con-
sidered to be "negative," "antisocial," "antidemocratic" reac-
tions.[5]

Although race relations specialists earlier tended to confine
their studies to the United States and to concentrate heavily
on synchronic studies of prejudice,[6] at present more attention
is being directed to historical and cross-cultural studies. A
number of recent studies have attempted to use historical and
comparative data to develop general theoretical propositions of
race and ethnic relations.[7] The form of these propositions has
varied, ranging from those explicitly formulated and advanced
as hypotheses requiring further testing to those implicitly
stated in typological schemes.[8]

This book develops a theoretical framework with a historical
and comparative focus and then applies it to race relations in
the United States and South Africa. Although I have ap-
proached this study with the belief that many aspects of race
relations in these two societies are not unique and hence can
be explained by general theoretical propositions, it is true that
some theoretical constructs may be more relevant to some so-
cieties. Recognizing this fact and considering the nature of
both United States and South African race relations, I have
given concepts of "racism" and "power" special attention in
this study. In fact, the central arguments of this volume are (1)
that a comprehensive account of the nature of race relations in
these two societies must deal with the dimensions of power
and their relation to dominant- and minority-group contact
and (2) that the dimensions of power cannot be completely
understood if treated independently of the phenomenon of rac-
ism.

Both power and racism have received an increasing amount
of attention in the field of race relations during the past few
years,[9] although there is still some disagreement about what
sorts of human experiences these concepts actually represent.
In some studies, discussion of power is limited to cases of overt
conflict between racial groups and racism is treated as a syn-

onym for individual prejudices. However, the analyses involving racism and power in the following chapters are guided by the belief that a dynamic interrelationship exists between the two concepts, that the nature of this association must be understood in order to explain adequately the basis of United States and South African race relations, and that neither can a power analysis of racial groups in interaction be restricted to overt conflict nor can racism be explained solely in terms of individual prejudices.

RACE AND ETHNICITY

The ensuing arguments, although relevant to the experiences of ethnic groups in many cases, are strictly applied to racial groups in interaction. Whereas racial groups are distinguished by socially selected physical traits, ethnic groups are distinguished by socially selected cultural traits. Designations such as ethnic group and racial group therefore have little or no meaning if members of society neither recognize nor acknowledge the traits said to distinguish groups. The classification of a particular group as either racial or ethnic is dependent on the perceptions and definitions of members of the larger society. Whereas Jews, Italians, Poles, and Irishmen are all distinguished as ethnic groups in the United States, they are not differentiated as distinct racial minorities. As members of the dominant racial group in American society, neither do they regard themselves as racial minorities nor are they so regarded by other groups in society. We classify such groups therefore as "nonracial ethnics."

However, certain racial minorities are also classified as ethnic groups, and some writers, in fact, have subsumed the concept of racial group under the general category of ethnic group (racially defined ethnic groups).[10] If a given racial group is ethnically distinct, i.e., viewed as having a distinct subculture and as being bound by similar cultural ties, such a designation is valid. It is only when social and cultural attributes are associated with physical features that the concept "racial" and hence that of racial groups takes on special signifi-

cance. To be sure, many subordinate racial groups have experiences comparable to those of nonracial ethnics (e.g., being victims of discrimination and social class exploitation), but, in addition, subjugated racial minorities often suffer from forms of exploitation that are directed by racist norms or racist ideologies and that are perpetrated not only by the middle-class segments of the dominant group but also by lower-class nonracial ethnics. Thus, racial groups have some experiences often quite distinct from those of groups that can be distinguished only by their ethnicity. In this study the concept of racism will be used to help identify and explain such experiences.

POWER CONFLICT VERSUS SYSTEMS INTEGRATION

Although racism is strictly applied to racial groups in interaction, the concept of power can be more generally applied. In fact, power is a concept of considerable scope: it can be used to help account for group oppression per se and to explain the continued association of certain racial groups with certain class or caste positions. Class or caste membership develops from historical contact in which groups possessing a power advantage have been able to place themselves in superior positions by solidifying a social structure that features a racial stratification system.

However, social scientists have only recently paid significant attention to the role of power in determining patterns of interracial behavior. Prior to the 1960s, sociologists (with a few noteworthy exceptions such as Frazier, Cox, and Blumer[11]) tended to treat concepts such as "prejudice" and "discrimination" as if they existed in a vacuum. Only tacit recognition was given to the fact that the frequency and degree of discrimination and other manifestations of prejudice against racial minority groups reflected the power of the white majority to dominate.[12] Commenting on this point, Hubert Blalock has stated: "it is important to note that without the resources or power potential . . . prejudices cannot be translated into effective discrimination. This particular point has been repeatedly emphasized by sociologists objecting to the simple assumption

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that theories of prejudice are sufficient to understand discrimination."[13]

Whereas some sociologists have objected to the lack of attention given to the relationship between power and race, Richard Schermerhorn has warned that the exclusive use of a power model may prove to be unnecessarily restrictive, especially when comparative studies of race and ethnic relations are made.[14] Specifically, he maintains that patterns of integration, not defined in the traditional sense as an end state of interracial cooperation and reciprocal participation, but as a *"process* whereby units or elements of a society are brought into an active and coordinated compliance with the ongoing activities and objectives of the dominant group in that society,"[15] are insufficiently accounted for when a power or conflict model is used. Schermerhorn contends that *"There are times when integration can only occur in and through conflict, and conversely, other times when conflict is necessary to reach a new order of integration."*[16]

Schermerhorn argues that the pure form of integration (completely harmonious relationship with no conflict) and the pure form of conflict (completely disruptive relationship with no integration) are rare indeed and that a dialectical relationship exists in an overwhelming number of instances involving intergroup contact characterized by compounded or overlapping processes of conflict and integration, antagonistic cooperation, peace in feud, integrative functions of conflict, and forms of accommodation. However, he carefully notes that there will very likely be widespread societal differences with regard to both the extent and the nature of overlapping in the processes of conflict and integration.

I agree with Schermerhorn that a power-conflict model that does not account for the dialectical relationship between the processes of integration and conflict has limited application. However, some of the recent power formulations applied to the subject of race do, in fact, address this issue. For instance, in his theory of power and discrimination, Blalock argues that race relations can be thought of as intergroup "power contests." Commenting on the significance of this distinction, he states:

The term "power contests" is used in preference to one such as "power struggle" in order to emphasize that there need be no overt conflict. I specifically wish to avoid a Marxian type of interpretation, namely, that discrimination results from a conscious, rational attempt on the part of elites to subordinate the minority to their own interests. The processes involved are certainly more complex than this, and usually much more subtle.[17]

The subtle dimensions of a power contest are often difficult to recognize because they are not marked by overt conflict. Yet it is reasonable to assume that a dialectical relationship exists. Antagonistic cooperation and forms of accommodation may be a direct result of the distribution and mobilization of power resources by both the dominant and the minority groups. Minority-group members may feel compelled to comply with the dominant group's norms, not because they identify with or have internalized these norms, but because they lack sufficient resources to openly challenge them. If there is minority resistance in such situations, it will likely be very subtle and indirect, frequently an individual rather than a collective endeavor. For example, Raymond and Alice Bauer have argued that although many slaves in the antebellum South resigned themselves to their subordinate position and for self-protection refrained from directly challenging plantation authority, they did, on numerous occasions, engage in subtler forms of resistance such as breaking tools, destroying crops, setting barns afire, and feigning illness.[18] Black leaders in more recent times, although openly rejecting many dominant-group norms of racial subordination, have urged their followers to comply with these norms in order to prevent further suppression and bloodshed, because of the unequal distribution of power resources between blacks and whites. In juxtaposition, the black protest movement of the 1960s that produced unprecedented forms of racial conflict was a direct response to an increasing sense of power and a feeling that positive change could be effected and therefore meek submission to racial norms was no longer necessary. Thus there is no reason to assume that the use of a power model to explain interracial be-

havior necessarily leads one to ignore either the processes of integration or the dialectical relationship between integration and conflict.

Nonetheless, the critical observer might challenge the extent to which a power-conflict model does in fact explain the fundamental basis of normative integration, because it is conceivable that minority members comply in many instances, not because they are coerced, but because they view the norms, values, and objectives of the dominant group as legitimate. Critics of the conflict thesis insist that overstressing tension, dissension, and conflict leads one to ignore the very foundation of society—i.e., the shared values enabling a social system to persist.[19] Disagreeing with this position, M. G. Smith argues that

> The difficulties which this social theory faces are clear and important. From this viewpoint, the rejection of European rule by colonial peoples remains utterly incomprehensible; but so must any conflict which revolves around "subordinate identifications" and segmental loyalties, simply because the thesis that society rests on shared common values inevitably implies their dominance, and so minimizes the strength of "subordinate identification" within segments of the total unit. It is perfectly clear that in any social system based on intense cleavages and discontinuity between differentiated segments, the community of values or social relations between these sections will be correspondingly low.[20]

It is true, as Ernest Barth and Donald Noel have pointed out, that racial and ethnic groups in a given society must share communication symbols, but "the critical issue is the presence or absence of consensus *between* groups on other than communication symbols."[21] In traditional racial orders such as in the United States and the Republic of South Africa, despite racial consensus on fundamental issues of morality not related to race relations (e.g., support of the legal code with respect to property crime and murder) and despite the sharing of communication symbols and the interdependence in the division of

labor, one must conclude that there is and has been significant dissensus between dominant and subordinate groups with respect to values and norms reinforcing racial stratification. Although some segments of the subordinate-group population in both societies have from time to time internalized dominant-group norms of racial domination and have been influenced by racist thought to the degree that they openly reject black identity and desperately strive to identify with white society,[22] to assume that this sort of consensus on race relations is or has been typical of these two societies and hence a valid explanation for periods of integration or lack of open conflict is unwarranted in the face of historical evidence.

Of course, it should be recognized that there may be discrepancies in views and opinions within the respective racial groups. Some minority members are more heavily committed to ending racial stratification and are more upset about the structural arrangements than others. Indeed, as E. Franklin Frazier attempted to show, many black professionals serving the black community have a vested interest in maintaining racial segregation because they are not thrown into competition with whites.[23] Likewise, some dominant members are more heavily committed to maintaining racial stratification than others. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, it would certainly be a mistake to treat the various racial groups as homogeneous units in analyzing all areas of racial interaction.[24] However, this should not obscure the fact that in accounting for significant black–white relations in the societies of the United States and South Africa, differential power has proved to be of greater historical importance than value consensus. Although between-group value consensus concerning race relations has had some effect on social behavior (e.g., the support given by Northern whites in the United States in the early 1960s to black demands that were consistent with, say, the Bill of Rights), the position taken in this volume is that both historical patterns of overt conflict and processes of integration in these two societies are largely explained in terms of a theoretical framework of power.

NOTES

1. For a discussion of this point, see Richard S. Rudner, *Philosophy of Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 6.

2. Pierre van den Berghe, *Race and Racism: A Comparative Perspective* (New York: Wiley, 1967) p. 6.

3. Concepts such as "dominant group," "subordinate group," and "minority group" have invited confusion in the literature of race relations because of their ambiguity. In this study, the terms "dominant group" and "majority group" are interchangeably used to refer to the racial group in a given society that has differential access to and control of power resources; conversely, the terms "subordinate group" and "minority group" are interchangeably used to refer to racial groups who relatively lack control of or access to power resources.

4. William J. Wilson, "Race Relations Models and Ghetto Behavior," in *Nation of Nations: The Ethnic Experience and the Racial Crisis*, ed. by Peter I. Rose (New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 259–275.

5. Harold Cruse, "Revolutionary Nationalism and the Afro-American," *Studies on the Left*, 2:16 (1962).

6. There were a few notable exceptions to these approaches. Pioneer race relations scholars such as E. Franklin Frazier and Oliver Cromwell Cox not only emphasized the sociohistorical approach to race relations but also placed a great deal of stress on the use of comparative data. See, for example, E. Franklin Frazier, *Race and Culture Contacts in the Modern World* (New York: Knopf, 1957), and Oliver Cromwell Cox, *Caste, Class, and Race: A Study in Social Dynamics* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948). Also see Charles Wagley and Marvin Harris, *Minorities in the New World* (New York: Columbia U.P., 1958).

