{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ranges": [
        {
          "database_specific": {
            "extracted_events": [
              {
                "introduced": "4.3.0"
              },
              {
                "last_affected": "4.4.2"
              }
            ],
            "source": [
              "AFFECTED_FIELD",
              "REFERENCES"
            ]
          },
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3568e1b6d5cdd51a6b964a2a1d6d29200fea2056"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "46f8af4f5ee472abc13b0291c44fdfe4ed879aaa"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
          "type": "GIT"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-w7pm-4r95-c9vr"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cna_assigner": "zephyr",
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-125"
    ],
    "osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/75xxx/CVE-2026-75085.json"
  },
  "details": "The STM32WBA IEEE 802.15.4 driver in drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_stm32wba.c computed the packet length of a received frame as pkt_len = rx_frame-\u003elength - IEEE802154_FCS_LENGTH without first checking that the radio-reported length could hold an FCS. pkt_len is a uint8_t, so a reported length of 0 or 1 wrapped to 254 or 255. The only bound on the resulting value was __ASSERT_NO_MSG(pkt_len \u003c= CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE), which compiles to nothing in the default production configuration (CONFIG_ASSERT=n).\n\nThe length originates in the ST link-layer receive-done metadata (p_metadata-\u003elength, stored by stm32wba_802154_receive_done()), and ultimately in the PHY header of a frame received over the air, so it is influenced by any attacker within radio range of the device. Reaching the underflow requires the vendor link layer to surface a frame shorter than the FCS with no error; the driver performed no validation of its own on that value.\n\nWhen the underflow occurs, stm32wba_802154_rx_thread() calls net_pkt_write(pkt, rx_frame-\u003epsdu, pkt_len) with a length of about 254 bytes against a receive buffer that holds at most one PHY packet (IEEE802154_MAX_PHY_PACKET_SIZE, 127 bytes). This reads roughly 128 bytes past the end of the radio receive buffer and copies that adjacent memory into a network packet that is submitted to the networking stack, giving an out-of-bounds read with a potential disclosure of adjacent RAM plus needless oversized packet allocation in the RX thread.\n\nThe fix rejects a frame whose reported length is smaller than IEEE802154_FCS_LENGTH before the subtraction, and replaces the compiled-out assertion with a runtime length check that drops oversized frames — matching the runtime check already present in drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_nrf5.c.",
  "id": "CVE-2026-75085",
  "modified": "2026-10-16T02:30:58.148584708Z",
  "published": "2026-10-14T16:46:02.993Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/75xxx/CVE-2026-75085.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-w7pm-4r95-c9vr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75085"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/46f8af4f5ee472abc13b0291c44fdfe4ed879aaa"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.9.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Out-of-bounds read from received-frame length underflow in the STM32WBA IEEE 802.15.4 driver"
}