{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ranges": [
        {
          "database_specific": {
            "cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:network-ai:network-ai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
            "extracted_events": [
              {
                "introduced": "5.0.0"
              },
              {
                "fixed": "5.12.2"
              }
            ],
            "source": [
              "AFFECTED_FIELD",
              "CPE_RANGE",
              "REFERENCES"
            ]
          },
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "c7891a948d643c22fb40ae36ac05174fd1bf0e5b"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/jovancoding/network-ai",
          "type": "GIT"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cna_assigner": "GitHub_M",
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/58xxx/CVE-2026-58482.json"
  },
  "details": "Network-AI, a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator, has a shipped, exported, documented feature called `ApprovalInbox` (`lib/approval-inbox.ts`). It is the network surface of the human-in-the-loop Approval Gate, which `ApprovalGate` uses to require explicit human approval for high-risk operations. The HTTP server it exposes has no authentication of any kind and sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on every route, including the state-changing `POST /approvals/:id/approve` and `/deny`. As a result, in versions 5.0.0 through 5.12.1, any party who can send an HTTP request to the inbox port — a co-located process, a container/SSRF on the same host, a remote client when the operator binds a non-loopback address, or any website the operator visits in a browser (via the wildcard CORS) — can enumerate pending approvals and approve them, defeating the entire human-in-the-loop control and causing the gated high-risk action (e.g. a shell command the agent was holding for review) to execute without consent. This issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `ApprovalInbox` now accepts a `secret` option. When set, the mutating endpoints `POST /:id/approve` and `POST /:id/deny` require an `Authorization: Bearer \u003csecret\u003e` header, validated in constant time with `crypto.timingSafeEqual`. `startServer()` already binds to `127.0.0.1` by default; operators exposing the inbox on a network must set a secret.",
  "id": "CVE-2026-58482",
  "modified": "2026-08-15T11:31:19.428048553Z",
  "published": "2026-07-20T16:38:55.576Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/58xxx/CVE-2026-58482.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58482"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.9.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Network-AI: ApprovalInbox HTTP server has no authentication — anyone can approve pending agent actions"
}