7. See, for example, van den Berghe, op. cit.; Richard Schermerhorn, *Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research* (New York: Random House, 1970); Herbert Blumer, "Industrialisation and Race Relations," in *Industrialisation and Race Relations: A Symposium*, ed. by Guy Hunter (London: Oxford U.P., 1965), pp. 220–253; Stanley Lieberson, "A Societal Theory of Race and Ethnic Relations," *American Sociological Review*, 26:902–910 (Dec. 1961); Donald L. Noel, "A Theory of the Origin of Ethnic Stratification," *Social Problems*, 16:157–172 (Fall 1968).

8. There is, of course, a technical distinction between an empirical proposition and a typology. The former is designed to explain and predict behavior, whereas the latter is intended to categorize or classify behavior. However, many propositions are implied in typologies by the item arrangement and hence may become explicit when they are formulated as statements that relate the items in a manner making them amenable to direct empirical testing. For an excellent discussion of this

point, see Carl G. Hempel, *Aspects of Scientific Explanation* (New York: Free Press, 1965).

9. See, for example, Schermerhorn, op. cit.; H. M. Blalock, Jr., *Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations* (New York: Wiley, 1967); and Noel, op. cit., for a discussion of power and race. For a systematic discussion of racism, see Robert Blauner, "Internal Colonialism and Ghetto Revolt," *Social Problems*, 16:395–408 (Spring 1968), and "Black Culture: Myth or Reality?" in *Americans from Africa: Old Memories, New Moods*, ed. by Peter I. Rose (New York: Atherton, 1970), pp. 417–441; van den Berghe, op. cit.; Schermerhorn, op. cit.; and Donald L. Noel, "Slavery and Rise of Racism," in *The Origins of American Slavery and Racism*, ed. by Donald L. Noel (Columbus, O.: Merrill, 1972), pp. 153–174.

10. Schermerhorn, op. cit., and Tamotsu Shibutani and Kian M. Kwan, *Ethnic Stratification: A Comparative Approach* (New York: Macmillan, 1965).

11. See, for example, Herbert Blumer, "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position," *Pacific Sociological Review*, 1:3–7 (Spring 1958); Cox, op. cit.; and E. Franklin Frazier, "Theoretical Structure of Sociology and Sociological Research," *British Journal of Sociology*, 4:292–311 (Dec. 1953).

12. Other sociologists have emphasized this point. See Robin M. Williams, Jr., *Strangers Next Door* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964); Peter I. Rose, *The Subject Is Race* (New York: Oxford U.P., 1968); Blalock, op. cit.; and Schermerhorn, op. cit.

13. Blalock, op. cit., p. 111.

14. Schermerhorn, op. cit., chap. 1.

15. Ibid., p. 14.

16. Ibid., p. 58.

17. Blalock, op. cit., p. 109.

18. Raymond and Alice Bauer, "Day to Day Resistance to Slavery," *Journal of Negro History*, 27:388–419 (Oct. 1942).

19. See, for example, Lloyd Braithwaite, "Social Stratification and Cultural Pluralism," in *Social and Cultural Pluralism in the Caribbean*, ed. by Vera Rubin, *Annals of the New York Academy of Science*, 83:816–831 (1960).

20. M. G. Smith, *The Plural Society in the British West Indies* (Berkeley: U. of California, 1965), p. xi.

21. Ernest A. T. Barth and Donald L. Noel, "Conceptual Frameworks for the Analysis of Race Relations: An Evaluation," *Social Forces*, 50:340 (Mar. 1972).

22. In some measure, this may also be ascribed to an unequal power relationship in the sense that the dominant group, through its superior power resources, is able to control and influence patterns of thought among minority members. Included here is the effective technique of

co-optation, whereby minority leaders are rewarded by the dominant group to the extent that they openly support dominant-group norms.

23. E. Franklin Frazier, *Black Bourgeoisie* (New York: Free Press 1957).

24. For a discussion of this point, see James Blackwell and Marie R Haug, "Black Bosses, Black Workers: Or Are Black Bosses Beautiful?" paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Denver, Colo. (Sept. 1971).

CHAPTER TWO
Race, Power, and the Development of Racial Stratification

P OWER as a concept has been applied universally to all forms of human behavior—not only to explain intergroup behavior but also to explain dyadic relationships and individualistic behavior. Power has different considerations and different empirical referents depending on the level of analysis.[1] For our purposes, however, power is viewed strictly from the vantage point of intergroup behavior.

THE CONCEPTUAL DIMENSIONS OF RACIAL-GROUP POWER

From a group perspective, power may be conceptualized in terms of two dimensions—"active power" and "power ability." By active power, I mean the actual exercising of influence by Group A over Group B such that the behavior of Group B is modified in accordance with the wishes of Group A. However, it should not be inferred that "actual influence" refers only to the overt efforts of Group A to control Group B. In fact, the behavior of B can be affected by what it perceives to be A's power or power ability, and hence B is not likely to behave in a manner that will produce negative sanctions from A. To the extent that B has little regard for A's power, it can behave independently and not feel constrained to follow what it assumes to be a course of action that A will approve.

Power ability—as the name implies—refers to the abil-

ity of Group A to control or influence the behavior of Group B regardless of whether A has actually influenced B's behavior. The best way to amplify the notion of power ability is to introduce the concept of "power resources." Broadly defined, power resources have to do with the properties that determine the scope and degree of the group's ability to influence behavior.[2] These properties could include high social status, reputation for power, capability to bear arms, control of political office, control of mass media, wealth, and land ownership, to mention a few. Resources can be used to coerce a group to behave in the desired manner (e.g., B's boycotting the stores controlled by A), to induce individuals to behave in certain ways (e.g., B's promising to vote for certain political candidates of A if the latter supports certain kinds of legislation), or, finally, to persuade individuals to follow a certain course of action. Generally, inducement and persuasion resources are applied by groups that have placed themselves in a position whereby they can often influence another group without resorting to threats or penalties (i.e., constraint or pressure resources).[3] Here I am referring to group economic and political power, the possession of certain desired skills such as are acquired through formal education, and the control of certain prestige symbols. For the sake of brevity, I will often refer to inducement and persuasion resources as "competitive resources."[4]

The decision of whether a given item is relevant to the exercise of power and hence qualifies as a power resource can only be made by consideration of the objectives providing the reasons or justifications for the group's entering into and/or continuing a power confrontation with another party. In other words, objectives furnish the rationale not only for identifying an item as a power resource but also for suggesting its relative importance to the exercise of power. For example, in recent years black economic boycotts have proved to be quite an effective resource in eliminating racial discrimination in department stores, yet it is unlikely that group silent prayers by blacks would have had the same impact on white entrepreneurs.

Resources can be general in nature or highly particular;[5] that is, some resources are applicable to a number of different

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situations whereas others are restricted to specific cases and to narrow ranges of people. Accordingly, the greater the generality of the resources a group controls, the greater is the scope of the group's power ability; the larger the number of resources a group has at its disposal, the more alternative means it has to reach its goal.

Finally, resources should be considered in terms of their liquidity, that is, the extent to which they can be deployed or mobilized to exert influence.[6] Some resources can be deployed easily and quickly because the mechanisms that facilitate their mobilization or application exist. For example, the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) has legal machinery that can immediately be put into operation in order to win court cases involving civil rights. When successful litigation is the goal, the NAACP has resources of high liquidity that can yield influence without having to be extensively mobilized. On the other hand, if black leaders were to call for a nationwide boycott of products produced by American organizations practicing racial discrimination, they would lack ready mechanisms to facilitate such an operation, and hence the resources needed would be of low liquidity, because a successful boycott would, under the circumstances, entail extensive mobilization or redeployment of manpower, communications network, and organizational efforts.

In the final analysis, the greater the scope and the higher the liquidity of a group's resources, the greater is the group's power ability. In the study of racial-group power, the focus of analysis shifts from power ability to active power to the extent that the group's resources become mobilized to exert influence. However, for the sake of convenience, the term power will be used in this study to connote both a group's active power and its power ability (including its power resources) unless otherwise specified.

POWER AND THE ORIGIN OF RACIAL STRATIFICATION

Racial domination and exploitation have occurred repeatedly throughout history. Usually when two distinct ra-

cial groups have established contact and have interacted for a continuous period, one group ends up dominating the other.[7] Continuous or sustained interaction between racial groups after contact is a prerequisite both for the development of racial stratification and for the establishment of equalitarian relations between racial groups.[8] In actual fact, however, there are no known cases of racial groups in advanced nation states having established equalitarian relationships. By the same token, there are no known cases in which the relationships between racial groups have been based on complete equality of power. Differential power is a marked feature of racial-group interaction in complex societies: the greater the power discrepancy is between subordinate and dominant racial groups, the greater are the extent and scope of racial domination. In most cases, the existing power relationships have their basis in the manner in which the groups first established contact. Stanley Lieberson has commented on this point:

> In short, when populations begin to occupy the same habitat but do not share a single order, each group endeavors to maintain the political and economic conditions that are at least compatible with the institutions existing before contact. These conditions for the maintenance of institutions can not only differ for the two groups in contact, but are often conflicting. European contacts with the American Indian, for example, led to the decimation of the latter's sources of sustenance and disrupted religious and tribal forms of organization. With respect to a population's efforts to maintain its social institutions, we may therefore assume that the presence of another ethnic group is an important part of the environment. Further, if groups in contact differ in their capacity to impose changes on the other group, then we may expect to find one group "superordinate" and the other population "subordinate" in maintaining or developing a suitable environment.[9]

The original contact situation involving racial groups currently concentrated in modern nation states was typically of

one of three major forms—slave transfers, colonization, and voluntary migration, with each situation involving at least one racial group migrating to the region and at least one indigenous racial group. Following Lieberson's usage, the term "indigenous" is not restricted to aborigines "but rather to a population sufficiently established in an area so as to possess the institutions and demographic capacity for maintaining some minimal form of social order through generations."[10] In the case of colonization, the migrating population is the dominant racial group (or superordinate in Lieberson's terminology), whereas in slave transfers and voluntary migration, the migrating population is the subordinate racial group.[11] In each instance, the dominant racial group assumes a certain degree of control over the subordinate population, with the most rigid control and greatest power discrepancy occurring in slave transfers, followed by colonization and voluntary migration in descending order. Let us focus briefly on these three forms of contact.

