


MOZAMBIQUE

Capital: Maputo
Population: 27,233,789
GDP per capita (PPP): \$1,300
Human Development Index: Low (0.437)
Freedom in the World: Partly Free (52/100)

OVERALL CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.8



The peace negotiations that began in 2017 between the two sides in Mozambique’s long military conflict—the ruling party, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), and the main opposition party, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO)—suffered a setback in May 2018 with the sudden death from illness of RENAMO head Afonso Dhlakama, who had led the negotiations. However, in August, the two parties finally signed a memorandum of understanding to demilitarize and integrate RENAMO into the country’s armed forces and police. RENAMO made historic gains against FRELIMO in nationwide municipal elections in October. But the elections were not without problems, as violence broke out and RENAMO claimed electoral fraud in municipalities they believed they had won. Although the tribunals rejected all but one of the opposition’s allegations on technical grounds, the Election Observation Platform, a group composed of leading Mozambican CSOs, presented evidence that appeared to back up many of RENAMO’s claims.

Armed terrorist attacks, including brutal killings and the widespread destruction of property, escalated in the northern province of Cabo Delgado in 2018. The government seemed at a loss to deal with the problem and resorted to heavy-handed but ineffectual tactics, such as mass arrests and illegal detainments. In a chilling continuation of assaults on journalists and activists, a journalist and political commentator for the independent station Socio Television was abducted, beaten, and left unconscious by the side of the road after he openly criticized the behavior of one of the president’s sons. No arrest was made in the case.

In the aftermath of the discovery in 2015 of the state’s hidden debt of \$2.2 billion, the national economy finally began to show signs of recovery in 2018, according to the World Bank. However, income equality increased, and consumers’ purchasing power remained low because of steady increases in the cost of living. The former finance minister, who had approved the fraudulent loans at the heart of the debt scandal, was arrested in South Africa in December 2018 for extradition to the United States, and further arrests were expected.

The overall sustainability of Mozambican CSOs did not change in 2018. CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated slightly as many organizations temporarily closed their doors because of reductions in foreign and government funding. At the same time, advocacy was slightly stronger as many organizations campaigned effectively on the debt scandal and other issues. All other dimensions were stable.

No official up-to-date statistics about the number of CSOs in Mozambique are available. The estimate of the Civil Society Support Mechanism (MASC) Foundation, a major grantmaking and capacity-building organization, is that the country has approximately 10,000 formal and informal organizations.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.1



CSOs' legal environment was unchanged in 2018. All CSOs continued to register under Associations Law 8/91, and little progress was made on revising the law during the year. CSOs may acquire legal status at the national level from the Ministry of Justice, at the provincial level from provincial governors, and at the district level from district administrators. Organizations are usually able to begin working before completing registration. The speed of registration often depends on the officials processing the applications, and the lack of consistency leaves CSOs frustrated. While service-providing CSOs reported few problems with their registrations in 2018, CSOs working on governance continued to experience delays. The Mozambican Association for the Defense of Sexual Minorities continued to wait for approval of its registration

application eleven years after its submission. The requirement that every organization report regularly to its line ministry is not rigorously enforced and therefore not overly burdensome.

As with registration, CSOs' freedom of operation seemed to depend on their area of focus. CSOs working on sensitive issues, such as corruption and governance, reported greater scrutiny and even harassment in 2018, while service-providing organizations experienced few problems. The abduction and beating in March of an outspoken journalist for the independent station Socio Television after he left the National Union of Journalists' office was a chilling warning to civil society activists. Thereafter, CSOs working on sensitive topics sometimes practiced self-censorship if they received information of such a sensitive nature that its release could jeopardize the safety of their staffs. In such cases, CSOs sometimes publicized their findings through local or international media. CSOs were able to exercise the right to assemble, although a heavy police presence, with blinds and dogs, contributed to low turnouts at many public marches in 2018.

CSOs are permitted to earn income from the provision of goods and services, but few organizations take advantage of this opportunity. Under the Associations Law, CSOs may engage in fundraising activities and receive funding from foreign donors. Organizations are legally allowed to bid on government contracts, but they rarely do so, on the assumption that they have no chance of winning the contracts.

CSOs receive tax exemptions and deductions on income from grants if they are registered as public utility institutions, which requires the approval of the Council of Ministers. It is estimated that fewer than 5 percent of CSOs have public utility status, since most organizations not aware of the possibility or are daunted by the complexity of the application process.

