{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.1.176-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.88-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.0.7-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  net: rtnetlink: zero ifla_vf_broadcast to avoid stack infoleak in rtnl_fill_vfinfo  rtnl_fill_vfinfo() declares struct ifla_vf_broadcast on the stack without initialisation:  \tstruct ifla_vf_broadcast vf_broadcast;  The struct contains a single fixed 32-byte field:  \t/* include/uapi/linux/if_link.h */ \tstruct ifla_vf_broadcast { \t\t__u8 broadcast[32]; \t};  The function then copies dev-\u003ebroadcast into it using dev-\u003eaddr_len as the length:  \tmemcpy(vf_broadcast.broadcast, dev-\u003ebroadcast, dev-\u003eaddr_len);  On Ethernet devices (the overwhelming majority of SR-IOV NICs) dev-\u003eaddr_len is 6, so only the first 6 bytes of broadcast[] are written. The remaining 26 bytes retain whatever was previously on the kernel stack. The full struct is then handed to userspace via:  \tnla_put(skb, IFLA_VF_BROADCAST, \t\tsizeof(vf_broadcast), \u0026vf_broadcast)  leaking up to 26 bytes of uninitialised kernel stack per VF per RTM_GETLINK request, repeatable.  The other vf_* structs in the same function are explicitly zeroed for exactly this reason - see the memset() calls for ivi, vf_vlan_info, node_guid and port_guid a few lines above. vf_broadcast was simply missed when it was added.  Reachability: any unprivileged local process can open AF_NETLINK / NETLINK_ROUTE without capabilities and send RTM_GETLINK with an IFLA_EXT_MASK attribute carrying RTEXT_FILTER_VF. The kernel walks each VF and emits IFLA_VF_BROADCAST, leaking 26 bytes of stack per VF per request. Stack residue at this call site can include return addresses and transient sensitive data; KASAN with stack instrumentation, or KMSAN, will flag the nla_put() when reproduced.  Zero the on-stack struct before the partial memcpy, matching the existing pattern used for the other vf_* structs in the same function.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-46132",
  "modified": "2026-09-09T08:47:25.282306440Z",
  "published": "2026-05-28T10:16:28.753Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-46132"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-46132"
  ]
}