Slave transfers present a situation in which the dominant racial group has supreme power over the subordinate population—involving continuous coercion from the time of the slaves' capture to their day-to-day activities after arrival. Historically, slave transfers have been associated with plantation economies having a racial caste system with a rigidly stratified occupational structure. On the plantations, slaves perform menial tasks under the close supervision of dominant-group overseers and plantation owners. Thrust into a new environment, often separated from their families, and isolated in groups on rural plantations, slaves are vulnerable to control by plantation owners. Such control is further reinforced by the marked differences in culture and history that typically distinguish the groups in contact and make it difficult for the slaves to adapt to the new situation in ways other than those dictated by the slavemasters. Specifically, slaves who are separated from their families and communities and forcibly transferred to a new and alien environment populated with strange people with strange ways find themselves of necessity in a much greater dependent relationship with the slavemaster than are

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indigenous racial groups forced to be slaves in their own territory or country. Because members of the latter groups are familiar with their home environment and are not completely separated from their families, groups, and communities, they are able to mount greater resistance to dominant-group exploitation. Edgar T. Thompson sums the matter up very well: "Thus the native Negro in many parts of Africa is regarded as a very unsatisfactory plantation laborer, but in early Virginia he was regarded as superior not only to the native Indian but also to the white indentured servant. With imported laborers, usually familyless, the control situation changed in favor of the planter."[12]

The second major contact situation, colonization, entails control of a given territory by a nonindigenous racial group.[13] Although the nonindigenous population attempts to gain maximum control over the indigenous population, the task is difficult and the degree of control typically found in the slave-transfer situation is never reached. The reasons for this have just been stated briefly but deserve repeating: the indigenous population is familiar with the home territory, often lives in large, organized societies, and therefore can launch reprisals against the nonindigenous population if the need arises. This was exactly the situation that the colonizers in America faced when they attempted to enslave the American Indian. Even though the colonizers had access to greater power resources and in effect virtually annihilated the Indians in numerous skirmishes, at no time were they able to force the Indians to submit to the degree of total submission that characterized black–white interaction during the slavery period.[14] Nonetheless, the initial phases of colonization involve situations in which the dominant racial group is able to seriously undermine the social, economic, and political institutions of the indigenous population and hence disrupt both their social organization and their cultural life.[15]

Of the three types of racial contact, voluntary migration represents a situation of greatest freedom of choice and movement for the migrating group; hence the degree of racial domination is not as great as in slave transfers and colonization. Be-

cause the immigrant racial group comes of its own free will, it is able to establish its separate and autonomous communities and practice its cultural forms with greater liberty and less interference from the dominant racial group. However, immigrant racial groups often experience exploitation and discrimination by the receiving dominant group, especially in racially ordered societies where the immigrant group finds itself in direct competition with certain segments of the dominant group for scarce goods and positions.[16] Moreover, even though voluntary migrants come of their own free will, their migration is often encouraged for purposes of exploitation by, say, industrialists, managers, and proprietors of the receiving society. Nonetheless, unlike the racial groups subjected to slave transfers and colonization, voluntary migrants have the option of returning to their home country if their persecution becomes unbearable.[17]

Contract labor is a major form of voluntary migration involving a situation "where the movement from one country to another follows the instigation of agents from either side."[18] However, as Schermerhorn has noted, it is the case that

> The distinction between slave labor and contract labor is not always clear empirically since the latter often involves force and compulsion. The legal or analytical differences between the two may be important, but one must recognize that contract labor runs the gamut from enforced servitude without chattel ownership to carefully stipulated intervals of work obligation terminated abruptly when contracts end.[19]

Usually, however, contract labor is voluntary, and on completion of the initial work obligation the migrants may exercise one of three options: (1) renew the old contracts or continue to work without a formal contract, (2) seek other forms of employment but continue to reside in the country, or (3) return to their homeland.[20] An exception to this general pattern was seen in the case of early black migrants to the United States. The first blacks involuntarily brought to this country were defined as indentured servants (one kind of contract laborers) and

initially had the same legal status as white indentured servants. However, for blacks, indentured servitude was, within a few years, defined as unlimited servitude and hence treated synonymously with slavery.

The type of racial domination emerging from the initial contact situation often leads to the development and institutionalization of special kinds of racial stratification systems (e.g., caste systems) that persist through generations. In Chapter Four, I will examine the reasons some of these systems undergo change whereas others persist with little or no alteration. However, at this point, we must confront a basic question: why, given the existence of a power differential between racial groups, will one group typically attempt to control the other?

It is conceivable that when two racial groups come into contact they might live side by side in mutual harmony despite a power differential, but rarely has such a situation occurred. In complex nation states, attempts at racial dominance invariably occur when groups establish contact and interact for a sustained period of time.[21]

Some explanations of racial dominance may be applied to any form of intergroup contact, whereas others are more specifically relevant to interracial interaction. For our purposes, certain aspects of Gerhard Lenski's theory of power and privilege explain racial dominance in general terms, whereas more specific explanations involve matters pertaining to the complex dimensions of racism.[22] The latter will be discussed in some detail in Chapter Three, so let us now direct our attention to the former.

Implicit in any power explanation of group behavior are fundamental postulates regarding the nature of self- and group interests. In his theory, Lenski introduces and discusses these postulates. Specifically, Lenski maintains that "*man is a social being; obliged by nature to live with others as a member of society*"[23] (in other words, the cooperative activity of men is necessary to obtain maximum satisfaction of their human desires and needs), that conflict often emerges from cooperative activity because most of man's *important decisions or actions* are prompted by self-interests or partisan group interests, that

most of the many objects that man strives to control or possess are in short supply ("Unlike the various plants and animals, *man has an insatiable appetite for goods and services.*" Regardless of how much he produces and consumes, man is never completely satisfied because in addition to the utilitarian value there is also a status value attached to the goods and services consumed. "The very nature of status striving makes it inevitable that the demand will exceed the supply"[24]), and that because of the foregoing points "*a struggle for rewards will be present in every human society*",[25] and the outcomes of the struggle (be it violent or nonviolent or within the framework of some established system of rules) will largely be a function of differential power resources.[26]

By applying Lenski's arguments to the interracial arena, we may argue that the efforts of a racial group to subjugate another group are, in some cases, motivated by desires to control or increase control of scarce goods. Through the process of domination, the subordinate group can be eliminated or neutralized as a competitor.

Competition can be either an interindividual or an intergroup phenomenon. In this connection, Amos Hawley insightfully suggests that

Competition is a function of the ratio of resources to population. Its intensity rises and falls as the relative value of the denominator in the fraction increases or decreases. But where the population is subdivided into groups competition tends to shift from an individual to an intergroup basis. When this occurs the fundamental competitive issue is altered; to the problem of how much each individual competitor will be able to obtain is added the problem of how many individuals from each group will have the opportunity to enter into the competition.[27]

Hawley furthermore suggests that if only a very small number of subordinate individuals are involved, competition is likely to remain more on an interindividual than on an intergroup basis. However, as subordinate-group members tend to

increase proportionately to dominant individuals, competition may be expected to become increasingly intergroup in character; accordingly, when the subordinate group looms "progressively larger as a competitive force, tensions develop, restrictions accumulate, and the minority is more and more suppressed."[28]

Racial stratification may also be used by the dominant group to exploit the labor of the minority group in order to increase or maximize rewards. For example, the use of slave labor to increase farm production cannot be explained solely by the argument that this form of domination was designed to eliminate the slave as a major competitor. In fact, it could be contended that in some situations slaves brought to Brazil and to the United States were initially indifferent to the materialistic rewards Westerners endlessly sought. On that basis alone, they would not be in competition with the dominant group. Theoretically, the competition for goods could be minimized if one group has no interest in them.[29] However, if a group attaches a status value to certain goods its members consume or produce, it is likely that regardless of the degree of competition from other groups an endless struggle for rewards will exist within the group. Accordingly, if the individual members of a dominant group feel that their control of these goods can be maximized by exploiting the labor of minority groups, they will strive to develop and maintain racial stratification.

Of crucial importance in this connection is the manner in which the ruling classes of the dominant racial group, particularly the segments controlling the government and the means of production, are able to get the masses to support and reinforce racial stratification even though the latter may not materially benefit from minority subjugation. In other words, in situations where the ruling classes have a vested interest in the development and institutionalization of a racial order while at the same time they control the agencies of communication virtually necessary to mold public opinion, a normative consensus in favor of racial stratification may develop among all segments of the dominant group. For example, the institution of slavery in the United States was directed by a handful of powerful

plantation owners who not only controlled the political and economic life of the South but also had a very strong influence on patterns of social thought during the antebellum period. Indeed, by 1860 only one quarter of Southern families owned any slaves at all, yet slavery was fervently supported by the nonslaveholding masses. Although it is true that the nonslaveholders derived some psychic benefit from identifying with a "superior" caste, the motivation for the system of slavery initially came from the privileged classes, whose desire to maximize their own resources led to the permanent servitude of blacks. Without the solid backing of the Southern aristocracy, it is unlikely that slavery in America would have become such a mammoth institution and lasted as long as it did.

Although examination of the role of differential power in the struggle for scarce goods helps to account for the emergence and continued existence of racial stratification, such explanations are general enough to apply to various nonracial ethnics in contact or even to groups distinguishable in terms of social class. In fact, the previous discussion could provide the basis for a general theory of intergroup stratification in which racial stratification would merely be one special case. It is at this level that racial-group interactions have elements in common with patterns of other distinct groups in contact, and certainly any fully developed theory of racial stratification would have to take this into account. But once we move beyond this general level and begin to examine the dynamics of group behavior in the formation and institutionalization of a system of racial stratification, a general explanation of this sort leaves a great deal unexplained. Here is where the unique factors associated with racial contact, in particular the role of racism in molding group attitudes and shaping group behavior, have to be considered, and I will give this subject considerable attention in the next chapter.

NOTES

1. Mary Rogers, *The Concept of Power in Community Research*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, U. of Massachusetts, Amherst (1971).

2. Ibid.

3. William Gamson, *Power and Discontent* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1968). Also see H. M. Blalock, Jr., *Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations* (New York: Wiley, 1967).

4. The term "competitive resource" is borrowed from op. cit., p. 118.

5. Rogers, op. cit.

6. Gamson, op. cit., p. 95.

7. For a discussion of this argument as it applies to both racial and ethnic groups, see Richard Schermerhorn, *Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research* (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 68. There have been a few cases where one racial group has been culturally and physically absorbed by another group following a period of racial friction. In South Africa the early Hottentot tribes were miscegenated out of existence after struggling with the Dutch settlers for land and cattle in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. White colonists in Brazil miscegenated and intermarried with American Indians to form the mestizo population. Both of these "mergers" were, in part, prompted by a shortage of white women.

8. Donald L. Noel, "A Theory of the Origin of Ethnic Stratification," *Social Problems*, 16:157–172 (Fall 1968).

9. Stanley Lieberson, "A Societal Theory of Race and Ethnic Relations," *American Sociological Review*, 26:904 (Dec. 1961).

10. Ibid., p. 903.

11. The major distinction between voluntary migration and colonization is that in the former the group migrating voluntarily is in a subordinate position vis-à-vis the indigenous population, whereas in the latter the group migrating voluntarily is in a dominant position. For a more detailed discussion of slave transfers, colonization, and voluntary migration, see Schermerhorn, op. cit., chap. 3.

12. Edgar T. Thompson, "The Plantation: The Physical Basis of Traditional Race Relations," in *Race Relations and the Race Problem*, ed. by Edgar T. Thompson (Durham, N.C.: Duke U.P., 1939), p. 185. Also see Winthrop D. Jordan, *White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro 1550–1812* (Chapel Hill: U. of North Carolina, 1968). A fuller treatment of this subject is presented in Chapter 5.

13. Schermerhorn has outlined three major types of colonization—limited settlement, substantial settlement, and massive settlement expanding to majority rule (the last type represents the history of white settlement in the United States). All types signify the relative control by the nonindigenous population of the indigenous population. Schermerhorn, op. cit., chap. 3.

14. Jordan, op. cit., chap. 2. Also see Gary B. Nash, "Red, White, and Black: The Origins of Racism in Colonial America," in *The Great Fear: Race in the Mind of America*, ed. by Gary B. Nash and Richard Weiss (New York: Holt, 1970), pp. 1–26.

15. For insightful discussions of the relations between the colonizers

and the colonized in North Africa, see Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963), and Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (Boston: Beacon, 1967).

16. Herbert Blumer, "Industrialisation and Race Relations," in *Industrialisation and Race Relations: A Symposium*, ed. by Guy Hunter (London: Oxford U.P., 1965), pp. 220–253, and Peter I. Rose, "Outsiders in Britain," *Trans-Action*, 4:18–23 (March 1967).

17. Lieberson, op. cit., p. 905.

18. Schermerhorn, op. cit., p. 98.

19. Ibid., p. 110.

20. Ibid., p. 68.

21. Noel, op. cit., and Schermerhorn, op. cit.

22. Gerhard Lenski, *Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966).

23. Ibid., p. 35.

24. Ibid., p. 31. It should be noted that Lenski does in fact consider altruistic behavior in individual and group decision making; however, he argues that altruism, unlike self-interest behavior, is largely confined to *unimportant* actions or decisions.

