{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.1.176-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.94-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.0.13-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  misc: fastrpc: fix use-after-free of fastrpc_user in workqueue context  There is a race between fastrpc_device_release() and the workqueue that processes DSP responses. When the user closes the file descriptor, fastrpc_device_release() frees the fastrpc_user structure. Concurrently, an in-flight DSP invocation can complete and fastrpc_rpmsg_callback() schedules context cleanup via schedule_work(\u0026ctx-\u003eput_work). If the workqueue runs fastrpc_context_free() in parallel with or after fastrpc_device_release() has freed the user structure, it dereferences the freed fastrpc_user. Depending on the state of the context at the time of the race, any one of the following accesses can be hit:   1. fastrpc_buf_free() calls fastrpc_ipa_to_dma_addr(buf-\u003efl-\u003ecctx, ...)     to strip the SID bits from the stored IOVA before passing the     physical address to dma_free_coherent().   2. fastrpc_free_map() reads map-\u003efl-\u003ecctx-\u003evmperms[0].vmid to     reconstruct the source permission bitmask needed for the     qcom_scm_assign_mem() call that returns memory from the DSP VM     back to HLOS.   3. fastrpc_free_map() acquires map-\u003efl-\u003elock to safely remove the     map node from the fl-\u003emaps list.  The resulting use-after-free manifests as:    pc : fastrpc_buf_free+0x38/0x80 [fastrpc]   lr : fastrpc_context_free+0xa8/0x1b0 [fastrpc]   fastrpc_context_free+0xa8/0x1b0 [fastrpc]   fastrpc_context_put_wq+0x78/0xa0 [fastrpc]   process_one_work+0x180/0x450   worker_thread+0x26c/0x388  Add kref-based reference counting to fastrpc_user. Have each invoke context take a reference on the user at allocation time and release it when the context is freed. Release the initial reference in fastrpc_device_release() at file close. Move the teardown of the user structure — freeing pending contexts, maps, mmaps, and the channel context reference — into the kref release callback fastrpc_user_free(), so that it runs only when the last reference is dropped, regardless of whether that happens at device close or after the final in-flight context completes.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-53161",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T16:47:32.861881830Z",
  "published": "2026-06-25T09:16:33.483Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-53161"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-53161"
  ]
}