{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.1.176-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.94-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.0.13-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  6lowpan: fix off-by-one in multicast context address compression  The second memcpy in lowpan_iphc_mcast_ctx_addr_compress() uses \u0026data[1] as destination and \u0026ipaddr-\u003es6_addr[11] as source, but both should be offset by one: \u0026data[2] and \u0026ipaddr-\u003es6_addr[12] respectively.  This off-by-one has two consequences: 1. data[1] is overwritten with s6_addr[11], corrupting the RIID    field in the compressed multicast address 2. data[5] is never written, so uninitialized kernel stack memory    is transmitted over the network via lowpan_push_hc_data(),    leaking kernel stack contents  The correct inline data layout must match what the decompression function lowpan_uncompress_multicast_ctx_daddr() expects:   data[0..1] = s6_addr[1..2]  (flags/scope + RIID)   data[2..5] = s6_addr[12..15] (group ID)  Also zero-initialize the data array as a defensive measure against similar bugs in the future.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-53263",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T16:47:38.218446877Z",
  "published": "2026-06-25T09:16:44.283Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-53263"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-53263"
  ]
}