

# TODAY'S MEDIA TRENDS

## SUDAN

MARCH 1, 2026

THE GDELT PROJECT

### THE SUDANESE STATE PIVOT:

REGIONAL REALIGNMENT & DOMESTIC RECONSTRUCTION (MARCH 2026)

#### DAY-AT-A-GLANCE: INFLECTION POINT

  
KADUGLI & DILLING SIEGE LIFTED  
(SOUTH KORDOFAN)

  
90% DROP IN BASIC  
COMMODITY PRICES

  
WHO RETURNS TO KHARTOUM  
(RETURNING TO NORMALCY)

#### REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERING



#### DOMESTIC RECONSTRUCTION & ASYMMETRIC THREATS

##### REBUILDING & DECENTRALIZATION



##### ONGOING CHALLENGES



#### STRATEGIC FORESIGHT & KEY THEMES

SHORT TERM (1-4 WEEKS):  
INTENSIFY SAF OFFENSIVES,  
RSF DRONE RESPONSE

MEDIUM TERM (1-6 MONTHS):  
AU MEMBERSHIP PUSH,  
ECONOMIC STABILIZATION

LONG TERM (1-5 YEARS):  
DECENTRALIZED POST-WAR ECONOMY,  
GULF SECURITY PACTS



THEME 1:  
HUMANITARIAN  
DIPLOMACY AS LEGITIMACY  
(AID AS ENDORSEMENT)



THEME 2:  
ECONOMIC WARFARE &  
MARKET PSYCHOLOGY  
(SIGNALING RESILIENCE)



THEME 3:  
END OF  
CENTRALIZATION  
(STRUCTURAL SHIFT)

#### IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL & PRIVATE SECTOR

##### INTERNATIONAL POLICY

WHO RETURN = NGO GREEN LIGHT  
RED SEA SECURITY ARCHITECTURE OPPORTUNITY  
BILATERAL NILE COOPERATION

##### PRIVATE SECTOR/INVESTORS

INFRASTRUCTURE OPPORTUNITY (SOLAR/UTILITIES)  
AGRIBUSINESS PIVOT (NEW HALFA)  
SUPPLY CHAIN RISK (SECURITY REQUIRED)

# TODAY'S MEDIA TRENDS

## SUDAN

MARCH 1, 2026

---

THE SUDANESE STATE IS PIVOTING TOWARD REGIONAL REALIGNMENT AND DOMESTIC RECONSTRUCTION AMIDST MILITARY BREAKTHROUGHS IN SOUTH KORDOFAN AND THE RETURN OF INTERNATIONAL ENTITIES TO KHARTOUM.

### DAY-AT-A-GLANCE

---

March 1, 2026, marks a significant inflection point for the Sudanese government as it transitions from a posture of pure survival to one of regional diplomatic maneuvering and domestic institutional restoration. The primary driver of this shift is the reported lifting of the prolonged siege on Kadugli and Dilling in South Kordofan, which has resulted in a [90% drop in basic commodity prices](#), signaling a major logistics victory for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) over the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia. This tactical success is being leveraged by the state to project an image of "returning to normalcy," underscored by the reopening of the World Health Organization (WHO) office in Khartoum and the resumption of industrial activities in the capital's suburbs.

On the diplomatic front, Prime Minister Dr. Kamel Idris's return from Cairo highlights a deepening of the Sudan-Egypt axis, specifically regarding Nile water management and Sudan's eventual return to the African Union (AU). Simultaneously, Sudan has aggressively aligned itself with the Gulf monarchies—Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain—by issuing strong condemnations of Iranian "aggression," a move likely designed to secure financial and political backing from the anti-Iran bloc while isolating the RSF's alleged regional sponsors. However, this progress is tempered by ongoing asymmetric threats, as evidenced by [terrorist drone strikes](#) on industrial infrastructure in El Obeid and new escalations in the Blue Nile State by militia-aligned groups.

### MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS

---

- **Strategic Logistics Breakthrough in South Kordofan:** The SAF has successfully opened supply lines from Habila to Kadugli and Dilling, effectively breaking a crippling militia siege. This has shifted the economic reality on the ground, with [sugar prices falling](#) from 50,000 to 5,000 SDG, a vital win for domestic stability during the Ramadan period.
- **Rehabilitation of State Institutions in Khartoum:** The government is aggressively promoting the narrative that Khartoum is once again secure for international operations. The return of the [WHO to Khartoum](#) and the resumption of manufacturing at the Muawiya Al-Berir industrial complexes in Bahri and Soba serve as primary proof-points for this claim.

