{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ranges": [
        {
          "database_specific": {
            "cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:strapi:strapi:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*",
            "extracted_events": [
              {
                "introduced": "0"
              },
              {
                "fixed": "5.45.0"
              }
            ],
            "source": [
              "CPE_RANGE",
              "REFERENCES"
            ]
          },
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "c5bc749feeb5b7b4f3d845b52da41277100465a8"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5e0d243cba9830e6f791de6a94798bcde51468db"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi",
          "type": "GIT"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-307"
    ],
    "osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2025/64xxx/CVE-2025-64526.json"
  },
  "details": "Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts. The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request. The patch in version 5.45.0 maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled.",
  "id": "CVE-2025-64526",
  "modified": "2026-07-08T05:36:06.300034092Z",
  "published": "2026-05-14T18:32:01.998Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/releases/tag/v5.45.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2025/64xxx/CVE-2025-64526.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/security/advisories/GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64526"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/commit/5e0d243cba9830e6f791de6a94798bcde51468db"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/pull/24818"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.5",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Strapi has a rate limit bypass on users-permissions plugin via attacker-controlled email keying"
}