While some local lawyers are knowledgeable about laws affecting CSOs, their services are out of the financial reach of most organizations. CSOs in the larger Maputo area have access to several legal resources, including the Mozambique Bar Association (OAM), which offers free legal assistance to needy CSOs but does not have nationwide coverage, and the Institute of Social Communication of Southern Africa and the Community Radio Forum (FORCOM), which offer legal assistance to community radio stations and journalists nationwide. In case of extreme need, smaller CSOs sometimes receive legal support from or through larger CSOs.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.2

CSOs' organizational capacity did not change in 2018. CSOs continued to work closely with their constituents and beneficiaries. For example, the Associação Muchefa in the Mandlakazi District of Gaza Province relied on its close community relationships to organize a series of public debates about priority areas for intervention. These debates, which were coordinated with the local municipalities, helped community members influence the planning process. Informal movements, especially at the grassroots level, have stronger day-to-day links with their constituents than organizations based in Maputo, which usually implement projects in districts in which they do not have offices or

close permanent relationships. For example, the Civil Society District Platform (PLASCIMAC) in Manica Province works closely with community development observatories (ODCs), which are informal voluntary groups formed by civil society, donor, and government representatives to monitor local implementation of the government's poverty reduction programs. In 2018, the ODC in Machaze was able to pressure district officials, the contractor, and the provincial government to resume construction of a district hospital that had stopped for more than three years. When completed, the hospital will serve more than 120,000 people.

The majority of registered CSOs have vision and mission statements, which are included in their constitutions and approved by the government during registration.

However, CSOs' projects are often determined by the availability of funding, and in the absence of sufficient core funding, CSOs must sometimes accept projects that do not align with their missions or are not key priorities for the communities that they serve. Only well-established and well-financed organizations, such as the Center for Learning and Capacity Building Civil Society (CESC), Mozambican Debt Group (GMD), and Parlamento Juvenil, have strategic plans that they follow. Organizations at the provincial and district levels usually do not have strategic plans because of the limited number of people capable of leading the planning process and the cost of their services, which is out of the reach of smaller CSOs. In the absence of strategic plans, most CSOs develop yearly work plans, which sometimes include indicators describing outputs but usually omit methods to evaluate program results.

Formal CSOs have clearly defined management structures, although they do not always function. For example, general assemblies may not meet regularly or fully involve or share information with members. The division of responsibilities between the board and the staff is not well understood, and without clear terms of reference, boards and their chairs may take on day-to-day executive roles. In small organizations that lack funds to hire staff, board members take on implementing roles, which can lead to a lack of transparency and checks and balances and result in the misuse of funds.

Mozambican CSOs have great difficulty maintaining permanent staff because of their lack of funding. The private sector is slowly growing in Mozambique, and its better employment conditions are luring away CSO staff. Government jobs offer low salaries but life-long employment and pensions and thus are also more attractive than well-paid but short-term positions with CSOs. Training for CSO staff usually consists of learning by doing, which deters potential employees who seek formal coursework ending in certificates that they can include on their resumés. The majority of staff at larger, well-established organizations have contracts and job descriptions. CSOs do not usually have sufficient resources to hire professional staff, such as lawyers or information technology managers, but they may outsource these services on a one-off basis. CSOs work with volunteers on a limited scale, in part because of their weak links to universities, which could offer a large pool of volunteers.

Many CSOs, particularly in Maputo and provincial capitals, have reasonable access to basic office equipment, including computers and up-to-date software, as well as internet services. They often use social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, and, especially, WhatsApp. Internet services continue to be limited at the district and local levels.


ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY IN MOZAMBIQUE



FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.3

CSOs' financial viability deteriorated slightly in 2018, as many organizations temporarily closed their doors because of reductions in foreign and government funding. Most CSOs, especially at the provincial and local levels, do not have multiple or diverse sources of funding, which leaves them exceptionally vulnerable to any drop in traditional donor support.

As in previous years, CSOs relied nearly entirely on foreign funding, and organizations at the local and provincial levels complained about a drop in available funding during the year. Donors decreased their support to local



intermediary support organizations (ISOs). For example, the MASC Foundation, which is funded by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development, Irish Aid, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, Danish International Development Agency, and Norwegian Embassy, experienced a decline in funding in 2018, as did the Action Program for Inclusive and Responsible Governance (AGIR) and thematic forums such as FORCOM. These ISOs therefore had fewer funds to pass on to local CSOs. Several donors downsized their operations in 2018, which reduced their capacity to reach out directly to organizations at provincial and local levels. Longer-term funding was a problem even for CSOs based in the capital, as donors also continued to reduce the duration of their support. Most CSOs, especially at the provincial and local levels,

do not have multiple or diverse sources of funding.

