{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ranges": [
        {
          "database_specific": {
            "cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:mintplexlabs:anythingllm:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
            "extracted_events": [
              {
                "introduced": "0"
              },
              {
                "fixed": "1.12.1"
              }
            ],
            "source": [
              "CPE_RANGE",
              "REFERENCES"
            ]
          },
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "f144692903305b0dfa24efe30e5192b3eea81fed"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "f5fa03f4728e483949f6360093bc3ea1ef555535"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm",
          "type": "GIT"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-4q6m-qh3w-9gf5"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-1336",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/41xxx/CVE-2026-41318.json"
  },
  "details": "AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. Prior to version 1.12.1, AnythingLLM's in-chat markdown renderer has an unsafe custom rule for images that interpolates the markdown image's `alt` text into an HTML `alt=\"...\"` attribute without any HTML encoding. Every call-site in the app wraps `renderMarkdown(...)` with `DOMPurify.sanitize(...)` as defense-in-depth — except the `Chartable` component, which renders chart captions with no sanitization. The chart caption is the natural-language text the LLM emits around a `create-chart` tool call, so any attacker who can influence the LLM's output — most cheaply via indirect prompt injection in a shared workspace document, or directly if they can create a chart record in a multi-user workspace — can trigger stored DOM-level XSS in every other user's browser when they open that conversation. AnythingLLM chat history is loaded server-side via `GET /api/workspace/:slug/chats` and rendered directly into the chat UI. Version 1.12.1 contains a patch for this issue.",
  "id": "CVE-2026-41318",
  "modified": "2026-08-07T11:31:04.829700141Z",
  "published": "2026-04-24T02:57:16.193Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/41xxx/CVE-2026-41318.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/Mintplex-Labs/anything-llm/security/advisories/GHSA-4q6m-qh3w-9gf5"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41318"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://github.com/Mintplex-Labs/anything-llm/commit/f5fa03f4728e483949f6360093bc3ea1ef555535"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.8.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AnythingLLM vulnerable to stored DOM XSS in chart caption renderer - LLM-driven prompt injection produces executable HTML via unsanitized renderMarkdown(content.caption) in Chartable component"
}