{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.1.176-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.86-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.0.4-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv  rxe_rcv() currently checks only that the incoming packet is at least header_size(pkt) bytes long before payload_size() is used.  However, payload_size() subtracts both the attacker-controlled BTH pad field and RXE_ICRC_SIZE from pkt-\u003epaylen:    payload_size = pkt-\u003epaylen - offset[RXE_PAYLOAD] - bth_pad(pkt)                  - RXE_ICRC_SIZE  This means a short packet can still make payload_size() underflow even if it includes enough bytes for the fixed headers. Simply requiring header_size(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE is not sufficient either, because a packet with a forged non-zero BTH pad can still leave payload_size() negative and pass an underflowed value to later receive-path users.  Fix this by validating pkt-\u003epaylen against the full minimum length required by payload_size(): header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-46043",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T16:47:50.575626569Z",
  "published": "2026-05-27T14:17:23.743Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-46043"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-46043"
  ]
}