{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.1.187-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.105-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.1.9-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux-6.12"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.107-1~deb12u1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  net: remove CAP_SYS_RAWIO zero-padding in dev_validate_header  dev_validate_header() reads dev-\u003ehard_header_len directly when zero-padding short link layer headers for CAP_SYS_RAWIO holders:      if (capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) {         memset(ll_header + len, 0, dev-\u003ehard_header_len - len);         return true;     }  Packet send paths call dev_validate_header() on skbs whose headroom was allocated from an earlier hard_header_len read. If the device is reconfigured so that dev-\u003ehard_header_len increases before validation, the memset writes past the reserved buffer, an out-of-bounds write.  This out-of-bounds write is masked in some SOCK_RAW paths today because the same concurrent increase can first make skb_push() exceed the reserved headroom and trigger skb_under_panic(). Remove the zero-padding branch before making those hard_header_len reads consistent, so the snapshot fixes do not turn a loud panic into a silent overwrite.  This path is only reached for variable length L2 protocols, where len \u003c hard_header_len but len \u003e= min_header_len. No remaining in-tree variable length L2 protocol implements header_ops-\u003evalidate, and the CAP_SYS_RAWIO bypass that zero-pads and accepts short headers has no real value beyond allowing testing of intentionally malformed input.  Drop the CAP_SYS_RAWIO branch. The remaining reads of dev-\u003ehard_header_len in dev_validate_header() are comparisons only and have no memory safety impact.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-80731",
  "modified": "2026-09-19T21:47:28.968853420Z",
  "published": "2026-09-03T13:06:11.707Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-80731"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-80731"
  ]
}