{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.100-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.1.5-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  perf/x86/amd/lbr: Fix kernel address leakage  A user-only branch stack can contain branches that originate from the kernel. As a result, kernel addresses are exposed to user space even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. On AMD processors supporting X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2, perf can still report SYSRET/ERET entries for which the branch-from addresses are in the kernel.  E.g.    $ perf record -e cycles -o - -j any,save_type,u -- \\         perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \\         perf script -i - -F brstack|tr ' ' '\\n'| \\         grep -E '0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}'    ...   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a38f1a/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a39157/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a2c628/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a41b60/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a260db/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a260db/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a8bef1c30/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   0xffffffff81001268/0x717a8e4d3c90/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH   ...  The reason is that the hardware filter only considers the privilege level applicable to the branch target. Extend software filtering to also validate the branch-from addresses against br_sel, so that any branch record whose branch-from address is in the kernel is dropped when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-80602",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T16:47:29.136267936Z",
  "published": "2026-08-28T08:16:44.070Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-80602"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-80602"
  ]
}