25. Ibid., pp. 31–32.

26. One qualification should be introduced here. Lenski states: "In our discussion of the nature of man, it was postulated that where important decisions are involved, most human action is motivated by either self-interest or by partisan group interests. This suggests that power alone governs the distribution of rewards. This cannot be the case, however, since we also postulated that most of these essentially selfish interests can be satisfied only by the establishment of cooperative relations with others. Cooperation is absolutely essential for survival and for efficient attainment of most other goals. In other words, men's selfish interests compel them to remain members of society and to share in the division of labor.

"If these two postulates are correct, then it follows that *men will share the product of their labor to the extent required to insure the survival and continued productivity of those whose actions are necessary or beneficial to themselves*." Ibid., p. 44.

27. Amos Hawley, "Dispersion Versus Segregation: Apropos of a Solution of Race Problems," *Papers of the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts, and Letters*, 30:669 (1944).

28. Ibid., p. 670. Also see Robin Williams Jr., "The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions," *Social Science Research Council Bulletin* 57 (1947), chap. 3. Of course, this argument presupposes the existence of what Blumer calls "a sense of group position," as one racial group defines its position vis-à-vis another group. The more that minority individuals involve themselves in competition with the dominant group, the greater is the challenge to the latter's superior position. In Chapter Three, I will

discuss the sense of group position as a factor in racial stratification. See Herbert Blumer, "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position," *Pacific Sociological Review*, 1:3–7 (Spring 1958).

29. For a discussion of this point, see Blalock, op. cit., chap. 4, and Noel, op. cit.

CHAPTER THREE
Race and Racism

FOLLOWING the publication of the *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*, nationwide attention was focused on the concept of racism.[1] A point heavily stressed in this report was that because blacks have experienced discrimination and exploitation they have been excluded from meaningful participation in the dominant institutions of the United States. White racism—defined as white prejudiced attitudes toward blacks—was identified in the report as the major cause of this problem. Critical of this approach, a number of authors have pointed out that stressing white prejudiced attitudes led to the failure to gauge other manifestations of racism.[2] In the words of Gary Marx,

> The report would have been more persuasive if it had differentiated institutional from idiosyncratic racism, racist attitudes from racist behavior, self-conscious and intended racism from subconscious or nonreflective and unintentional behavior and attitudes that may have racist consequences, and done more to document rather than simply assert the importance of current racism.[3]

Marx's criticisms give some idea of the variety of ways racism can be approached. On the other hand, they reflect the recent tendency to expand the term "racism" to so many different categories that a precise conceptual and empirical application becomes difficult. Racism should be distinguished from "discrimination," "prejudiced attitudes," "ethnocentrism," and other locutions used to describe minority- and dominant-group interaction, and this is one of the central tasks of this chapter.

THE VARIABLE MEANING OF RACISM

In their respective analyses of racial and ethnic relations, Noel and Schermerhorn have introduced conceptions basic to an analytical and empirical discussion of racism.[4] Schermerhorn first of all distinguishes racism as "minimal racism" and "maximal racism." This differentiation represents a fundamental departure from the traditional definition and treatment of racism in the literature, and its essential uniqueness derives from Schermerhorn's conception of minimal racism:

> In its minimal form, racism defines darker people as backward or less evolved, different in degree but not in kind from their master, therefore, capable, with training and education, to rise individually from their lowly position to a status of equality with the ruling group.[5]

It is important to recognize that the concept of minimal racism is quite clearly related to the general notion of ethnocentrism, because evaluations of a particular race's cultural achievements are based, not on assumptions about that group's biological inferiority, but on factors of social and cultural origin.

Unlike minimal racism, maximal racism asserts a categorical association between biological features and cultural attributes. Schermerhorn states:

> racism takes a maximal form where the distinctions between superordinates and subordinates assume an absolute rather than a relative character, one of kind and not of degree. . . . The key notion in maximal racism becomes the inherent superiority of peoples with lighter color, together with its obverse, the inherent inferiority of the darker colored. In this view, the rule of the former over the latter is therefore inevitable, not arbitrary.[6]

Although accepting Schermerhorn's notion of maximal racism as being fairly consistent with the way racism is generally

defined in systematic usage, Noel rejects the concept of minimal racism.[7] He feels that "racism" should be restricted to an ideology justifying a discriminatory social structure and "based on the conception that racial groups form a biogenetic hierarchy,"[8] that what Schermerhorn calls minimal racism is essentially nothing more than cultural ethnocentrism. Noel writes:

> Cultural ethnocentrism assumes that with opportunity and training out-group members could be acculturated and become the equals of the in-group. On the other hand, physical ethnocentrism (i.e., racism) assumes that members of the relevant out-group are biogenetically incapable of ever achieving intellectual and moral equality with members of the in-group. Where cultural ethnocentrism attributes differences in behavior and culture to historical accident, racism attributes them to differences in innate endowment[9]

I agree with Noel that Schermerhorn's concept of minimal racism should be relabeled "ethnocentrism" (or "cultural ethnocentrism"), especially in view of the way the term is usually defined in the literature. However, I disagree with his equating physical ethnocentrism with racism. Noel's position is that racism represents one form of the more general phenomenon of ethnocentrism—hence the term "physical ethnocentrism." Although he defines ethnocentrism as "preeminently a matter of in-group glorification"—i.e., the "focus is on the virtues of the in-group" even though the inevitable concomitant is generalized rejection or disparagement of the out-group[10]—he is willing to stretch the meaning of the term to incorporate an ideology *justifying racial domination in biogenetic terms.*

The position taken in this study is that there is an essential difference between ethnocentrism and racism and that it is indeed misleading to treat the latter as a special instance of the former. Let me be more specific. The fundamental distinction between these two concepts is that ethnocentrism is a principle of invidious group distinction, whereas racism is a philosophy or ideology of racial exploitation. In speaking of ethnocentrism

as a principle of invidious group distinction, I have in mind evaluative judgments of not only cultural criteria (i.e., cultural ethnocentrism) but also of group physical traits such as skin color and height (i.e., physical ethnocentrism). However, unlike Noel's, my concept of physical ethnocentrism does not entail an in-group ideology justifying racial domination by assumption of a biogenetic hierarchy; rather, it denotes a general disdain or contempt for out-group physical features and nothing more. For example, early connotations of the term "black" contributed significantly to the development of unfavorable English attitudes toward black-skinned Africans when the two races established contact. "As described by the Oxford English Dictionary," states Winthrop Jordan, "the meaning of *black* before the sixteenth century included, 'Deeply stained with dirt; soiled, dirty, foul. . . . Having dark or deadly purposes, malignant; pertaining to or involving death, deadly; baneful, disastrous, sinister. . . . Foul, iniquitous, atrocious, horrible, wicked. . . . Indicating disgrace, censure, liability to punishment, etc.' Black was an emotionally partisan color, the handmaid and symbol of baseness and evil, a sign of danger and repulsion."[11] Of course, juxtaposed with the concept of blackness was that of whiteness. White signified purity, virginity, virtue, beauty, and beneficence.[12] Although invidious distinctions against Africans were also based on cultural ethnocentrism, one cannot dismiss the negative evaluation based on skin color. However, this instance of physical ethnocentrism did not entail a commitment to a view positing the biogenetic hierarchy of races. As Jordon has argued, such an ideology was virtually unknown in English thought prior to the eighteenth century.[13]

Whereas ethnocentrism is viewed in this study as a principle of invidious group distinction with reference to either cultural or physical criteria, racism is defined as an *ideology of racial domination or exploitation that (1) incorporates beliefs in a particular race's cultural and/or inherent biological inferiority and (2) uses such beliefs to justify and prescribe inferior or unequal treatment for that group.*[14] The crucial distinction in this definition is that racism has two major dimensions—

biological and cultural. Biological racism is straightforward, is consistent with Noel's conception of racism and Schermerhorn's definition of maximal racism, and poses few analytical problems—in fact, a rationale or justification for racial domination is implicit in assumptions about inherent biological inferiority. A fundamental reason for a racial hierarchy is logically implied when assumptions are made concerning the minority race's inherent inferiority to the dominant race, and the more virulent the racism, the more explicit the rationale becomes. Cultural racism, however, departs significantly from racism as usually discussed. In fact, some readers may argue that I am taking liberties with the notion of racism by giving it a cultural base, that cultural racism has no biological basis and hence the connotation of race in the concept is misleading. However, the distinction is not without merit because what I am saying is that a particular *race* is judged to be culturally inferior and set aside for discriminatory treatment.[15] As discussion in subsequent chapters will show, dominant-group rationales for racial exploitation based on cultural criteria actually preceded rationales grounded in biological distinctions in both the United States and South Africa. To stretch the meaning of cultural ethnocentrism to incorporate a philosophy of racial exploitation (i.e., cultural racism) would be confusing, for we would not know when purely invidious distinctions are being invoked or when a distinct rationale is being used to justify the inferior treatment of a particular racial group.

Finally, it should be noted that, unlike in biological racism, a rationale for minority subjugation is not logically implied in beliefs of cultural inferiority, because there it is not assumed that the minority race is biologically incapable of achieving equality with the dominant group. For example, racial stratification justified in terms of cultural criteria, particularly religion (Africans were viewed as heathens and therefore were not permitted to receive equal treatment with Europeans until they converted to Christianity), in South Africa during the seventeenth century did not lead to the conclusion that Africans could never reach equality with Europeans. Therefore, the arbitrary nature of racial stratification based on cultural

differences is more vulnerable to attack, and, as we shall see, in certain periods of history cultural racism was supplanted by biological racism to strengthen racial stratification.

Viewing racism as a philosophy of racial exploitation prescribing inferior treatment for a particular racial group reveals it to have a normative quality. In other words, racism produces certain societal or group norms indicating the way that dominant members ought to relate to or treat minority members. In this sense, both cultural and biological racism can be analyzed on three different levels—"institutional," "collective," and "individual."

When the ideology of racial exploitation gives rise to normative prescriptions designed to prevent the subordinate racial group from equal participation in associations or procedures that are stable, organized, and systematized (e.g., the electoral process, residential patterns, and formal education), institutional racism exists. Institutional racism therefore represents the structured aspect of racist ideology. The other two levels of racism are more unstructured elements of the ideology of racial exploitation. Specifically, collective racism connotes the existence of informal societal or group norms that specifically reinforce sporadic collective acts of racial discrimination, exploitation, and suppression (e.g., demonstrations against a black who moves into a white neighborhood or more violent acts such as lynchings or programs), whereas individual racism refers to a given person's set of attitudes (that members of the minority group are culturally or biologically inferior to the dominant group and therefore should be exploited or discriminated against) "derived from" or influenced by racist norms and ideology.

Although I take the position later in this chapter that racial stratification often exists before racist norms are developed, this does not in any way negate the importance or influence of racism on human behavior. To be more specific, explicit racist norms not only reinforce already established patterns of race exploitation (e.g., increasing group or individual motivation to discriminate), but they also may give rise to new forms of exploitation (e.g., psychic exploitation, that is, the dehumanization of minority individuals, leading them to question their hu-

manity and lose their spirit of resistance to subjugation). Equally as important, racist beliefs regarding minority inferiority provide the needed justification for race exploitation when the system of inequality is challenged or criticized.

THE EMERGENCE OF RACISM IN SOCIETY

The development of racism in society is ultimately a collective process. Although a number of writers have focused on individual psychological factors in the etiology of racism, my position in this study is that racism can only be understood as a product of collective action. However, this does not mean that individual racism is not a legitimate subject of study; rather, it implies that individual racism, like collective and institutional racism, is a product of an ongoing process of group interaction whereby the status and behavior of the minority group are defined and redefined with respect to the dominant group.

