{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ranges": [
        {
          "database_specific": {
            "cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:wolfssl:wolfssl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
            "extracted_events": [
              {
                "introduced": "5.5.4"
              },
              {
                "last_affected": "5.9.1"
              },
              {
                "fixed": "5.9.2"
              }
            ],
            "source": [
              "AFFECTED_FIELD",
              "CPE_RANGE"
            ]
          },
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4fbd4fd36a21efd9d1a7e17aba390e91c78693b1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "ac01707f552c611fbd135cc723b2682b3e7f80f2"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/wolfssl/wolfssl",
          "type": "GIT"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cna_assigner": "wolfSSL",
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/55xxx/CVE-2026-55962.json"
  },
  "details": "TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA) issue where a server could accept a client's Finished message without the client having sent a Certificate and CertificateVerify. The post-handshake-auth exemption that allows an empty/absent peer certificate was only intended for the initial handshake, but it was also being applied while a post-handshake CertificateRequest was still outstanding. The check is now scoped to the initial handshake only: on the server, once a post-handshake CertificateRequest has been sent (certReqCtx is set), a peer certificate and a valid CertificateVerify are required again before the Finished is accepted, with empty-certificate handling following the configured verify mode (FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) just as during first-handshake client authentication. Only affects TLS 1.3 servers built with post-handshake authentication support (WOLFSSL_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH / --enable-postauth, included in --enable-all) that enable WOLFSSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE and request a client certificate after the handshake via wolfSSL_request_certificate(). Clients, and servers that do not use post-handshake authentication, are unaffected.",
  "id": "CVE-2026-55962",
  "modified": "2026-07-16T03:31:15.612608119Z",
  "published": "2026-06-25T21:12:38.074Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wolfssl.com/docs/security-vulnerabilities/"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/55xxx/CVE-2026-55962.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55962"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/pull/10702"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.8.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication: server accepts Finished without client Certificate/CertificateVerify"
}