{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.1.176-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.94-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.0.10-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  ocfs2: fix listxattr handling when the buffer is full  [BUG] If an OCFS2 inode has both inline and block-based xattrs, listxattr() can return a size larger than the caller's buffer when the inline names consume that buffer exactly.  kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort+0xb7/0xd0 mm/usercopy.c:102 Call Trace:  __check_heap_object+0xe3/0x120 mm/slub.c:8243  check_heap_object mm/usercopy.c:196 [inline]  __check_object_size mm/usercopy.c:250 [inline]  __check_object_size+0x5c5/0x780 mm/usercopy.c:215  check_object_size include/linux/ucopysize.h:22 [inline]  check_copy_size include/linux/ucopysize.h:59 [inline]  copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:219 [inline]  listxattr+0xb0/0x170 fs/xattr.c:926  filename_listxattr fs/xattr.c:958 [inline]  path_listxattrat+0x137/0x320 fs/xattr.c:988  __do_sys_listxattr fs/xattr.c:1001 [inline]  __se_sys_listxattr fs/xattr.c:998 [inline]  __x64_sys_listxattr+0x7f/0xd0 fs/xattr.c:998  ...  [CAUSE] Commit 936b8834366e (\"ocfs2: Refactor xattr list and remove ocfs2_xattr_handler().\") replaced the old per-handler list accounting with ocfs2_xattr_list_entry(), but it kept using size == 0 to detect probe mode.  That assumption stops being true once ocfs2_listxattr() finishes the inline-xattr pass. If the inline names fill the caller buffer exactly, the block-xattr pass runs with a non-NULL buffer and a remaining size of zero. ocfs2_xattr_list_entry() then skips the bounds check, keeps counting block names, and returns a positive size larger than the supplied buffer.  [FIX] Detect probe mode by testing whether the destination buffer pointer is NULL instead of whether the remaining size is zero.  That restores the pre-refactor behavior and matches the OCFS2 getxattr helpers. Once the remaining buffer reaches zero while more names are left, the block-xattr pass now returns -ERANGE instead of reporting a size larger than the allocated list buffer.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-53041",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T16:47:35.260415026Z",
  "published": "2026-06-24T17:17:15.830Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-53041"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-53041"
  ]
}