{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.1.187-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.101-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.1.6-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux-6.12"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.101-1~deb12u1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  wifi: carl9170: bound memcpy length in cmd callback to prevent OOB read  When the firmware sends a command response with a length mismatch, carl9170_cmd_callback() logs the mismatch and calls carl9170_restart() but then falls through to memcpy(ar-\u003ereadbuf, buffer + 4, len - 4). Since len comes from the firmware and can exceed ar-\u003ereadlen, this copies more data than the readbuf was allocated for.  Bound the memcpy to min(len - 4, ar-\u003ereadlen) so that the response is still completed -- avoiding repeated restarts from queued garbage -- while preventing an overread past the response buffer.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-68351",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T16:47:48.224372339Z",
  "published": "2026-08-10T13:20:27.153Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-68351"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-68351"
  ]
}