{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ranges": [
        {
          "database_specific": {
            "extracted_events": [
              {
                "introduced": "0"
              },
              {
                "fixed": "0.0.91"
              }
            ],
            "source": "AFFECTED_FIELD"
          },
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1267b7b6a02f88eb447a5d09057296c4fac54c67"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/heymrun/heym",
          "type": "GIT"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-6rph-qqcv-jqh4"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cna_assigner": "VulnCheck",
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/100xxx/CVE-2026-100863.json"
  },
  "details": "Heym versions 0.0.90 and earlier contain two server-side request forgery (SSRF) egress gaps, both remediated in app/services/ssrf_guard.py in 0.0.91. First, the LLM image-edit input loader (_load_image_bytes) fetched caller-controlled HTTP/HTTPS URLs with a bare httpx.get, applying only a scheme check and bypassing the egress-pinning HTTP client; because the workflow DSL supports \"imageInput\": \"$userInput.body.imageUrl\", a webhook or API caller can choose the fetch target when a workflow author uses that expression, allowing requests to loopback, RFC1918, and cloud metadata endpoints. Second, _is_public_address unwrapped only IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses, so IPv6 transition forms — the NAT64 well-known prefix 64:ff9b::/96, deprecated IPv4-compatible ::x.x.x.x addresses, and 6to4 (2002::/16, classified as globally routable by Python 3.11.0 through 3.11.9) — could carry loopback, RFC1918, link-local, or cloud-metadata IPv4 destinations past both the initial URL validation and the dial-time IP pin. Version 0.0.91 routes the image loader through guard_http_url and the guarded client, evaluates NAT64 and IPv4-compatible addresses by their embedded IPv4 address, and refuses 64:ff9b:1::/48, 6to4, and Teredo (2001::/32) outright.",
  "id": "CVE-2026-100863",
  "modified": "2026-09-30T03:30:26.381301713Z",
  "published": "2026-09-27T01:28:52.561Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/100xxx/CVE-2026-100863.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-6rph-qqcv-jqh4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-100863"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/heym-before-0.0.91-ssrf-via-image-fetching-and-ipv6-validation"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.9.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Heym before 0.0.91 SSRF via image fetching and IPv6 validation"
}