{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ranges": [
        {
          "database_specific": {
            "extracted_events": [
              {
                "introduced": "0"
              },
              {
                "fixed": "1.0.5"
              }
            ],
            "source": [
              "AFFECTED_FIELD",
              "REFERENCES"
            ]
          },
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4522a44c001782848faff5529d7c1e2be7ac9ef5"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software",
          "type": "GIT"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-rhp5-vmcx-4qm8"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48075.json"
  },
  "details": "OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.5, the `add-to-tunnel` endpoint creates a new appointment row in any client tunnel without any caller authentication. A request that supplies any valid `tunnelId` and any valid `emailHash` (the two need not belong to the same tunnel) results in an inserted appointment with `status = \"CONFIRMED\"`, attacker-controlled ciphertext fields, attacker-controlled date and duration, and an attacker-chosen agent. The endpoint validates only that some tunnel exists with the given `emailHash`, then writes the appointment using the attacker-supplied `tunnelId` directly. The `emailHash` lookup is effectively an existence check on the tenant; it does not authenticate the caller as the owner of the supplied `tunnelId`. Combined with the absence of any session, Authorization header, booking access token, or PoW, this makes the endpoint accept arbitrary appointment writes into arbitrary tunnels. By contrast, the sibling endpoint `create-new-client` (used to bootstrap a brand-new client tunnel) requires a Bearer bootstrap booking access token issued by the bootstrap-challenge / bootstrap-verify flow. The `add-to-tunnel` endpoint, intended for return-clients booking additional appointments, has no equivalent gate. The application's own middleware confirms this is intentional: `add-to-tunnel` is explicitly listed in the apiAuthHandle public-route allowlist alongside the bootstrap and challenge endpoints (which legitimately have no session). Version 1.0.5 fixes the issue.",
  "id": "CVE-2026-48075",
  "modified": "2026-08-09T03:30:33.123590620Z",
  "published": "2026-08-06T20:39:34.056Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48075.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-rhp5-vmcx-4qm8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48075"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/4522a44c001782848faff5529d7c1e2be7ac9ef5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.8.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenReception's unauthenticated add-to-tunnel endpoint accepts arbitrary appointment injections"
}