- **Escalation of Asymmetric Warfare:** For the third consecutive day, the RSF targeted [civilian and industrial areas](#) in El Obeid with "suicide drones," specifically aiming for the industrial zone to disrupt local economic recovery and commerce.
- **Deepening Rift with Kenya and Ethiopia:** Sudanese officials have leveled serious accusations against Nairobi, alleging that the [Kenyan presidency](#) issued passports to RSF leaders. Simultaneously, Ethiopia is accused of hosting militia camps and facilitating cross-border drone strikes into Blue Nile State.
- **Industrial Resilience and Recovery:** Large-scale industrial tours led by business leaders like Muawiya Al-Berir demonstrate a [concerted effort to restart](#) detergent, food, and chemical production in liberated zones of the capital, aimed at reducing dependence on imported goods.

## KEY GOVERNANCE TOPICS

---

### International Relations & Foreign Policy

The Sudanese government is executing a dual-track diplomatic strategy. First, it is solidifying its "Strategic Partnership" with Egypt to address [GERD technical data sharing](#) and the status of Sudanese refugees. Second, it is positioning itself as a frontline defender of Gulf sovereignty against Iranian influence. Al-Burhan's direct calls to the [Emir of Qatar](#) and the Crown Prince of Kuwait regarding Iranian "aggression" represent a calculated pivot to secure its flank within the Arab League as it seeks to bypass AU freezes.

**Food & Water Access/Security** The stabilization of New Halfa and Sennar has become a model for the government's agricultural strategy. Officials highlighted [local vegetable production](#) in New Halfa and

the installation of solar-powered water stations in Sennar to ensure [24-hour water availability](#). However, transport costs and "zakat" taxes remain significant hurdles to lowering consumer prices further.

### National Security & Tactical Developments

The conflict is evolving into a drone-heavy engagement. Reports from Blue Nile State indicate that Joseph Touka's forces, allied with the RSF, have utilized [strategic drones](#) to displace hundreds from Kurmuk. The SAF is responding by increasing the role of the "Al-Hajjana" (Camel Corps) and "Special Action Forces" to [secure major highways](#) before the onset of the rainy season, which typically halts heavy armor movement.

### Critical Infrastructure

The destruction of the Al-Shorouq TV headquarters and other media hubs in Khartoum is being framed as a [systematic attack on Sudanese identity](#). In response, the Ministry of Information has announced a plan to rebuild cultural and tourism institutions, treating them as strategic assets for state legitimacy.

## LEGISLATIVE ROUNDUP

---

Governance activity focused on administrative adjustments to accommodate war-time realities and regional land management. High-level press events served as the primary vehicle for policy announcements regarding

international cooperation and domestic reform.

- **BILLS DISCUSSED/DEBATED:**

- **Agricultural Land Disposal Regulations 2026 (Kassala):** The Higher Council for Urban Planning approved new [regulations for agricultural land](#) to govern activity in the sector and likely manage the influx of displaced persons into the state's economy.
- **Civil Service Promotion Amendment:** The Council of Ministers passed [adjustments to promotion bylaws](#) to account for the "changes" in the country and ensure justice for a wide swath of public sector workers affected by the conflict.

- **HEARINGS & PRESS EVENTS:**

- **PM Dr. Kamel Idris Press Conference (Khartoum Airport):** Following his Egypt visit, the PM clarified that rumors of [forced returns](#) of Sudanese from Egypt were false, attributing them to "routine security measures."
- **Justice Ministry Human Rights Briefing:** Minister Abdullah Drif briefed the Indonesian permanent representative to the UN on [militia violations](#) and national efforts to enhance the rule of law.

## **DEEP DIVE: TRENDS AND THEMES**

---

**The End of Centralization** A recurring theme in the day's broadcasts was the strategic error of "Capital Centralization." Government analysts noted that the [fall of Khartoum](#) in 2023 crippled the entire nation because all services were concentrated there.

The current trend is toward decentralizing essential services to states like Kassala, Sennar, and White Nile. This is not just a wartime necessity but a proposed [structural change](#) for the future Sudanese state to prevent a repeat of the current crisis.

### **Humanitarian Diplomacy as Legitimacy**

The "Ramadan" context is being used as a backdrop for high-stakes humanitarian diplomacy. The [Qatari-Sudanese aid bridge](#) and the King Salman Center's activities through the "Eghtenam" organization are portrayed as more than just charity; they are seen as geopolitical endorsements of the SAF government over the RSF. This theme of "Takaful" (social solidarity) is being tied directly to [support for the military](#).