Some local foundations, including the Foundation for Community Development (FDC), MASC Foundation, Manhiça Foundation, Lourdes Matola Foundation, and Joaquim Chissano Foundation, offered grants to CSOs in 2018. Taken together, local foundations support fewer than 10 percent of CSOs nationwide.

Funding from government and private-sector sources remains negligible. Government funding is rare, as the government considers CSOs sufficiently recompensed by donors. CSOs may compete for government contracts at both the central and local levels but rarely do so. CSOs may also compete for district funds, which are meant to stimulate employment, income generation, and food production. However, such funds were largely on hold in 2018 because of the debt crisis. The National Aids Council has suffered huge cuts in funding from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis in the last two years and has decreased its support to CSOs. Local private-sector sources of funding are fighting for their own survival in the current economic climate and therefore have cut back on their support to CSOs. The corporate social responsibility programs of larger multinational companies tend to be available only in the limited geographical areas directly affected by their enterprises.

A few larger institutions, such as FDC, which works in health care, education, and advocacy, and N'weti, which focuses on health care, earn income from the sale of services and products or rentals. Professional bodies such as the OAM obtain healthy revenues from the contributions of members, who must belong for professional reasons. However, most CSOs obtain limited funding from individuals or communities, especially as they show little creativity or confidence in generating local income through fundraising activities such as crowdsourcing. Most individuals do not understand the role of CSOs, and they often believe that CSOs already receive external funding or their money does not reach intended target groups. The little funding that individuals give is usually directed to churches or family members, although they may donate food and clothing during emergencies or devote time to working with CSOs to resolve local issues. CSOs sometimes organize concerts and other activities to raise funds for emergency assistance but not for their own operations. Social enterprises are still in their infancy, but CSOs are beginning to realize their potential. For example, the Citizens Platform in Quelimane, Zambezia Province, operates a small bicycle taxi service.

The majority of CSOs manage their finances using simple Excel spreadsheets. Larger, well-established organizations, such as Social and Economic Studies (IESE), Rural Development Observatory (OMR), and CESC, usually have defined financial systems and procedures approved by external auditors, use accounting software such as Primavera, and have qualified or experienced financial managers and other financial management staff. Professional financial services and external audits are generally out of the reach of smaller provincial and local CSOs. Smaller organizations show limited understanding of the need for checks and balances in financial transactions, do not have financial manuals, and usually operate on a cash basis.

ADVOCACY: 4.2

Advocacy by Mozambican CSOs strengthened slightly in 2018 as many organizations continued to focus on the debt issue. The scandal was unusual in that it involved individuals at the highest levels of government and would normally have been brushed under the carpet. In coordination with the donor community, CSOs, which tend to drop such cases for fear of reprisal, managed to maintain pressure and hold previously untouchables elites to account. Also strengthening CSO advocacy was the shift of the focus of a number of organizations from monitoring to advocacy at the provincial and district levels.


Laws and policies do not require the government to consult with civil society. Official mechanisms to hold the government to account, such as the Administrative Tribunal, are not widely used by CSOs. The administration, the parliament, and CSOs themselves make little effort to ensure that CSOs receive advance notification of issues under consideration by national and provincial governments. Direct lines of communication between CSOs and policy makers function on the local level but are mostly ad hoc. Formal groups such as development observatories operate in all provinces but are advisory rather than decision-making bodies, and the government is not obliged to follow up on their concerns and recommendations. Moreover, many key decisions on issues such as mineral resource licences and decentralization are made outside of formal processes.

CSOs seek to use issue-based coalitions to influence the government and public opinion. One of the most effective coalitions is an informal consortium focused on the illegal debt, which is composed of the MASC Foundation, IESE, OMR, and the Center for Public Integrity (CIP). In 2018, the consortium's efforts were strengthened by the work of the Budget Monitoring Forum (FMO), which published several position papers on the topic. Pressure from CSOs and international partners in 2018 kept the debt issue on top of the national and international agenda and led to the arrest of the former minister of finance, who allegedly approved the illegal loans.

Other coalitions that advocated successfully in 2018 included the Network for the Defense of Sexual and Reproductive Rights, which expanded its work to Gaza, Inhambane, Zambezia, Nampula, and Cabo Delgado provinces and introduced the issue of sexual and reproductive rights to public debate and local health institutions. The Coalition for the Elimination and Fight against Premature Marriages in Mozambique worked in various provinces through public debates and roundtable discussions to have underage marriage classified as a criminal offence. When the Mozambican government was invited to make a formal declaration of its goals at the Global Disability Summit in 2018, the Mozambican Forum of Associations of the Disabled (FAMOD) brought together CSOs working on disabilities to draft recommendations. More than 70 percent of FAMOD's recommendations were adopted by the government and subsequently approved at the summit.

