{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.1.180-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.96-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.1.4-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux-6.12"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.100-1~deb12u1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  exfat: bound uniname advance in exfat_find_dir_entry()  In exfat_find_dir_entry(), each TYPE_EXTEND (file name) entry advances the output pointer by a fixed amount while the loop guard only tracks the accumulated name length:  \tif (++order == 2) \t\tuniname = p_uniname-\u003ename; \telse \t\tuniname += EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN; \tlen = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname); \tname_len += len; \tunichar = *(uniname+len); \t*(uniname+len) = 0x0;  uniname grows by EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN (15) per name entry, but name_len grows only by the actual extracted length, which is shorter when a name fragment contains an early NUL.  The only guard is `name_len \u003e= MAX_NAME_LENGTH`, so a crafted directory with many short name fragments lets uniname run far past the p_uniname-\u003ename[MAX_NAME_LENGTH + 3] buffer while name_len stays small, causing an out-of-bounds read and write at *(uniname+len).  The sibling extractor exfat_get_uniname_from_ext_entry() already stops on a short fragment (the lockstep `len != EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN` guard added in commit d42334578eba (\"exfat: check if filename entries exceeds max filename length\")); exfat_find_dir_entry() never got the equivalent.  Track the per-entry write offset as a count and reject a fragment once the offset, or the offset plus the extracted length, would exceed MAX_NAME_LENGTH, before forming the output pointer.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-64296",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T16:47:30.354589608Z",
  "published": "2026-07-25T10:17:10.390Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-64296"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-64296"
  ]
}