{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.1.170-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.85-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.19.10-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  libceph: Fix potential out-of-bounds access in ceph_handle_auth_reply()  This patch fixes an out-of-bounds access in ceph_handle_auth_reply() that can be triggered by a message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY. In ceph_handle_auth_reply(), the value of the payload_len field of such a message is stored in a variable of type int. A value greater than INT_MAX leads to an integer overflow and is interpreted as a negative value. This leads to decrementing the pointer address by this value and subsequently accessing it because ceph_decode_need() only checks that the memory access does not exceed the end address of the allocation.  This patch fixes the issue by changing the data type of payload_len to u32. Additionally, the data type of result_msg_len is changed to u32, as it is also a variable holding a non-negative length.  Also, an additional layer of sanity checks is introduced, ensuring that directly after reading it from the message, payload_len and result_msg_len are not greater than the overall segment length.  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811404df14 by task kworker/20:1/262  CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 262 Comm: kworker/20:1 Not tainted 6.19.2 #5 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn [libceph] Call Trace:  \u003cTASK\u003e  dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0  print_report+0xd1/0x620  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10  ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x72/0x210  kasan_report+0xe7/0x130  ? ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]  ? ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]  __asan_report_load_n_noabort+0xf/0x20  ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]  mon_dispatch+0x973/0x23d0 [libceph]  ? apparmor_socket_recvmsg+0x6b/0xa0  ? __pfx_mon_dispatch+0x10/0x10 [libceph]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30i  ? mutex_unlock+0x7f/0xd0  ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10  ? __pfx_do_recvmsg+0x10/0x10 [libceph]  ceph_con_process_message+0x1f1/0x650 [libceph]  process_message+0x1e/0x450 [libceph]  ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x2e48/0x6c80 [libceph]  ? __pfx_ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x10/0x10 [libceph]  ? save_fpregs_to_fpstate+0xb0/0x230  ? raw_spin_rq_unlock+0x17/0xa0  ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x13b/0x760  ? __switch_to+0x385/0xda0  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30  ? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0  ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10  ceph_con_workfn+0x248/0x10c0 [libceph]  process_one_work+0x629/0xf80  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30  worker_thread+0x87f/0x1570  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10  ? __pfx_try_to_wake_up+0x10/0x10  ? kasan_print_address_stack_frame+0x1f7/0x280  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10  kthread+0x396/0x830  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30  ? recalc_sigpending+0x180/0x210  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10  ret_from_fork+0x3f7/0x610  ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10  ? __switch_to+0x385/0xda0  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30  \u003c/TASK\u003e  [ idryomov: replace if statements with ceph_decode_need() for   payload_len and result_msg_len ]",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-43407",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T16:47:29.678422073Z",
  "published": "2026-05-08T15:16:52.250Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-43407"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-43407"
  ]
}