This position is based on Herbert Blumer's path-breaking analysis of "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group position."[16] Although Blumer's analysis is devoted to explaining the nature of what he calls "race prejudice,"[17] as we shall see his arguments, with a few modifications, are useful in a conceptual framework of racism; therefore, I shall outline the central propositions of Blumer's study. He states:

A basic understanding of race prejudice must be sought in the process by which racial groups form images of themselves and of others. This process . . . is fundamentally *a collective process*. It operates chiefly through the public media in which individuals who are accepted as spokesmen of a racial group characterize publicly another racial group. To characterize another racial group is, by opposition, to define one's own group. This is equivalent to placing the two groups in relation to each other, or defining their position vis-à-vis each other. It is the sense of social position emerging from the collective process of characterization which provides the basis of race prejudice.[18]

Blumer has outlined four basic types of feeling that constitute dominant-group "prejudice": (1) an attitude that the minority race is inferior,[19] (2) a sense that the minority race is intrinsically alien and different, (3) a feeling of prior claim to certain rights and privileges, and (4) an apprehensiveness that the minority plans to encroach on or challenge the dominant group's prerogatives. Blumer notes that even though the first two feelings engender antipathy toward the minority group and the third makes dominant-group members believe that they are entitled to either prior or exclusive rights in many important spheres of life, these feelings are not in themselves sufficient to create "race prejudice." In fact, Blumer emphasizes that these three feelings are often prevalent in caste societies and in certain types of feudalism where, because claims have become crystallized into a structure respected and accepted by all, group "prejudice" does not seem to exist. He maintains that it is the fourth feeling, the apprehensiveness that the subordinate racial group is about to challenge the dominant group's position, that is essential to "race prejudice." This fear is often reflected in the dominant group's hostile cries that the subordinate racial group is "getting out of place."

Because the minority group is considered to be inferior, alien, without prior rights or privileges, and threatening, it is easy for dominant members to develop a sense of group position vis-à-vis the subordinate members. There is, to be sure, considerable variance in the feelings of dominant members toward the subordinate group, ranging from bitter hostility and strong antipathy to mild contempt and condescension. But the common denominator is the sense of superior group position.[20] Because dominant members often feel compelled to behave in accordance with group expectations, the sense of group position actually serves as a special kind of social norm, particularly for individuals who strongly identify with or consider themselves a part of the group. Blumer comments:

Thus, even though given individual members may have personal views and feelings different from the sense of group position, they will have to conjure with the sense of group position held by their racial group. If the sense of position is

strong, to act contrary to it is to risk a feeling of self alien-
ation and to face the possibility of ostracism. I am trying to
suggest, accordingly, that the locus of race prejudice is not
in the area of individual feeling but in the definition of the
respective position of the racial group.[21]

The sense of group position is a historical product often
emerging from the conditions surrounding the initial contact
situation, when one racial group establishes dominance over
other groups. As the group in the dominant position continu-
ously interacts with subordinate racial members, the sense of
group position can either grow and become solidified, or it can
never take root and become weak.

The collective image of the subordinate racial group is de-
veloped and shaped within the "public arena," which might
include such media as the press, conventions, public meetings,
and legislative assemblies.[22] Although most or even a signifi-
cant percentage of dominant members do not directly partici-
pate in these public discussions, the views expressed are often
assumed to be those of the dominant group. Individuals pos-
sessing persuasion resources, i.e., having power or prestige or
believed to have considerable knowledge, are particularly in-
fluential in shaping public opinion.

Finally, Blumer stresses that the role played by powerful
vested interests in shaping the sense of group position should
not be ignored. For instance, individuals or groups profiteering
off minority labor will often attempt to develop public opinion
supporting this form of exploitation. They may openly de-
nounce subordinates, describe them as unfit, and maintain that
they pose a serious threat to the rights and privileges of domi-
nant-group members. Because such discussions often give the
appearance of having great collective significance, they are es-
pecially potent in increasing "racial prejudice." If not seriously
challenged within the dominant group, negative characteriza-
tions of racial subordinates will solidify the sense of group po-
sition, help to preserve the racial order, and protect the inter-
ests of special parties benefiting from racial subordination.
Blumer concludes his analysis by pointing out that

When events touching on relations are not treated as "big events" and hence do not set crucial issues in the arena of public discussion; or when the elite leaders or spokesmen do not define such big events vehemently or adversely; or where they define them in the direction of racial harmony; or when there is a paucity of strong interest groups seeking to build up a strong adverse image for special advantage—under such conditions the sense of group position recedes and race prejudice declines.[23]

In interpreting Blumer's statements, it is important to note the meaning he assigns to the term "race prejudice." Although the terms "race prejudice" and "racism" are often used interchangeably, for the purposes of this study they are distinguished on the following grounds: Whereas race prejudice, traditionally defined, connotes individual or group feelings of antipathy toward a particular racial group because of "objectionable qualities ascribed to the group,"[24] these feelings may or may not involve assumptions that the disdained group is inferior. Racism specifically incorporates the concept of a particular racial group's believing another group to be biologically or culturally inferior. Moreover, unlike racism, prejudice cannot be readily classified as an ideology of racial domination. Commenting on prejudice as an attitude, Noel states:

While it is meaningful to speak of positive attitudes, including positive prejudices, the concept of prejudice generally implies a negative orientation. This is particularly true in the interethnic context. Hence we can define prejudice as a hostile or negative attitude toward the members of a specific group solely because they are members of that group. In contrast to ethnocentrism, with its in-group focus and derivative generalized rejection of out-groups, prejudice is focused on and directed toward a specific out-group.[25]

My position is that Blumer's analysis is actually more of racism than of either race prejudice or ethnocentrism. To be more explicit, two of the basic feelings of dominant-group

"prejudice" (the subordinate racial group is naturally inferior and intrinsically alien) outlined in his study are directly related to my prior discussion of racist ideology based on beliefs asserting the biological and cultural inferiority of the minority group.

There are two other major points of convergence between Blumer's analysis and my discussion of the components of racism: First, his statement that the dominant group feels that it has prior claim to certain rights and privileges is indicative of racist social norms. Indeed, Blumer acknowledges a direct association between proprietary claims of advantages and beliefs of racial superiority.[26] Second, Blumer's argument that individual "race prejudices" must be studied in conjunction with the sense of group position is consistent with my supposition that the manifestation of individual racism is, to a large extent, a function of the social norms that define racial group contact. Individual acts of racism cannot be exclusively explained by personality factors. Psychological explanations, often invoked to explain individual attitudes and acts of discrimination, prove to have little predictive value when social factors are taken into account.[27]

However, the basic difference between my formulation and Blumer's has to do with his inclusion of the fourth feeling (the apprehension that the minority group plans to encroach on the dominant group's prerogatives) as an element of "race prejudice" (or racism). Rather than considering this feeling as one of the indicators of racism, I feel that it is more appropriately viewed as one of the variables that help to predict the existence, form, and intensity of racism in society. This point is discussed more fully later.

In concluding this section, I need to explain a point about the sense of group position among subordinates. Unlike that of dominant members, their collective image is in part a result of negative factors such as lack of power resources, discriminatory treatment by dominant members, and restricted rights and privileges. Although subordinate racial members may be able to offset a negative group image by cultivating other aspects of their experience, (e.g., their cultural achievements), the more

dependent they are on the dominant group for survival and the greater their desire is to share the rights and privileges of the dominant group, the less likely they will be to sustain a group ethnocentrism. Furthermore, as long as the subordinate group remains in a state of subjection and dependency, an ideology of exploitation based on claims of dominant-group cultural and/or biological inferiority is unlikely to take root. It is true, however, that in time some exploited groups attempt to overcome the effects of racial oppression through cultural revitalization and nationalistic movements, which frequently develop in conjunction with efforts to establish some degree of political and economic autonomy. And the more minority members press for their independence, the more likely racist views toward the dominant group could mature.

RACISM, POWER, AND THE EMERGENCE OF RACIAL STRATIFICATION

The sense of group position must be understood as a summation of historical experiences, often originating when racial groups first establish contact. Although racism is most certainly a *sufficient condition* for a group's sense of collective identity vis-à-vis other groups, it is not a *necessary condition* for the development of a firm sense of group position. In fact, a coherent philosophy of racism is most likely to occur after a sense of group position has been crystallized. Let me elaborate on this point.

Group differences in cultural or behavioral patterns universally provide the basis for collective identities. Ethnocentrism, a phenomenon characteristic of all racial and ethnic groups, increases awareness of these differences. In fact, regardless of how extreme the dissimilarity of cultural patterns of groups in contact, there will be *mutual* ethnocentrism if each is able to maintain its autonomy. Noel has applied this argument to the early relations between the European settlers and the American Indians:

Indians in the Americas did not automatically surrender their ethnocentrism in the face of European technology and

scientific superiority. Indeed, if the cultural strengths (including technology) of the outgroup are not relevant to the values and goals of the ingroup they will, by the very nature of ethnocentrism, be negatively defined.[28]

On the other hand, if the ingroup finds itself in a dependent relationship with the outgroup (or vice versa), wherein both share the same social order but with differential power resources, ethnocentrism will be greater among the group in the dominant position. Ethnocentrism, having its basis in perceived cultural differences between groups, receives its strength from perceived differences in power. These two factors, ethnocentrism and differential power, shape the sense of group position among dominant- and subordinate-group members.

For distinct racial groups, perceived differences in skin color further contribute to the formation and crystallization of a sense of group position. As I have attempted to show, although invidious comparisons of a subordinate group's culture and physical features constitute ethnocentrism, they also provide the necessary, but not sufficient, condition for racism.[29]

However, the question before us is what are the factors that give rise to cultural and biological racism? Before even attempting to answer such a question, we should briefly consider the historical proposition that in societies where initial contact between particular racial groups *is not* preceded by a tradition of race exploitation, the development of racism, if indeed it emerges at all, takes place after racial stratification has been firmly established.[30] Racism is therefore not essential for racial stratification. The factor that is absolutely necessary to the emergence of racial stratification is differential power. Without an unequal power balance, group efforts to achieve racial domination will simply generate conflict until a state of symbiosis or pluralistic equilibrium is reached.[31] Although differential power provides the basis for a system of racial stratification, group desires to control or maximize scarce resources furnish the motivation for developing the system and for putting it into operation. As I noted previously, control of scarce resources may be maintained or increased either through the

elimination of the subordinate racial members as competitors or through the exploitation of their labor.

Group vested interest leading to racial stratification is ultimately a product of the original sense of group position: the initial collective identity that develops because of differential racial power, skin color, and cultural differences and the subjective state of ethnocentrism that feeds on the differences. The more that dominant-group members identify with their group position, the greater is the likelihood that they will strive to perpetuate their position. It is out of this process that group interests are defined and special norms are developed in turn to protect these interests.

But dominant members may have ethnocentric feelings or contempt for minority culture and behavior patterns and still not attempt to justify their privileged position with claims of cultural or biological superiority, thereby obviating the need for a rationale to support racial exploitation. I previously mentioned caste systems and feudal societies in which claims of superiority were openly respected or accepted by all.[32] On the other hand, a rationale could be based simply on notions that it is in the dominant group's best interest to create and sustain racial stratification without any reference to minority traits or characteristics.[33]

However, when the system of racial stratification is challenged both by subordinates seeking to share the dominant group's rights and privileges and by other individuals and groups opposed to race exploitation, the need for a more explicit and forceful justification of racial domination emerges. This is when dominant-group spokesmen with vested interests begin to denounce the subordinate racial group publicly.

Available historical evidence is not sufficient to allow us to advance propositions concerning the origins of cultural and biological racism with any degree of certitude. What evidence we do have from our examination of the emergence of racism in Western societies suggests that both forms of racism tend to emerge and develop when racial stratification is under challenge and the position of the dominant group is being threatened.[34] The greater the challenge to racial stratification, the more likely it is that biological racism rather than cultural

racism will be used both to justify dominant-group claims of prior rights and privileges and to reinforce already established patterns of race subordination. However, this hypothesis must be advanced cautiously, because the development of racist thought is to some extent dependent on existing societal conceptions of man and human behavior derived from a society's theology, science, philosophy, and so on, and therefore belief in biological racism may be more easily nurtured in one period of time than in another.

