{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ranges": [
        {
          "database_specific": {
            "extracted_events": [
              {
                "introduced": "0"
              },
              {
                "fixed": "0.64.0"
              }
            ],
            "source": [
              "AFFECTED_FIELD",
              "REFERENCES"
            ]
          },
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "00b7dd7b79c5d03c94be284cf3459d98195ebfba"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/langroid/langroid",
          "type": "GIT"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-pmch-g965-grmr"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/50xxx/CVE-2026-50180.json"
  },
  "details": "Langroid is a framework for building large-language-model-powered applications. Prior to version 0.64.0, `SQLChatAgent` in `langroid` ships a `_validate_query` defense-in-depth layer whose `_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS` regex blocklist enumerates dangerous SQL primitives by specific function name. The list misses the canonical PostgreSQL filesystem-disclosure family `pg_read_file()`, `pg_stat_file()`, `pg_ls_logdir()`, `pg_ls_waldir()`, `pg_current_logfile()` (and similar `SELECT`-shaped functions in the same family). It also leaves SQL Server `OPENDATASOURCE` and SQLite `ATTACH '\u003cfile\u003e' AS x` (DATABASE keyword omitted) unblocked. An attacker able to shape the LLM's generated SQL (directly via prompt input or transitively via prompt-injection in data the LLM ingests) can read arbitrary files from the PostgreSQL host through ordinary `SELECT` queries, even with the agent's strict default configuration (`allow_dangerous_operations=False`, `allowed_statement_types=['SELECT']`). The payloads survive the statement-type allowlist (each is a `SELECT`) and pass through the regex blocklist (none of the function names match), then reach the live SQLAlchemy engine via `SQLChatAgent.run_query`. Version 0.64.0 contains a patch for the issue.",
  "id": "CVE-2026-50180",
  "modified": "2026-07-15T01:49:13.548125767Z",
  "published": "2026-07-09T23:42:52.853Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/50xxx/CVE-2026-50180.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/langroid/langroid/security/advisories/GHSA-pmch-g965-grmr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50180"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://github.com/langroid/langroid/commit/00b7dd7b79c5d03c94be284cf3459d98195ebfba"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.8.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Langroid: SQLChatAgent _validate_query blocklist misses pg_read_file family enabling arbitrary file read"
}