{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ranges": [
        {
          "database_specific": {
            "cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:karaf:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
            "extracted_events": [
              {
                "introduced": "0"
              },
              {
                "fixed": "4.4.12"
              }
            ],
            "source": "CPE_RANGE"
          },
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "189048fff3422afaadcbbb57d95b257cb35248ad"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/apache/karaf",
          "type": "GIT"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cna_assigner": "apache",
    "osv_generated_from": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/91xxx/CVE-2026-91012.json",
    "unresolved_ranges": [
      {
        "extracted_events": [
          {
            "fixed": "4.4.12"
          }
        ],
        "source": "AFFECTED_FIELD"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "org.apache.karaf.config.core.impl.ConfigRepositoryImpl#update(pid, properties),\nwhich backs the \"config\" MBean and the config:* shell commands, derives the file\nit writes a configuration to from caller-supplied input without checking that\nthe result stays inside ${karaf.etc}:\n\n  *  if the submitted property map contains a felix.fileinstall.filename entry, that value is turned directly into a File (getCfgFileFromProperty), so it can point to any absolute path the Karaf process can write to;\n  *  otherwise the configuration PID is concatenated verbatim into the target file name (generateConfigFilename(): new File(karaf.etc, pid + \".cfg\")), so a PID containing \"..\" segments resolves outside ${karaf.etc}. createFactoryConfiguration() has the same issue via the factory PID/alias.\n\n\nBoth code paths are reachable by any caller holding the \"manager\" role under Karaf's shipped command/JMX ACL (org.apache.karaf.command.acl.conf.cfg: \"update = manager\"). Such a user can therefore write attacker-controlled content to any file the Karaf process can write, including files the same ACL otherwise reserves to \"admin\" (etc/users.properties, etc/*.acl.*.cfg, etc/org.apache.karaf.management.cfg, and similar), allowing a manager-role user to grant themselves the admin role or otherwise take over the container.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nConfigMBeanImpl.install() and the config:install shell command already guarded the equivalent risk on their own code path with a finalname.contains(\"..\") string check, but that check does not stop absolute paths or symlink-based escapes, and it was never applied to ConfigRepositoryImpl.update() / createFactoryConfiguration() at all.",
  "id": "CVE-2026-91012",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T02:30:34.436318436Z",
  "published": "2026-09-29T08:34:11.409Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/91xxx/CVE-2026-91012.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/op8trtz1qxkdwj2rjozhd9yt2yd6nhw4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-91012"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.9.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Apache Karaf: Path Traversal in Config Service Allows Manager-to-Admin Privilege Escalation"
}