{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.1.170-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.85-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.19.12-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  ipv6: icmp: clear skb2-\u003ecb[] in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach()  Sashiko AI-review observed:    In ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(), the skb is an outer IPv4 ICMP error packet   where its cb contains an IPv4 inet_skb_parm. When skb is cloned into skb2   and passed to icmp6_send(), it uses IP6CB(skb2).    IP6CB interprets the IPv4 inet_skb_parm as an inet6_skb_parm. The cipso   offset in inet_skb_parm.opt directly overlaps with dsthao in inet6_skb_parm   at offset 18.    If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv4 error with a CIPSO IP option, dsthao   would be a non-zero offset. Inside icmp6_send(), mip6_addr_swap() is called   and uses ipv6_find_tlv(skb, opt-\u003edsthao, IPV6_TLV_HAO).    This would scan the inner, attacker-controlled IPv6 packet starting at that   offset, potentially returning a fake TLV without checking if the remaining   packet length can hold the full 18-byte struct ipv6_destopt_hao.    Could mip6_addr_swap() then perform a 16-byte swap that extends past the end   of the packet data into skb_shared_info?    Should the cb array also be cleared in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() and   ip6ip6_err() to prevent this?  This patch implements the first suggestion.  I am not sure if ip6ip6_err() needs to be changed. A separate patch would be better anyway.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-43038",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T16:47:27.337331150Z",
  "published": "2026-05-01T15:16:48.533Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-43038"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-43038"
  ]
}