{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.18.14-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  RDMA/rxe: Fix iova-to-va conversion for MR page sizes != PAGE_SIZE  The current implementation incorrectly handles memory regions (MRs) with page sizes different from the system PAGE_SIZE. The core issue is that rxe_set_page() is called with mr-\u003epage_size step increments, but the page_list stores individual struct page pointers, each representing PAGE_SIZE of memory.  ib_sg_to_page() has ensured that when i\u003e=1 either a) SG[i-1].dma_end and SG[i].dma_addr are contiguous or b) SG[i-1].dma_end and SG[i].dma_addr are mr-\u003epage_size aligned.  This leads to incorrect iova-to-va conversion in scenarios:  1) page_size \u003c PAGE_SIZE (e.g., MR: 4K, system: 64K):    ibmr-\u003eiova = 0x181800    sg[0]: dma_addr=0x181800, len=0x800    sg[1]: dma_addr=0x173000, len=0x1000     Access iova = 0x181800 + 0x810 = 0x182010    Expected VA: 0x173010 (second SG, offset 0x10)    Before fix:      - index = (0x182010 \u003e\u003e 12) - (0x181800 \u003e\u003e 12) = 1      - page_offset = 0x182010 \u0026 0xFFF = 0x10      - xarray[1] stores system page base 0x170000      - Resulting VA: 0x170000 + 0x10 = 0x170010 (wrong)  2) page_size \u003e PAGE_SIZE (e.g., MR: 64K, system: 4K):    ibmr-\u003eiova = 0x18f800    sg[0]: dma_addr=0x18f800, len=0x800    sg[1]: dma_addr=0x170000, len=0x1000     Access iova = 0x18f800 + 0x810 = 0x190010    Expected VA: 0x170010 (second SG, offset 0x10)    Before fix:      - index = (0x190010 \u003e\u003e 16) - (0x18f800 \u003e\u003e 16) = 1      - page_offset = 0x190010 \u0026 0xFFFF = 0x10      - xarray[1] stores system page for dma_addr 0x170000      - Resulting VA: system page of 0x170000 + 0x10 = 0x170010 (wrong)  Yi Zhang reported a kernel panic[1] years ago related to this defect.  Solution: 1. Replace xarray with pre-allocated rxe_mr_page array for sequential    indexing (all MR page indices are contiguous) 2. Each rxe_mr_page stores both struct page* and offset within the    system page 3. Handle MR page_size != PAGE_SIZE relationships:    - page_size \u003e PAGE_SIZE: Split MR pages into multiple system pages    - page_size \u003c= PAGE_SIZE: Store offset within system page 4. Add boundary checks and compatibility validation  This ensures correct iova-to-va conversion regardless of MR page size and system PAGE_SIZE relationship, while improving performance through array-based sequential access.  Tests on 4K and 64K PAGE_SIZE hosts: - rdma-core/pytests   $ ./build/bin/run_tests.py  --dev eth0_rxe - blktest:   $ TIMEOUT=30 QUICK_RUN=1 USE_RXE=1 NVMET_TRTYPES=rdma ./check nvme srp rnbd  [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHj4cs9XRqE25jyVw9rj9YugffLn5+f=1znaBEnu1usLOciD+g@mail.gmail.com/T/",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-46325",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T16:47:45.968959370Z",
  "published": "2026-06-09T14:16:42.177Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-46325"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-46325"
  ]
}