{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.1.187-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.100-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.1.5-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  ntfs3: validate split-point offset in indx_insert_into_buffer  indx_insert_into_buffer() computes      used = used1 - to_copy - sp_size;     memmove(de_t, Add2Ptr(sp, sp_size), used - le32_to_cpu(hdr1-\u003ede_off));  where sp and sp_size come from hdr_find_split().  hdr_find_split() walks entries by le16_to_cpu(e-\u003esize) without validating that each step stays within hdr-\u003eused or that the size field is at least sizeof(struct NTFS_DE).  index_hdr_check(), the on-load gatekeeper, only validates header-level fields (used, total, de_off) and does not walk per-entry sizes.  A crafted NTFS image whose leaf INDEX_HDR reports used == total but contains one interior NTFS_DE with size = 0xFFF0 therefore passes validation, descends to indx_insert_into_buffer() through the ntfs_create() -\u003e indx_insert_entry() path, and makes hdr_find_split() return an sp whose sp_size (0xFFF0) greatly exceeds the remaining bytes in the buffer.  The u32 subtraction underflows and the memmove count becomes a near-4-GiB value, producing an out-of-bounds kernel write that corrupts adjacent allocations and panics the kernel.  Reproduced on 7.0.0-rc7 with UML + KASAN via a crafted image and a single 'touch' inside the mounted directory; crash site resolves to fs/ntfs3/index.c at the memmove.  Trigger requires only local mount of an attacker-supplied filesystem image (USB, loopback, or removable media auto-mount).  Reject the split whenever the chosen sp plus its declared size already extends past hdr1-\u003eused.  This is the minimal fix; it preserves the existing hdr_find_split() contract and relies on the same out: cleanup path as the pre-existing error returns.  A prior OOB read in the very same indx_insert_into_buffer() memmove was fixed in commit b8c44949044e (\"fs/ntfs3: Fix OOB read in indx_insert_into_buffer\") by tightening hdr_find_e(), but that fix does not cover the split-point size field path addressed here: sp is returned by hdr_find_split(), not hdr_find_e(), and the underflow is driven by sp-\u003esize rather than hdr-\u003eused exceeding hdr-\u003etotal.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-72191",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T16:47:44.403386577Z",
  "published": "2026-08-15T06:21:37.537Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-72191"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-72191"
  ]
}