Unlike cultural racism, biological racism provides dominant members with an ideology convincing them of the inevitability of their rule. They can claim that they are in a superior position because they are naturally superior, that subordinate members do not possess qualities enabling them to compete on equal terms. Such beliefs solidify the sense of group position, reinforce patterns of racial subordination, and provide a powerful rebuttal to humanitarian attacks against race exploitation.

In the final analysis, regardless of the manner in which the minority group is demeaned (on the basis of either cultural traits or physical attributes) in public deliberations to preserve the racial order, if such discussions are continuous rather than intermittent, are capable of generating and sustaining collective interests, and are not neutralized or offset by arguments opposed to racial stratification, it is overwhelmingly probable that norms of racial subordination will be generated. The net effect is the development of racism on individual, collective, and institutional levels. Although all three levels of racism have harmful social and psychological effects (this is particularly true if the racist norms are based on assumptions of biological inferiority, because the humanity of minority individuals is called into question), in the long run institutional racism has the most serious consequences. As long as minority individuals are excluded by racist norms from meaningful participation in the ongoing process of institutional life, their chances of developing the power resources needed to promote or protect their interests are seriously limited. However, even institutional racism and discrimination undergo change in the face of sufficient pressures, but this is a matter to be discussed in the next chapter.

NOTES

1. *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (New York: Bantam Press, 1968).

2. See, for example, Gary T. Marx, "Two Cheers for the National Riot Commission," in *Black Americans*, ed. by J. Szwed (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 78–96. William K. Tabb, "Race Relations Models and Social Change," *Social Problems*, 18:431–444 (Spring 1971).

3. Marx, op. cit., p. 83.

4. Richard Schermerhorn, *Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research* (New York: Random House, 1970), and Donald L. Noel, "Slavery and the Rise of Racism," in *The Origins of American Slavery and Racism*, ed. by Donald L. Noel (Columbus, O.: Merrill, 1972), pp. 153–174.

5. Schermerhorn, op. cit., p. 73.

6. Ibid., p. 74.

7. Noel, op. cit., pp. 170–171.

8. Ibid., p. 156.

9. Ibid., p. 157.

10. Ibid., p. 156.

11. Winthrop D. Jordan, *White over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro 1550–1812* (Chapel Hill: U. of North Carolina, 1968), p. 7.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. 26. This subject is discussed more fully in Chapter Five.

14. This definition could apply to both the dominant and the subordinate racial groups. However, if both groups share the same social order, it would be more difficult for subordinate racial members to develop and sustain a racist philosophy, because they have an inferior status and lack the power resources of the dominant group (this point is further discussed in a later section of this chapter). In this study, my concern is with racism among dominant group members and the way it sustains and reinforces racial stratification.

15. The concept of cultural racism advanced in this study should not be confused with the term as used by James M. Jones in his study of prejudice and racism. Jones states: "In its broadest sense, cultural racism is very closely related to ethnocentrism. However, a significant factor which transcends simple ethnocentrism is power. This power to significantly affect the lives of people who are ethnically and/or culturally different is the factor which transforms white ethnocentrism into white, cultural racism." The problem with Jones's discussion of cultural racism is that its broad application does not allow one to distinguish sheer exploitation or discrimination without a racist base from exploitation guided by a philosophy of racial domination. See James M. Jones, *Prejudice and Racism* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1972), p. 149.

16. Herbert Blumer, "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position," *Pacific Sociological Review*, 1:3–7 (Spring 1958)..

17. See pp. 38–39 for a distinction between racism and race prejudice.

18. Blumer, op. cit., pp. 3–4.

19. Commenting on this first feeling, Blumer states: "In race prejudice there is a self-assured feeling on the part of the dominant racial group of being naturally superior or better. This is commonly shown in a disparagement of the qualities of the subordinate racial group. Condemnatory or debasing traits, such as laziness, dishonesty, greediness, unreliability, stupidity, deceit, and immorality, are usually imputed to it." Ibid., p. 4.

20. Ibid., p. 5. For a related discussion of this point, see Roger Daniels and Harry H. L. Kitano, *American Racism: Exploration of the Nature of Prejudice* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), chaps. 1 and 2, and E. Franklin Frazier, "Theoretical Structures of Sociology and Sociological Research," *British Journal of Sociology*, 4:292–311 (Dec. 1953).

21. Blumer, op. cit., p. 5.

22. Because the subordinate group is defined as an aggregate entity, this collective image tends to be abstract. "While actual encounters are with individuals," writes Blumer, "the picture formed of the racial group is necessarily a vast entity which spreads out far beyond such individuals and transcends experience with such individuals." Ibid., p. 6.

23. Ibid., p. 7.

24. Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1954), p. 12.

25. Noel, op. cit., pp. 158–159.

26. Blumer, op. cit., p. 4.

27. After examining sociological studies of racial attitudes, van den Berghe was led to conclude that if racism is overtly and blatantly endorsed, individuals will exhibit racist behavior regardless of personality factors. Van den Berghe also notes that psychological explanations of racist behavior have their greatest explanatory power in situations where individuals practice racial discrimination despite the fact that strong social norms exist prohibiting expression of racism. In such instances, he notes, racial bigotry fulfills a psychological need. However, such cases represent the exception rather than the rule. Pierre van den Berghe, *Race and Racism: A Comparative Perspective* (New York: Wiley, 1967), p. 20; also see Lewis M. Killian, "The Adjustment of Southern White Migrants to Urban Norms," *Social Forces*, 32:66–69 (Oct. 1953), and "The Effects of Southern White Workers on Race Relations in Northern Plants," *American Sociological Review*, 17:327–331 (June 1952); and Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, *Social Change and Prejudice* (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 77.

28. Noel, op. cit., p. 159.

29. It is easier to distinguish these two ideas on a conceptual basis than it is to apply them empirically. Obviously, some dominant-group behavior typically characterized as racist will at times exhibit elements of ethnocentrism, and, conversely, behavior typically defined as ethnocentric will sometimes manifest elements of racism. There will always be some overlapping when these concepts are empirically applied.

30. This is true of Western societies, where a racist ideology did not develop until after contact was made with the Africans. For further discussion of this point, see Chapter Five.

31. Noel, op. cit., p. 163.

32. Blumer, op. cit., p. 4.

33. In this regard, Thorpe has stated that, unlike in the United States, "Latin American culture accepted the institution of slavery as a necessary evil . . . there was no need to create myths and stereotypes to justify the institution." Earle E. Thorpe, "Chattel Slavery and Concentration Camps," in *Slavery and Its Aftermath*, ed. by Peter I. Rose (New York: Atherton, 1970), p. 58.

34. Some of this evidence will be examined closely in subsequent chapters by drawing on historical data from the United States and the Republic of South Africa.

CHAPTER FOUR

Power, Racism, and the Theoretical Basis of Racial Conflict

SOCIAL scientists have often remarked that rebellions against institutionalized inequality by an oppressed racial group are least likely to occur in a rigidly stratified system characterized by the dominant group's almost complete control over the lives of the subordinate group.[1] With few exceptions, the empirical evidence indicates that the major preoccupation of the subordinate racial group in such societies is with survival, the day-to-day struggle to satisfy basic physical needs. "Far from making people into revolutionaries," states James C. Davies, "enduring poverty makes for concern with one's solitary self or solitary family at best and resignation or mute despair at worst."[2] However, in some situations some members of the oppressed minority may manage to improve their position to a point where the satisfaction of their basic human needs becomes a secondary concern, and as their status improves their expectations increase and dissatisfaction with their position in society intensifies. It is only when subjugated racial members sense the possibility of change that they are likely to apply pressure to improve their situation.

Gary T. Marx has incorporated this principle in his analysis of black militancy in America:

militancy requires at least some degree of hope, a belief in the possibility of beautiful tomorrows. Morale is needed— which, although linked with dissatisfaction, is the opposite

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of despair. A sense of futility would seem to work against the development of the morale and hope required for a militant vision. One of the reasons that militancy is more pronounced among those in higher positions may be that this group is more likely to have the high morale needed to sustain it. No matter how dissatisfied and distraught an individual may be over his personal and group situation, unless his discontent is found together with a positive morale, it is likely to lead not to militancy but to apathy, despair, and estrangement.

This does not mean that the underprivileged are filled with love or respect for the system that oppresses them. But they are likely to lack the energy, incentive, and will to challenge it in the disciplined way of civil rights organizations. If their concern does lead to attack, it is more likely to take the form of violent outbursts.[3]

Nevertheless, in some cases the power gap between the dominant group and the minority group may be so great that the minority's desire for change is superseded by the conviction that any effort to effect change will be abortive. Accordingly, despite increased minority motivation to overcome oppressive conditions, interracial relationships may continue to exist in what Schermerhorn has called a state of "integration" —in which the various groups of society actively and coordinately comply with norms of the dominant members.[4] Race relations observers may often interpret open compliance with or accommodation to oppression as an indication of minority acceptance of racial stratification when it more nearly reflects the subordinate group's pessimism about successful resistance. I believe that a comprehensive theory of minority mobilization of power resources (i.e., "the portion of the total resources that are actually utilized or expended to achieve a given objective"[5]) must take into consideration, not only a group's desire for change, but also (1) its expectation that change can in fact be brought about and (2) its perception of the rewards and punishments associated with change.[6] If a group's desire for change is low and/or it feels unable to apply the kinds of

pressure needed to effect significant change, or if a group feels that regardless of the kinds of pressure applied the cost of resistance is too high for the rewards, then the probability is great that it *will not* take steps to challenge the racial order. In the final analysis, a group's beliefs regarding its ability or inability to produce change are based on perceptions of both its own relative power resources and the magnitude of the problem to be solved.

Perceptions of power resources often are related to judgments concerning the degree or type of pressure needed to produce the best results, ranging from the employment of formal procedures such as litigation and the exercise of political franchise to the use of open rebellion or revolution. Two major factors operate to explain the utilization of the latter, more violent forms of protest: (1) "a prolonged period of rising expectations and rising gratification followed by a short period of sharp reversal during which the gap between expectations and gratification quickly widens and becomes intolerable"[7] and (2) a belief that the desired change can only be successfully accomplished by accelerating and intensifying the protests. The first factor incorporates the central hypothesis of Davies' "J-curve" theory of revolution and rebellions[8]; however, it provides only a necessary condition for the outbreak of these forms of protest. In order to predict whether the revolt will in fact occur, whether it will escalate to the level of a rebellion or to that of a revolution, consideration also must be given to the second factor.[9] A minority group's faith in the efficacy of violent tactics can be traced to its assessment of both the dominant group's possession of power resources and its willingness to mobilize these resources in order to suppress a revolt.

Although it could be argued that some rebellions are spontaneous and do not involve calculated and rational decisions, nonetheless even in such cases the participants are cognizant of the possible consequences. There is little evidence to support the thesis that the oppressed strike out blindly with suicidal fervor and with little regard for their personal and group welfare. Planned revolts such as revolutions or organized rebel-

lions quite clearly are based on an assessment, accurate or inaccurate, of the prospects of success and the possible returns. In fact, the more the rebellious group has to lose by the use of violent forms of protest, the less likely it is willing to take the necessary risks. Even those who argue that little is to be lost and everything to be gained by a violent uprising must confront the distasteful possibility that they could lose their lives, however miserable their lives might be.

The more restrictive the social structure, the greater are the risks minority members take when they attempt to protest. In very restrictive social structures, e.g., autocratic slavery systems, not only is the power discrepancy between the minority group and the dominant group relatively fixed (although in time all structural relations undergo some change), but also any form of collective minority protest is likely to generate rather severe repression from dominant racial members.

