{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ranges": [
        {
          "database_specific": {
            "extracted_events": [
              {
                "introduced": "0"
              },
              {
                "last_affected": "6.5.1.202602"
              }
            ],
            "source": "AFFECTED_FIELD"
          },
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1a0e9e43a03e37ddecfb6b49e9b078d6e1803d05"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/eclipse-threadx/netxduo",
          "type": "GIT"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-wr79-332c-ff8f"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cna_assigner": "eclipse",
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-125",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/102xxx/CVE-2026-102713.json"
  },
  "details": "The TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter than\n\n\n\nfour bytes (nxd_tftp_server.c:1037) and nothing anywhere checks an upper bound, in particular not\n\n\n\nagainst the protocol maximum of 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX. Two things follow from that one\n\n\n\nmissing check, both reachable before any authentication because TFTP has none.\n\n\n\nThe handler passes `nx_packet_length - 4` straight to FileX:\n\n\n\n```c\n\n\n\n/* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_server.c:1863, 1889 */\n\n\n\nstatus = nx_packet_copy(packet_ptr, \u0026temp_ptr,\n\n                        server_ptr -\u003e nx_tftp_server_packet_pool_ptr, NX_WAIT_FOREVER);\n\n\n...\n\n\n\nfx_file_write(\u0026(client_request_ptr -\u003e nx_tftp_client_request_file),\n\n              packet_ptr -\u003e nx_packet_prepend_ptr + 4,\n              packet_ptr -\u003e nx_packet_length - 4);\n\n\n```\n\n\n\n`nx_packet_length` is the length of a chain, not of one contiguous buffer, so FileX copies past the\n\n\n\nend of the first packet:\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow\n\n\n\nREAD of size 1280 at 0x621000001108 thread T5\n\n    #0 __interceptor_memcpy\n    #1 _fx_utility_memory_copy  filex/common/src/fx_utility_memory_copy.c:78\n\n\n0x621000001108 is 0 bytes to the right of 4104-byte region\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nThose bytes are written into the file the attacker is uploading, and a TFTP read request hands them\n\n\n\nback, so this is a memory disclosure with a convenient retrieval channel.\n\n\n\nThe same datagram also wedges the server. `nx_packet_copy` at :1863 needs\n\n\n\nceil(nx_packet_length / pool_payload) packets and asks for them with NX_WAIT_FOREVER, so when the\n\n\n\nattacker sizes the datagram beyond what the pool holds, the server thread suspends and never\n\n\n\nreturns. A liveness probe after one such datagram times out with the pool at 0 of 12 packets and\n\n\n\nthe server thread suspended, and no later client is served.\n\n\n\nReject `nx_packet_length \u003e 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX` in the DATA branch before either call,\n\n\n\nand use a bounded wait rather than NX_WAIT_FOREVER for the copy.",
  "id": "CVE-2026-102713",
  "modified": "2026-10-01T03:31:02.277255720Z",
  "published": "2026-09-29T17:40:40.067Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/102xxx/CVE-2026-102713.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/eclipse-threadx/netxduo/security/advisories/GHSA-wr79-332c-ff8f"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102713"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.9.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}