{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ranges": [
        {
          "database_specific": {
            "extracted_events": [
              {
                "introduced": "0"
              },
              {
                "fixed": "1.0.2"
              }
            ],
            "source": [
              "AFFECTED_FIELD",
              "REFERENCES"
            ]
          },
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2419f9e87a8abad72f31b1fedeb80c758b30322e"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "f833dbf50059ff7d4ea42ce7bbb3a5cdcf7a6929"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software",
          "type": "GIT"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-hrhm-m2hm-7cjh"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-613"
    ],
    "osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48079.json"
  },
  "details": "OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, when a user navigates to the `/logout` page, the page's server-side load handler deletes the `access_token` cookie before calling `/api/auth/logout` via an internal `event.fetch()`. The internal fetch consequently runs without the auth cookie, so `apiAuthHandle` rejects it, the logout handler never executes, and `SessionService.revokeSession()` is never called for the current session. The DB session row remains valid until its natural expiry (one week by default). The user sees a successful logout (cookie gone, UI returns to login), but any party still holding a copy of the now-deleted access token can continue making authenticated API calls until the session naturally expires. The root cause is a simple ordering mistake. The same auth subsystem implements the correct order in `/api/auth/logout`: revoke the current DB session first, then delete the cookie. The page-level wrapper does the opposite. Version 1.0.2 initiates server-side logout before removing authentication cookies and first appears in version 1.0.2. Version 2.0.0 later replaces this with a race-free client-side logout flow.",
  "id": "CVE-2026-48079",
  "modified": "2026-08-09T03:30:27.714406951Z",
  "published": "2026-08-06T21:00:44.615Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48079.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-hrhm-m2hm-7cjh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48079"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/2419f9e87a8abad72f31b1fedeb80c758b30322e"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/f833dbf50059ff7d4ea42ce7bbb3a5cdcf7a6929"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.8.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenReception's logout page clears local access_token before server-side revocation, leaving duplicated tokens valid until expiry"
}