In other advocacy efforts in 2018, the environmental association Livangingo advocated for the closure of the Hulene rubbish dump, where a landslide of accumulated debris destroyed houses and killed several families. Livangingo took the municipality to court to secure financial compensation for the affected families. If the case is successful, it will be the first victory of its kind in Mozambique.


The use of social media and mobile platforms to foster civic engagement has had varying success in Mozambique. The Citizens' Platform in Zambezia established an online mechanism that the public could use to pressure the district government to replace a recently collapsed bridge. But the cost and lack of access to internet services often restricts public participation in social media. In addition, people are often not aware of the existence of online platforms or may mistrust them if they fear that their comments will be traced. Informal avenues for influencing decision making, such as meetings with members of political parties and retired public servants, are often more effective tools for advocacy, but they require networking and public relations skills that many CSOs do not possess.



Mozambican CSOs are not yet comfortable with the idea of lobbying, mainly because of their fears of reprisal. Unusually, the Citizens Observatory of Mozambique has begun to submit proposals for laws to the parliament, including, in 2018, a draft law to create a single national identification document. FMO comments regularly on government budgets and interacts with the relevant parliamentary committee.

Work on revising the Associations Law was largely stagnant in 2018. At a national meeting in September 2018, CSOs discussed the process of revising the law, but the government made no steps in that direction during the year. The government is revising the Foundations Law 41/2018, but Mozambican foundations have only limited involvement in the process. While CSOs are aware that revised laws could improve their effectiveness and sustainability, they do not seem as aware of the risk that revisions could have the opposite effect if the government chooses to adopt a hardline approach.

SERVICE PROVISION: 4.0



CSO service provision did not change in 2018. CSOs continued to provide services in all areas, with a particular focus on education, health, water and sanitation, agriculture, and mineral resources. However, the decrease in funding from the National AIDS Council caused a number of organizations (for example, in Inhambane Province) to close their doors in 2018, which resulted in a reduction in the intensity of public awareness of HIV/AIDS.

CSOs' interventions generally respond to community needs. Once a need has been identified, medium-sized and larger CSOs, such as the Associação Sucesso, which works on corruption in Manica District, carry out baseline exercises to gauge the extent of the need and define targets to measure the progress of their

interventions. At the same time, CSOs' services are also driven by donor funding, which may not accurately reflect community needs.

CSOs do not discriminate in their service provision. When funding permits, their services cover entire communities and do not support only their own members or specific political or religious groups.

Very few CSOs recover the costs of service provision, since they lack a business orientation or are unaware of their right to generate income. For example, Women and Law in Southern Africa (WLSA) Mozambique is often invited to make presentations to CSO workshops, conferences, and so forth but rarely charges for this service. In addition, the lack of allocations for CSOs' services in government and other budgets means that few stakeholders have extra funds to pay for CSOs' work.

In some areas, CSOs monitor the quality of basic service provision in unison with local governments, some of which are very open to and accepting of the results of monitoring. For example, in 2018, the Association Environmental Development Program worked with local and district governments in Mocuba District, Zambezia Province, to map non-functioning water holes and repair a large portion of pumps, so that 20,000 families could have access to clean drinking water. At the national level, the government is similarly open to criticism resulting from monitoring, especially if it receives feedback prior to its public release, and CSOs present solutions in addition to describing problems that the government already recognizes. The high quality of WLSA Mozambique's work induced the government to hire the organization to offer capacity building to workers in the judicial sector at the Center for Legal and Judicial Training.

SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0

The sectoral infrastructure did not change in 2018. No dedicated CSO resource centers exist in Mozambique. Several ISOs, including FDC, FORCOM, CESC, the MASC Foundation, and Child Rights Network, offer capacity building and technical assistance in project and financial management as part of their support to grantee organizations. Donor programs such as AGIR and international CSOs such as Counterpart International, Medicus Mundi, and World Vision also offer capacity building and technical assistance. Because of the lack of CSO resource centers and the limited number of ISOs, CSOs' need for training and technical assistance in project design and management is well short of being fulfilled, especially at the provincial and local levels. ISOs do not charge for their services, as their costs are covered by grants from donors and their target groups do not have the ability to pay.

SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN MOZAMBIQUE




Local foundations such as MASC and FDC re-grant international funds to Mozambican CSOs working in areas such as governance and health monitoring. They usually issue calls for proposals that are open to organizations nationwide, and they also identify strategic partners for direct support. The level of funding available through ISOs decreased in 2018.

