{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ranges": [
        {
          "database_specific": {
            "extracted_events": [
              {
                "introduced": "0"
              },
              {
                "fixed": "4.6.40"
              }
            ],
            "source": [
              "AFFECTED_FIELD",
              "REFERENCES"
            ]
          },
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "179cab02dbec0c1e9b601507a659"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/mervinpraison/praisonai",
          "type": "GIT"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-xp85-6wwf-r67c"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48168.json"
  },
  "details": "PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 4.6.40, the bundled Claude GitHub Actions workflow is vulnerable to command injection because it embeds an attacker-controlled pull request branch name into a Bash run: block without quoting or validation. Additionally, the workflow allows any @claude comment to trigger the job regardless of whether the commenter is a trusted collaborator. An outside contributor can open a pull request from a fork whose branch name contains shell metacharacters and comment @claude, causing Bash to execute arbitrary shell code in the GitHub Actions runner. Because these commands run in a job holding a GitHub App token with write permissions, OIDC access, and gh/git access, the injection can be chained through $GITHUB_PATH to compromise later privileged steps, enabling repository writes, pull request and issue manipulation, or OIDC-token abuse. This issue has been fixed in version 4.6.40.",
  "id": "CVE-2026-48168",
  "modified": "2026-08-07T11:31:18.344661539Z",
  "published": "2026-08-05T18:29:38.632Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48168.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-xp85-6wwf-r67c"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48168"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/179cab02dbec0c1e9b601507a659"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.8.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI: GitHub Actions Claude workflow command injection via unquoted PR branch name"
}