{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.1.176-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.88-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.0.7-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  net: wwan: t7xx: validate port_count against message length in t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler  t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler() uses the modem-supplied port_count field as a loop bound over port_msg-\u003edata[] without checking that the message buffer contains sufficient data. A modem sending port_count=65535 in a 12-byte buffer triggers a slab-out-of-bounds read of up to 262140 bytes.  Add a sizeof(*port_msg) check before accessing the port message header fields to guard against undersized messages.  Add a struct_size() check after extracting port_count and before the loop.  In t7xx_parse_host_rt_data(), guard the rt_feature header read with a remaining-buffer check before accessing data_len, validate feat_data_len against the actual remaining buffer to prevent OOB reads and signed integer overflow on offset.  Pass msg_len from both call sites: skb-\u003elen at the DPMAIF path after skb_pull(), and the validated feat_data_len at the handshake path.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-43495",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T16:47:48.445341173Z",
  "published": "2026-05-21T13:16:18.847Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-43495"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-43495"
  ]
}