Rather than leading to attacks against the racial order, minority response to racial subjugation frequently assumes the form of nationalist or separatist movements. More specifically, in a society where the subordinate and dominant racial groups share the same social order and pursue the same scarce goals (e.g., jobs, land, and capital) and where subordinate racial members find themselves in more of a dependent than an autonomous relationship with the dominant group, minority nationalist sentiment will tend to be high during periods when the struggle for racial equality seems hopeless or when intense frustration and disillusionment follow a span of heightened expectations. Accordingly, the less minority members depend on dominant members for, say, jobs, housing, and education, the more nationalist sentiment will depend on events internal to the minority community, and therefore the less will it be affected by the behavior of dominant racial members (e.g., the development of more virulent racist norms) or events outside of the community.

The major attraction of nationalist movements is that parallel institutions or societies could be established free of, or removed from, dominant-group control. Nationalist movements may range from those proclaiming positive race identity, in-

cluding elaboration and/or development of the racial group's historical and cultural identity (cultural nationalism), to those that attempt to gain control of minority social, economic, and political institutions and/or establish separate institutions (institutional nationalism). Central to all nationalist movements is a strong emphasis on racial solidarity.

The success of institutional nationalist movements is dependent on (1) sufficient minority resources to develop and sustain autonomous institutions, (2) support of rank and file minority members ready to abandon the struggle to achieve assimilation in the larger society, and (3) support from dominant members who are willing to sacrifice any possible losses from subordinate-group separation (e.g., relinquishing control of minority labor and of institutions serving the minority community). The more minority nationalists renounce all desire to be incorporated into the larger society, the less of a threat they pose to dominant-group claims of prior rights and privileges. It is true that dominant members differ in their responses to various forms of institutional nationalism. Dominant-group entrepreneurs, for instance, are likely to be far less enthusiastic about the voluntary withdrawal of minority participation in the market place than are others who are not directly affected by such action. Moreover, industrialists who depend on subordinate-group labor are likely to resist any efforts to establish a *totally* separate and independent minority society. However, other aspects of institutional nationalism that are not central to dominant-group livelihood, such as the isolation of residential areas and the separation of social events, are not only likely to receive far less resistance from dominant members, but, depending on the level of racism in society, could very well be strongly supported. In short, the less that dominant members suffer from minority withdrawal, the more they will tolerate and sometimes encourage minority separatism.[10]

The basic thesis implicit in this discussion is that social structures vary with regard to the types of minority response to racial subordination they generate and tolerate. This point is amplified and made explicit in the following section.

RESTRICTIVENESS OF THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND MOBILIZATION OF POWER RESOURCES

According to Pierre van den Berghe, "it is reasonable to accept [the fact] that basic aspects of the social structure exert a considerable degree of determinism on the prevailing type of race relations"[11] in society. Nowhere is this relationship more clearly demonstrated than in his rather elaborate typology of competitive versus paternalistic systems of race relations. Grounded on both historical and comparative data, this typology is designed (1) to relate interaction patterns between the dominant and subordinate racial groups to basic structural variables (i.e., the economy, division of labor, and social stratification), (2) to provide a basis for analyzing the mode of race relations at a given period of time, (3) to consider the reasons for the changing forms of race relations through time, and (4) to compare patterns of race relations in different cultures.

The paternalistic form of race relations is, according to van den Berghe, "characteristic of fairly complex but preindustrial societies, in which agriculture and handicraft production constitute the basis of the economy."[12] In such societies, the economy is controlled by an aristocratic segment of the dominate group numerically a relatively small part of the total population. Wide discrepancies exist between the dominant and subordinate groups in income, education, occupation, life style, and death and birth rates. These gaps reflect racial divisions that are reinforced and solidified by a caste system prohibiting mobility except within the racial castes. By rationalizing its rule, the dominant group develops an ideology of "benevolent despotism" and regards the members of the minority group "as inferior, but lovable, as long as they stay in 'their place.' "[13]

An elaborate, symbolized etiquette marked by asymmetrical manners of address and speaking, stringent regulations, and continuous manifestations of subservience and dominance maximizes the differences between the roles and statuses of the dominant and subordinate groups and allows for "close symbiosis and even intimacy, without any threat to status inequalities."[14] This sytem of racial differentiation does not

give rise to physical isolation: there is no designed attempt by the dominant group to control the minority group via physical separation, because the elaborate procedures of racial etiquette maintain control of the subordinate group.

As long as the system is not challenged by the subordinate racial group, dominant-group racism is likely to be characterized, not by virulent hatred, but by "pseudotolerance." However, overt racial conflict may flare up in infrequent, periodic ways, generally in the form of minority slave revolts or messianistic, revivalistic, or nationalistic movements.

In short, paternalistic regimes are "extreme examples of tyranny over, and exploitation of, the many by the few. The relative stability of these regimes is partly a product of coercion and, at least as importantly, of close, intimate, albeit highly unequal symbiosis."[15]

Competitive race relations, the polar extreme of paternalistic relations, are generally associated with *industrialized and urbanized society*. Here the dominant group may be a numerical majority or constitute more than 20 or 25 per cent of the total population. Because a heavy price in productivity would have to be paid if racial ascription of occupations was maintained, the gap between the castes of dominant and subservient groups tends to narrow, not only in occupation, but consequently also in education, income, and life style.[16] The racial distinction is still present, but "class differences become more salient relative to caste; that is, there is a greater range of class status within castes."[17]

As the line between the castes diminishes and economic competition increases between the subordinate group and lower-class segments of the dominant group, hatred and bigotry are frequently manifested. Physical segregation is introduced to protect the dominant group's position. Thus the amount of contact between the castes is minimized, and the society is increasingly compartmentalized. Segregation becomes spatial.

The political system of the dominant group generally takes the form of a regime that restricts the exercise of de jure as well as de facto power to dominant-group members. Political consciousness on the part of the subordinate group becomes a

catalyst for rebellion; "conflict is endemic and frequently erupts in both dominant and subordinate groups in the form of lynchings, pogroms, race riots, and terrorism as well as disciplined mass movements of political opposition ranging from ordinary demonstrations to passive resistance."[18]

With this summary of the central features of van den Berghe's typology of paternalistic and competitive systems of race relations, I will now attempt to spell out the kinds of power relations one would expect to find in both paternalistic and competitive systems.

Power and paternalistic systems. The subordinate group in a paternalistic system of race relations tends to lack control of sufficient power resources to seriously challenge the racial order. The dominant group's position approaches absolute control over the lives of subordinate racial members. Attempts to resist racial subordination do occur but tend to be limited to the exercise of constraint or pressure resources (i.e., resources used to coerce or punish a group to behave in the desired manner), because the minority group lacks inducement or persuasion resources. The fact that some segments of the minority population are inclined to exercise constraint resources (e.g., slave revolts) indicates a degree of alienation from the system and a rejection of its norms.

The frequency, degree, and type of constraint resources used by subordinate members in a paternalistic system are based to some extent on beliefs regarding their ability to change the system to make their lives more satisfactory. Historians have pointed out that slave revolts in the antebellum South (which was characterized by a paternalistic system of race relations) were more likely to occur near large urban areas, where the slaves were more literate and conscious of their oppressed condition and not as rigidly controlled and suppressed as those in servitude on large plantations.[19] Moreover, it has been argued that both the French and Indian War and the War of 1812 increased the probability of slave revolts because the local militia was drafted to fight in these wars, thus leaving the areas they patrolled to prevent slave rebellions unprotected.[20]

Given the rigidity of the paternalistic system, it seems warranted to conclude that the subordinate group's motivation[21] to exert pressure would be low in all but a few paternalistic regimes,[22] primarily because the dominant group's controls are so strong that few would even entertain the possibility of successfully effecting change. In fact, the dominant group in paternalistic systems, recognizing and fearing the possibility that the subordinate group might use its constraint resources, will tend to rely almost solely on coercion as a means of controlling the subordinate group. The relative stability of paternalistic systems is based on unlimited coercion.

Power and competitive systems. Power relations between dominant and subordinate groups in a paternalistic system are in sharp contrast to those typical of a competitive system. There is more power reciprocity or feedback between the superordinate and subordinate groups in a competitive system. Majority-group members in a competitive system frequently find themselves vulnerable to applied minority constraint resources such as sit-ins, boycotts, and riots. In many cases, the use of constraint resources enables minority members to obtain certain competitive resources. Thus political pressures and economic boycotts can be used to effect changes leading to improved housing, upgraded occupations, and higher-quality education. It is also the case, however, that as minority members acquire competitive resources they move into direct competition with some members of the dominant group, particularly those of the lower strata. If the latter feel that their own status or security is in jeopardy, they will tend to manifest hostility and resentment toward the minority group, ranging from verbal assaults to violent attacks against persons and property.

However, the degree to which certain dominant members express their racial hostility is based not only on the vulnerability of the minority group to belligerent attacks but also on the prevailing norms that define proper interracial behavior. If individual or group attacks against the minority race do not bring strong sanctions either from minority members themselves or from dominant authorities, racial violence perpetrated against the subordinate race will continue unabated.

However, a competitive system of race relations may undergo considerable change during a relatively short period of time, and the manner in which racial violence is managed may be consequently altered. Patterns of interracial behavior do not tend to be as immutable as they are in paternalistic systems. For our purposes, therefore, we may place competitive systems of race relations along a continuum from the relatively restrictive to the relatively fluid or open.[23] Examples from American history may help clarify this point. From 1890 to the first two decades of the twentieth century, the period known as the "golden age of racism," race relations in the United States were the epitome of a restrictive competitive system. Although black people theoretically were free to compete with whites, in most areas of life the repressive and often violent Jim Crow system with its inherent policy of discrimination and segregation reinforced by virulent racial norms severely reduced the blacks' chances of developing competitive resources. Moreover, because of the high probability of overwhelming suppressive reactions by the white majority, blacks were unlikely to resort to the use of activist constraint resources such as protest demonstrations or rioting against property. Organized resentment against the racial order more typically assumed the form of separatist or nationalist movements such as those led by Bishop Turner and Marcus Garvey in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but such movements represented a retreat from rather than an attack against the social order. Since this period, as blacks have been able to accumulate some competitive resources and apply sanctions against the white power structure by exercising constraint resources, race relations in the United States have slowly moved toward the other polar extreme of the competitive system, i.e., fluid competitive race relations.

Although minority members in a fluid rather than a restrictive competitive system are more likely to apply constraint resources to eliminate racial inequities, it is also the case that as their persuasion and inducement resources increase, their reliance on constraint as a means of influence is reduced. In fact, constraint resources tend to be employed only when the mi-

nority group does not possess sufficient inducement and persuasion resources to bring about desired changes.[24] In some instances, however, persuasion or inducement resources may be combined with constraint resources. Killian et al. apply this argument to nonviolent resistance movements:

> Non-violent protest constituted a mixed strategy of influence. The rhetoric of the movement emphasized its reliance on persuasion, on appealing to the conscience of white Americans. The demonstration of the capacity of blacks for love and long suffering, even in the face of violent white retaliation, was supposed to love the white man into submission to black demands. At the same time, the strategy involved relied on constraints. Civil rights leaders could be sure that the frantic response of white authorities and white citizens to even the most peaceful sit-in, kneel-in, or freedom ride would disrupt any community in which such a demonstration was staged.[25]

Although some pressure to change the racial order is directed at dominant-group citizens in general, minority protests such as nonviolent resistance are ultimately aimed at dominant authorities, particularly authorities of the administrative branch of the government, who tend to have greater power to satisfy demands for racial justice—depending, of course, on whether the protest is directed at municipal, state, or national authorities. Assuming therefore that minority pressures against the government include the presentation of certain demands, there are theoretically at least three steps governmental authorities may take in response to these pressures: (1) attempt to meet all of the demands, (2) present a conciliatory offer (e.g., grant some but not all of the demands, reject the demands but propose to act on alternative solutions to the basic grievances, or promise to give the matter some thought without commitment to a specific course of action), and (3) invoke some means of social control over the minority partisans by preventing their access to resources and their ability to use them.[26]

The first option is most likely to be exercised (1) if the de-

mands are specific rather than diffuse and if they are consistent with the ideals or values that the government is committed to uphold, (2) if the authorities feel that the dissenting minority possesses resources that could be used to seriously damage their political fortunes, and (3) if the authorities believe that failure to satisfy all of the demands would be more harmful politically than pursuing an alternative course of action. The government's selection of the first option is therefore an indication that the minority partisans possess sufficient resources to accomplish their main objectives.[27]

The second option represents an attempt to relax the pressures without meeting the original demands. Concessions are often granted essentially to maintain the balance of power in the government's favor. As William Gamson has noted, "Social movements may falter on partial success, winning small victories which, while leaving basic dissatisfaction untouched, hamper the members in their ability to mobilize resources for further influence."[28] The extent to which the conciliatory offer approximates or departs from the original set of demands is a function of two major factors: (1) the nature of the original demands—the more diffuse and extreme the original demands, the more the government's offer fails to satisfy them —and (2) the regard the governmental authorities have for the dissenting group—the greater the resources possessed by the minority, the greater the government's concern for the possible political consequences of their action and the more its conciliatory offer satisfies the original set of demands.

