{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.1.187-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.105-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.1.9-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux-6.12"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.107-1~deb12u1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  ima: fix out-of-bounds read in xattr_verify()  The digest-length check in xattr_verify() mixes int and size_t:  \tif (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value-\u003etype) - hash_start \u003e= \t\t\tiint-\u003eima_hash-\u003elength)  sizeof() yields size_t, so the usual arithmetic conversions promote the whole left-hand side to unsigned 64-bit before the subtraction runs. For a truncated xattr this underflows instead of going negative: a 1-byte IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG xattr (xattr_len == 1, hash_start == 1) turns \"1 - 1 - 1\" into SIZE_MAX, which is trivially \u003e= ima_hash-\u003elength. The check then passes and the following memcmp() reads iint-\u003eima_hash-\u003elength bytes starting past the end of the buffer vfs_getxattr_alloc() allocated for it.  Nothing upstream clamps xattr_len back into a safe range first: ima_get_hash_algo() only special-cases xattr_len \u003c 2 to pick a default algorithm, and evm_verifyxattr() returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN rather than failing when no HMAC key is loaded, so a truncated security.ima value reaches the length check as-is.  Rewrite the comparison so every operand stays a signed int and no implicit conversion to size_t can occur.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-74671",
  "modified": "2026-09-19T21:47:34.404527593Z",
  "published": "2026-08-22T16:16:41.063Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-74671"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-74671"
  ]
}