{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ranges": [
        {
          "database_specific": {
            "extracted_events": [
              {
                "introduced": "3.7.0"
              },
              {
                "fixed": "4.4.2"
              }
            ],
            "source": "AFFECTED_FIELD"
          },
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "36940db938a8f4a1e919496793ed439850a221c2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "dccb09599635bdff17633fa7e9dab014b91dce90"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
          "type": "GIT"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-mh5r-jxh8-hxwx"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cna_assigner": "zephyr",
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-125"
    ],
    "osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/13xxx/CVE-2026-13481.json"
  },
  "details": "The IEEE 1588 PTP management-message parser in subsys/net/lib/ptp/tlv.c mishandles the PTP_MGMT_TIME management id. In tlv_mgmt_post_recv(), the PTP_MGMT_TIME case casts mgmt_tlv-\u003edata to a 10-byte struct ptp_timestamp and reads it (then byte-swaps and writes it back) without first checking that the TLV data field is at least sizeof(struct ptp_timestamp). Every sibling management id in the same switch validates its length first; PTP_MGMT_TIME was the only case lacking that check.\n\nThe length passed in is the management data size (tlv-\u003elength - 2), and the upstream guard in ptp_tlv_post_recv() only requires tlv-\u003elength \u003e 2, while msg_tlv_post_recv() validates only that the TLV fits within the received byte count, not a per-id minimum. A peer on the local PTP segment can therefore send a PTP_MSG_MANAGEMENT message carrying a short PTP_MGMT_TIME TLV (data as small as 2 bytes), causing the parser to read and write 8 bytes beyond the validated data. The message type and TLV contents are taken straight off the wire, so the path is reachable by any adjacent attacker when CONFIG_PTP is enabled.\n\nThe over-read and write-back stay within the struct ptp_msg allocation (mgmt_tlv-\u003edata lives in the leading mtu[NET_ETH_MTU] union member, so data + 10 lands at most a few bytes past mtu[], inside the same object), so this is an out-of-bounds read of adjacent in-object memory plus a bounded in-place corruption of the message's parsed timestamp, not past-allocation memory corruption. Impact is limited to minor information exposure of adjacent bytes and corruption of the device's parsed management TIME value; there is no crash on the access and no reachable reference-count corruption.\n\nThe fix adds if (length \u003c sizeof(struct ptp_timestamp)) { return -EBADMSG; } before the cast, matching the other management-id cases and fully closing the receive-path defect.",
  "id": "CVE-2026-13481",
  "modified": "2026-09-02T03:30:31.437697410Z",
  "published": "2026-08-26T14:03:49.820Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/13xxx/CVE-2026-13481.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-mh5r-jxh8-hxwx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13481"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/de98c3721a0e21ca269313997736f4f6193909ef"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.9.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Out-of-bounds read in PTP management TLV TIME parsing in Zephyr net PTP"
}