Formal and informal coalitions continue to develop in Mozambique, although they are sometimes undermined by disputes over which organization will take the lead or manage the funding. Although normally resolved, the disputes can result in delays in program implementation and ineffective coordination of activities. In 2018, consortiums such as Sala de Paz and Votar Mozambique monitored the quality of the election process and reported cases of electoral violence and fraud, as well as success stories. More than fifty registered thematic and provincial and district forums and networks promote collaboration among their members. Many of these forums are driven by the chief executives rather than CSO members, and they sometimes suffer from weak participation, limited financial contributions, non-functioning governing bodies, and a lack of creativity. Informal consortiums created not just for funding purposes but to resolve specific short- to medium-term problems enjoy a higher level of participation and impact. For example, an informal group composed of CIP, IESE, FMO, and the MASC Foundation produced valuable research and analysis on the impact of the debt crisis.

Available training does not meet the needs of local CSOs. Capable CSO trainers are based mostly in Maputo and work for either local CSOs or cooperating partners and thus are not usually available to be hired independently. Independent consultants charge fees that are out of the reach of local and provincial CSOs. Basic training is usually offered by donors to their grantees. Advanced training is not available within the CSO sector but is sometime offered by private companies and universities, which makes it unaffordable for most CSOs. Training materials are mostly in Portuguese, the official language, mainly because many people speak but do not read the large number of local languages.

There are few examples of CSOs working in partnership with the private sector outside of the extractive industries. Many CSOs are reluctant to work even with extractive industries because of a fear that business interests will conflict with community needs. CSOs work more often with the media, with radio and television particularly open to cooperation and joint partnerships. For example, the Mozambican Economic and Social Forum sponsored a youth leadership initiative in which young CSO leaders presented their work on prime-time television. The government and CSOs sometimes engage in joint data collection about local problems, such as access to drinking water, or raise public awareness to mobilize community participation in meeting basic needs, such as the maintenance of water holes.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.6



CSOs' public image was stable in 2018. Coverage of CSOs in the media is limited and focuses mostly on current hot topics rather than social issues or marginalized groups. The media generally provide positive analysis of CSOs' role in society, although journalists' understanding of that role can be limited and individual journalists sometimes attack specific organizations or their leaders on social media. In 2018, for example, CIP and Votar Mocambique were accused on social media of being manipulated by donors. Journalists tend to interview CSO leaders as individual experts rather than as representatives of their organizations. Coverage in the government-controlled media, such as TVM and Jornal Notícias, is difficult to obtain if it involves issues that are politically sensitive.

Local independent media consist mostly of community

radio stations, which are closely linked to CSOs and understand their role. CSOs must usually pay the same fees as other entities for media coverage, except at community radio stations, which may offer them lower rates.

The public does not understand the concept of CSOs or value CSOs' contributions, aside from, to some extent, their provision of services. The public often gives moral support to national causes pursued by CSOs, such as their work on the debt issue, but remains apprehensive about participating in activities such as marches for fear of reprisal or marginalization. Communities are more open to supporting religious institutions than CSOs, and they often assume that CSOs have sufficient resources to carry out their work without community financial support.

The government's perception of CSOs is generally positive, especially of organizations working on issues that support the government's agenda, such as community mobilization, public education, and service provision. The government perceives organizations working on monitoring and good governance less positively. The government usually sees data and other information provided by CSOs as credible only if generated in cooperation with local governments. The private sector recognizes the importance of CSOs' role and the differences in their mandates, capacities, and degrees of transparency.

CSOs still put little emphasis on public relations and do not dedicate resources or partnerships to this purpose. Few organizations have extensive experience working with the media, and they mainly invite journalists to individual events rather than seeking to form long-term relationships. CSOs that understand how to work with journalists can achieve good coverage of their work in the independent media. For example, Associação Sucesso, a small local organization, produces many articles on social media, which are then picked up by newspapers. CIP generates good coverage on issues of corruption, and N'weti is sometimes highlighted in news outlets' coverage of health issues.

CSOs regularly produce progress reports and annual reports for their funders and members. They rarely publish their reports in the media, although they sometimes post them on their websites. CSOs have a sector-wide code of ethics that is slowly being disseminated. Cooperating partners such as the MASC Foundation include the code in their agreements with grantees and encourage other cooperating partners to do the same. It is hoped that by the end of 2019, more than 20 percent of organizations receiving funds nationwide will have signed on to the code, although there is no evidence to demonstrate that the code has actually improved behavior. The MASC Foundation has also created a transparency index, which aims to bring the code of conduct to life through measurable indicators. The index was tested with more than thirty CSOs in three provinces in 2018 and will be finalized in 2019.

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