{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ranges": [
        {
          "database_specific": {
            "extracted_events": [
              {
                "range": [
                  {
                    "introduced": "0"
                  },
                  {
                    "fixed": "2.0.0"
                  }
                ],
                "source": "AFFECTED_FIELD",
                "strategy": "StringRangeExpression"
              },
              {
                "range": [
                  {
                    "fixed": "df5432776a1a5b47c3a64d64e9d05dbe2b7a7819"
                  }
                ],
                "source": "REFERENCES_COMMIT"
              },
              {
                "original_tag": "v2.0.0",
                "range": [
                  {
                    "fixed": "51ef46d25d72c35bb4b69e018ddf64570668051b"
                  }
                ],
                "source": "REFERENCES_TAG"
              }
            ]
          },
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "51ef46d25d72c35bb4b69e018ddf64570668051b"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "df5432776a1a5b47c3a64d64e9d05dbe2b7a7819"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software",
          "type": "GIT"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-w5g9-g2p4-2g4m"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-640"
    ],
    "osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/58xxx/CVE-2026-58202.json"
  },
  "details": "OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 2.0.0, the account-confirmation link in emails is built from the request Host header, with no allowlist. The unauthenticated POST /api/auth/resend-confirmation rotates a pending invitee's confirmation token and emails a link whose host comes from the request. An attacker who sends one resend-confirmation with Host: attacker.example and a pending invitee's email causes that invitee to receive a confirmation email whose only link points to the attacker. If the invitee clicks, the one-time confirmation token reaches the attacker, who then confirms the account on the real tenant domain and registers a passkey they control, taking over the account before the legitimate invitee ever uses it. All released versions through v1.1.0 are affected; no patched version exists yet. Reaching the app with a spoofed Host depends on the front proxy: the stock Caddy catch-all forwards it, while an operator who configures explicit per-tenant proxy blocks is not affected (see Details 4). The invite path builds links from the trusted tenant.domain (invite/+server.ts:204-210); the resend-confirmation path builds them from the request Host. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.0.",
  "id": "CVE-2026-58202",
  "modified": "2026-10-31T02:31:00.051446917Z",
  "published": "2026-10-23T20:27:36.090Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/releases/tag/v2.0.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/58xxx/CVE-2026-58202.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-w5g9-g2p4-2g4m"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58202"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/df5432776a1a5b47c3a64d64e9d05dbe2b7a7819"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.9.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenReception: Confirmation-email links built from the request Host enable pending-account takeover via `POST /api/auth/resend-confirmation`"
}