{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.1.180-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.100-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.1.5-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  fs/ntfs3: bound attr_off in UpdateResidentValue against data_off  In do_action()'s UpdateResidentValue case (fslog.c:3307), lrh-\u003eattr_off and lrh-\u003eredo_len come from the on-disk LRH. When they satisfy aoff + dlen \u003c attr-\u003eres.data_off, the assignment  \tattr-\u003eres.data_size = cpu_to_le32(aoff + dlen - data_off);  underflows to ~4 GiB (e.g. 0xFFFFFFF9 when aoff=0x10, dlen=1, data_off=0x18).  Subsequent code that reads attr-\u003eres.data_size to walk the resident attribute payload would then read up to 4 GiB past the 1024-byte MFT record allocation.  The existing mi_enum_attr() defense in fs/ntfs3/record.c:287 catches the corrupted data_size on the next attribute walk and fails the mount, but only on the path that walks all attributes.  A read site that picks an attribute by name and reads its data_size without re-validating is not covered. Validate aoff against data_off and asize at the source.  Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 via pr_warn-only probe: with aoff=0x10 and data_off=0x18, the post-assignment data_size is 0xfffffff9 (mount then fails at -22 from mi_enum_attr).  [almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: clang-formatted the changes]",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-72195",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T16:47:45.303787936Z",
  "published": "2026-08-15T06:21:38.077Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-72195"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-72195"
  ]
}