### **Economic Warfare and Market Psychology**

The government is engaged in a sophisticated information campaign regarding market prices. By highlighting the [drastic price drops](#) in Kadugli, the state is signaling to the RSF that its "economic blockade" strategy is failing. Simultaneously, the focus on [local vegetable production](#) in New Halfa serves to assure the urban population that the "breadbasket" regions are secure, despite the loss of some traditional farming zones in Gezira.

## **STRATEGIC FORESIGHT**

---

**Short Term (1-4 Weeks):** Expect an intensification of SAF offensives in Kordofan to fully clear the Dilling-Kadugli corridor before the [rainy season begins](#) in late spring. Concurrently, the RSF is likely to increase drone strikes on "safe" cities like El Obeid and Sennar to counteract the government's "normalcy" narrative. Diplomacy with Egypt will focus on the [April 13th Sudanese Certificate exams](#) for students residing in

Egypt, a key test of administrative competence.

**Medium Term (1-6 Months):** The battle for AU membership will likely culminate in a diplomatic showdown. With [Egyptian and Algerian support](#), Sudan will push for the lifting of its suspension, though reported [UAE-backed resistance](#) remains a major obstacle. Domestically, if supply lines stay open, the government may attempt to re-establish a formal central bank presence in Khartoum to stabilize the SDG.

**Long Term (1-5 Years):** Sudan is laying the groundwork for a post-war economy that is significantly less centralized. The [investment maps](#) being drafted for New Halfa and the emphasis on solar-powered utilities suggest a long-term pivot toward regional infrastructure resilience. Alliances with Gulf states (Qatar/Kuwait/KSA) will likely solidify into formal security pacts, particularly if Sudan continues to position itself as a [bulwark against Iranian](#) and RSF-linked "non-state" threats.

## RECOMMENDATIONS & IMPLICATIONS

---

### For International Policy:

- The return of the WHO to Khartoum serves as a **green light** for other international NGOs to reassess their footprint in the capital, provided they coordinate with SAF security protocols. [Security for aid convoys](#) remains paramount.
- Sudan's alignment with the anti-Iran bloc creates an opportunity for Western and Gulf powers to integrate Sudan into a **Regional Red Sea Security Architecture**, potentially marginalizing the RSF's external support networks.

- The Nile water sharing agreement with Egypt indicates a shift toward **bilateral technical cooperation** that may bypass stalled trilateral GERD negotiations, potentially isolating Ethiopia's unilateral stance.

### For Private Sector/Investors:

- **Infrastructure Opportunity:** The move toward [solar-powered water and utility projects](#) in stable states like Sennar and Kassala represents a significant growth area for energy investors as the country seeks to move away from vulnerable centralized grids.
- **Agribusiness Pivot:** New Halfa is emerging as a **low-risk investment zone** for agricultural processing. With its sugar factory, flour mills, and strong [community-led development](#), it offers a more stable alternative than the still-contested Gezira region.
- **Supply Chain Risk:** Despite the opening of the Kadugli road, the [ongoing drone threat](#) to industrial zones in El Obeid and the capital's outskirts requires investors to prioritize robust private security and insurance for manufacturing facilities.

## ABOUT THIS REPORT

---

**Today's Media Trends** is a public interest experiment in applying deep thematic trend analysis to television news coverage from around the world to explore how responsibly applied advanced AI can help journalists and scholars better understand the overarching trends, themes and patterns of our global world.

**No data is used to train or tune any AI model.**

Each morning, in collaboration with the Internet Archive's TV News Archive, we apply Google's Gemini 3 to deeply examine yesterday's coverage from each television news channel to tease out the overarching themes and trends of its news coverage into a richly annotated thematic analysis. Each high-level insight is connected back to the original broadcast, allowing journalists and scholars to understand the dominate themes and trends and instantly click out to the underlying sources for details.

By helping journalists and scholars see the broader trends and patterns of global news coverage, this analysis helps them identify relevant stories and coverage they might not

otherwise have encountered and uncover connections, emphases and narrative shifts that enable more comprehensive reporting and deeper, evidence-based research.

This report is entirely machine generated using Gemini 3 and may include errors and omissions. Please verify all findings. No data is used to train or tune any AI model.

For questions or suggestions, please contact [kalev.leetaru5@gmail.com](mailto:kalev.leetaru5@gmail.com). You can also learn more about the GDEL T Project at <https://blog.gdeltproject.org/> and the Internet Archive's TV News Archive at <https://archive.org/details/tv>.