Finally, the third option will tend to be chosen by governmental officials if the demands are considered extreme and diffuse and, more importantly, the dissenting minority possesses insufficient resources to persuade or pressure the government to meet the demands or grant concessions. Stated differently, the fewer power resources a group possesses, the more likely is the government to ignore its demands and exert social control to eliminate the pressure. The third option is more frequently exercised in restrictive competitive systems. On the other hand, fluid competitive systems present more the opposite situation. Frequently there are some segments of the minority popula-

tion in a position to command the respect and attention of the larger community because of their possession and effective utilization of persuasion, inducement, and constraint resources.

RACISM AND RACIAL CONFLICT

As race relations approach a fluid competitive system, beliefs concerning minority cultural or biological inferiority are undermined and their debilitating effects on subordinate racial members are reduced. In other words, if the oppressed minority group can increase its power resources and move into positions once solely occupied by dominant members, institutional racism becomes exposed and is challenged, and individual racism and collective racism are undermined. Because of increasing opportunities for education and skilled training, subordinate members find themselves in a position to challenge the authority of the dominant group and exhibit degrees of competence and expertise that invalidate racist stereotypes. In the face of these changes, therefore, some members of the dominant group, particularly those receiving no direct material benefits from racial stratification, will come to question the legitimacy of an unequal distribution of rights and privileges and either withdraw support of racist norms or join other dominant members in an attack against the system of racism. The greatest threat to any form of racism, then, is the significant entry of minority members into upper-status positions within the larger society.

However, depending on the situation, racism can either heighten or diminish overt conflict. Specifically, racism reduces conflict when its effect on subordinate racial members is so penetrating that they actually suffer from psychic exploitation and hence define themselves as biologically or culturally inferior and attempt to identify with dominant norms and culture. Although often producing negative psychic reactions in subordinate racial members, racism also gives rise to "positive" psychic effects in dominant-group members in that it increases the sense of group position among dominants and contributes

to their feeling of superiority. The more that dominant members internalize racist norms and beliefs, the greater is their support for a social structure denying the subordinate group access to positions of power, prestige, and influence and the more likely are they to resist efforts to change the racial order. Thus the combination of dominant-group resolve to conserve racial stratification and minority self-derogation provides the greatest possibilities for the preservation of the racial order and the fewest possibilities for racial conflict.[29]

However, as the power resources of minority members increase so that they are able to challenge the authority of the dominant group, they tend to develop a heightened awareness of and bitterness toward the racial order. This process often leads to open struggle against the system of racism in which efforts are made to revive and perpetuate aspects of the minority's racial or cultural heritage that have been disrupted by racism, thus weakening personal and group identities.

The increased awareness and rejection of racism by members of the minority group produces a kind of racial solidarity that becomes increasingly threatening to dominant-group members. Under these conditions, if the dominant group attempts to reinforce the system of racism or if it fails to take the steps defined by the minority group as necessary to eliminate or reduce racist exploitation, the chances of overt conflict are greatly enhanced.

The irony of the situation is that racial conflict is most likely to occur when the minority racial group experiences some improvement in their condition and senses the possibility for further improvement.[30] It is here that the continued existence of racism in society becomes more of a catalyst for minority rebellion and less of a mechanism for dominant-group social control.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND TYPES OF RACE RELATIONS

The shift from one system of race relations to another (e.g., from paternalistic to restrictive competitive or fluid competitive) is not simply the result of some natural evolutionary pro-

cess but rather occurs because of fundamental societal changes, often beyond the interracial arena. I have in mind such factors as beginning or growing industrialization, urbanization, internal migration and immigration, political changes resulting from internal or external pressures on the government, revolutions, and civil wars. Because of such changes, racial groups may accumulate or lose resources, and long-term effects on the balance of power between the racial groups may be produced —effects often more significant than any race-related actions undertaken by the respective groups.[31] The more rapid the social change, the greater is the possibility that the social structure will loosen, thus making new resources available for either the dominant or the minority group to use to extend or alter the power balance in their favor.[32]

Although the subordinate racial members frequently are able to improve their absolute position in society (e.g., increased income, improved educational opportunities, upgraded occupations, and greater freedom of movement) as a result of societal changes, their relative position vis-à-vis the dominant group may remain the same because the latter may also experience an upswing in living conditions. Moreover, the absolute gains of minority members may be further neutralized by the dominant group's ability to introduce new mechanisms of social control and thus preserve their power advantage. In other words, a shift in the racial order may occur, but only in a lateral direction, with the dominant group merely transfering its control of the old institutions to new institutions ushered in by societal changes. Let us examine this process by focusing momentarily on the shift from paternalistic to competitive forms of race relations.[33]

In the race relations literature, it is commonly observed that the emergence of industrialization undermines the paternalistic racial order. To be more specific, certain innovations accompany industrialization such as severance of paternalistic dependency relations, dissolution of old and development of new occupations, breakdown of rural areas and villages with concurrent development of large urban centers, and increase of opportunities for vertical mobility as a result of the prolifera-

tion of skilled positions. In short, industrialization destroys many of the pillars of the established racial order, dislodges racial groups from their positions in society, and weakens or severs the bonds existing between them.

It has also been argued that in time the intrinsic tendencies of industrialization will undermine racist thinking. These tendencies represent "the structural requirement of industrialization" and include factors such as (1) the emphasis on rational perspectives, (2) the necessity of physical mobility, (3) the primacy of contractual relations, (4) the requirement of an impersonal market, (5) the allotment of resources on the grounds of productive receipts, and (6) the internal pressures that constantly activate the foregoing requirements.

A society undergoing industrialization therefore has a rather distinctive character, in which a premium is placed on rational decisions, in which social mobility is largely a consequence of individual merit and aptitude, hence undermining the importance attached to traditional group affiliation such as race, and in which secular interests form the basis of shifting alignments. In short, "status by achievement" replaces "status by ascription."

Finally, it is often assumed that where established relations between dominant and subordinate members in paternalistic regimes are forced, because of industrialization, to become competitive in areas where dominant members feel they have prior claim, racial tension and conflict ensue.

> The net import of this conventional view—even though it is not well developed—is that industrialisation introduces a transitional stage into race relations—a stage marked by unfamiliar association, competitive contact, and a challenge to previous social standing. Race relations become uncertain and instable. The shifts in them awaken suspicion, arouse resentment, occasion strain and provoke discord.[34]

These arguments constitute the basic postulates of the conventional thesis of industrialization and race relations and have been subjected to a penetrating critique by Blumer. As I un-

derstand them, the basic arguments in Blumer's rebuttal are as follows:

1. That it is a serious error to assume that industrialization necessarily leads to a basic transformation or displacement of the established racial order.

2. That in the early stages of industrialization, rational orientation "may compel an adherence to the racial system rather than a departure from it."[35] Employers may decide not to hire or promote minority workers because they fear a possible backlash by certain dominant-group workers that could lead to the disruption of efficient operation.

3. That the change from status relations to contractual relations and the increased possibilities for social mobility due to the proliferation of new occupations may not produce any basic changes in the respective positions of the racial groups. Subordinate racial members may find that certain ceilings are imposed on their job mobility, denying them skilled positions and limiting their options to only the most menial and poorly paid jobs.

4. That the racial conflict and tension attributed to emerging industrialization are not likely to occur in societies with an established racial order but rather in societies (a) where "industrialisation may bring together racial groups which previously have not had relations with each other or only tenuously defined positions with regard to each other" and (b) where "a firmly established racial order is definitely undergoing disintegration"[36] (usually brought about, not by pressures from industrial forces, but by nonindustrial influences).

5. That in the final analysis the "racial alignment is shaped in major measure by nonindustrial influences, that resulting patterns of racial alignment permeate the industrial structure, and that changes in such patterns are traceable mainly to movements in social and political happenings."[37]

As subsequent chapters will show, there is a good deal of empirical support for Blumer's thesis. Even though the shift from paternalistic to competitive race relations is facilitated by

industrialization, we should expect to find little change in the racial order if the shift is not also accompanied by political and social pressures of sufficient magnitude to alter the racial alignment.[38] New resources may become available as a result of industrialization, but they are offset by new controls imposed by the dominant group. Race relations become competitive, but only in the narrowest sense. The system remains closed, with restricted minority mobility, restricted interracial competition, and consequently restricted areas of racial conflict.[39]

Although industrialization may not *directly* contribute to a realignment of the established racial order, it can contribute indirectly. We need only recognize that with the growth of industrialization comes the growth of urbanization. As expanding industry lures minority members to urban areas, they find themselves in a much better position to accumulate power resources. There are greater educational and occupational opportunities available in the cities. The usual political, social, and economic imperatives of urban living provide greater opportunities to develop viable minority institutions such as schools, churches, political and labor organizations, and professional and business associations. The physical proximity of large numbers of minority individuals facilitates communication, ideological development, group identity, and collective action. Furthermore, in urban areas the minority members are not as vulnerable to dominant attacks such as pogroms or lynchings as they are in rural areas. For all of these reasons, minority groups concentrated in urban areas are in a far better position to mount an offensive against racial oppression and move into more fluid competitive relations with dominant members.[40]

Because rapid social change tends to loosen the social structure and thereby create new resources for either the dominant or the subordinate group to employ in the interracial power contest, conflict and tension between the two groups may be expected to increase until a new balance of power is stabilized.[41]

The manifold ways in which the power balance is disrupted, stabilized, and disrupted again may be spelled out more easily

through concrete examples than by further theoretical discussion. This process has been repeated often enough in the history of interracial behavior in the United States and the Republic of South Africa to provide us with sufficient illustrations to establish the validity of the hypothesis. Indeed, the entire theory outlined in this chapter and the three preceding chapters will be applied to the dynamics of race relations in these two societies. Our major focus, however, will be on black—white relations in the United States, a subject discussed in some detail in the next three chapters.

NOTES

1. Gary T. Marx, *Protest and Prejudice: A Study of Belief in the Black Community* (New York: Harper, 1967); James C. Davies, "The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion," in *Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (New York: Bantam, 1969), pp. 690–730; and James A. Geschwender, "Social Structure and the Negro Revolt: An Examination of Some Hypotheses," *Social Forces*, 43:248–256 (Dec. 1964).

2. James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review*, 27:5–19 (Feb. 1962).

3. Marx, op. cit., p. 69.

4. Richard Schermerhorn, *Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research* (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 14.

5. H. M. Blalock, Jr., *Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations* (New York: Wiley, 1967), p. 126.

6. Ibid., pp. 126–131.

7. Davies, "The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions," op. cit., p. 690.

8. Ibid. In Chapter Seven, I discuss the point that Davies' theory has not been fully understood by some writers, who fail to distinguish physical gratification from emotional gratification and hence reject the theory in some cases where it should be accepted. See section entitled "Power and the Changing Character of Black Protest" in Chapter Seven.

9. Designations such as "rebellion" or "revolution" are vague and difficult to apply empirically. Obviously, there are various levels of violence for acts described as rebellions or revolutions. Davies, for instance, states: "If the [oppressed group's] frustration is sufficiently widespread,