{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.1.170-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.85-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.19.12-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  ALSA: caiaq: fix stack out-of-bounds read in init_card  The loop creates a whitespace-stripped copy of the card shortname where `len \u003c sizeof(card-\u003eid)` is used for the bounds check. Since sizeof(card-\u003eid) is 16 and the local id buffer is also 16 bytes, writing 16 non-space characters fills the entire buffer, overwriting the terminating nullbyte.  When this non-null-terminated string is later passed to snd_card_set_id() -\u003e copy_valid_id_string(), the function scans forward with `while (*nid \u0026\u0026 ...)` and reads past the end of the stack buffer, reading the contents of the stack.  A USB device with a product name containing many non-ASCII, non-space characters (e.g. multibyte UTF-8) will reliably trigger this as follows:    BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in copy_valid_id_string        sound/core/init.c:696 [inline]   BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in snd_card_set_id_no_lock+0x698/0x74c        sound/core/init.c:718  The off-by-one has been present since commit bafeee5b1f8d (\"ALSA: snd_usb_caiaq: give better shortname\") from June 2009 (v2.6.31-rc1), which first introduced this whitespace-stripping loop. The original code never accounted for the null terminator when bounding the copy.  Fix this by changing the loop bound to `sizeof(card-\u003eid) - 1`, ensuring at least one byte remains as the null terminator.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-31778",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T16:47:41.478008921Z",
  "published": "2026-05-01T15:16:41.190Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-31778"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-31778"
  ]
}