{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ranges": [
        {
          "database_specific": {
            "extracted_events": [
              {
                "introduced": "0.3.0"
              },
              {
                "fixed": "1.5.2"
              }
            ],
            "source": "AFFECTED_FIELD"
          },
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "e4303a87b92081e162e080ff69f36830c1035c09"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3b75cd9c9a101bae26eecf1ad261d94aba247ee9"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/sigstore/rekor",
          "type": "GIT"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-47q9-m4ww-924m"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48702.json"
  },
  "details": "Rekor is a software supply chain transparency log. Starting in version 0.3.0 and prior to version 1.5.2, the `Package.Unmarshal()` function in `pkg/types/alpine/apk.go` decompresses the signature and control gzip members of an APK file into in-memory buffers without bounding the total decompressed size. The existing `max_apk_metadata_size` check (default 1MB) is only applied to individual tar entry header sizes after decompression completes, so it does not prevent a decompression bomb from consuming unbounded heap memory. An attacker can craft a gzip stream that compresses at a ~1000:1 ratio (e.g., 2MB compressed zeros → 2GB decompressed). When submitted as spec.package.content in an Alpine `ProposedEntry`, the server decompresses the full payload into memory during request processing, triggering a fatal Go runtime out-of-memory error or OS OOM-kill that cannot be caught by the server's recover() middleware. This is reachable via two unauthenticated endpoints, `POST /api/v1/log/entries (createLogEntry)` and `POST /api/v1/log/entries/retrieve (searchLogQuery)`. Both invoke `V001Entry.Canonicalize()` → `fetchExternalEntities()` → `apk.Unmarshal(packageData)`, which performs the unbounded decompression. Version 1.5.2 patches the issue. There is no effective workaround. Setting `max_request_body_size` reduces but does not eliminate exposure due to the ~1000:1 compression ratio (a 1MB body limit still allows ~1GB heap allocation). Setting `max_apk_metadata_size` has no effect on this vulnerability since the check is applied after decompression.",
  "id": "CVE-2026-48702",
  "modified": "2026-08-15T11:31:01.428431519Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T13:14:19.324Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48702.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/sigstore/rekor/security/advisories/GHSA-47q9-m4ww-924m"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48702"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.9.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Rekor has an OOM Condition due to Unbounded gzip Decompression in Alpine APK Parsing Logic"
}