{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.1.170-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.85-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.19.11-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  futex: Clear stale exiting pointer in futex_lock_pi() retry path  Fuzzying/stressing futexes triggered:      WARNING: kernel/futex/core.c:825 at wait_for_owner_exiting+0x7a/0x80, CPU#11: futex_lock_pi_s/524  When futex_lock_pi_atomic() sees the owner is exiting, it returns -EBUSY and stores a refcounted task pointer in 'exiting'.  After wait_for_owner_exiting() consumes that reference, the local pointer is never reset to nil. Upon a retry, if futex_lock_pi_atomic() returns a different error, the bogus pointer is passed to wait_for_owner_exiting().    CPU0\t\t\t     CPU1\t\t       CPU2   futex_lock_pi(uaddr)   // acquires the PI futex   exit()     futex_cleanup_begin()       futex_state = EXITING; \t\t\t     futex_lock_pi(uaddr) \t\t\t       futex_lock_pi_atomic() \t\t\t\t attach_to_pi_owner() \t\t\t\t   // observes EXITING \t\t\t\t   *exiting = owner;  // takes ref \t\t\t\t   return -EBUSY \t\t\t       wait_for_owner_exiting(-EBUSY, owner) \t\t\t\t put_task_struct();   // drops ref \t\t\t       // exiting still points to owner \t\t\t       goto retry; \t\t\t       futex_lock_pi_atomic() \t\t\t\t lock_pi_update_atomic() \t\t\t\t   cmpxchg(uaddr) \t\t\t\t\t*uaddr ^= WAITERS // whatever \t\t\t\t   // value changed \t\t\t\t return -EAGAIN; \t\t\t       wait_for_owner_exiting(-EAGAIN, exiting) // stale \t\t\t\t WARN_ON_ONCE(exiting)  Fix this by resetting upon retry, essentially aligning it with requeue_pi.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-31555",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T16:47:50.175762689Z",
  "published": "2026-04-24T15:16:29.837Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-31555"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-31555"
  ]
}