{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.1.187-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.107-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.1.12-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux-6.12"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.12.107-1~deb12u1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  HID: nintendo: fix out-of-bounds read in joycon_ctlr_read_handler()  joycon_ctlr_read_handler() casts an incoming HID input report to struct joycon_input_report and parses it, guarding the cast only with a 12-byte length check:  \tif (size \u003e= 12) /* make sure it contains the input report */ \t\tjoycon_parse_report(ctlr, (struct joycon_input_report *)data);  struct joycon_input_report is 49 bytes: a 13-byte header followed by a union whose IMU arm is 36 bytes. For an IMU report joycon_parse_report() -\u003e joycon_parse_imu_report() walks that union (struct offsets 13..48), so a report of exactly 12 bytes with data[0] == JC_INPUT_IMU_DATA passes the guard yet is read up to 37 bytes past its declared length. The over-read bytes are decoded into accelerometer/gyroscope values and forwarded to userspace through the \"(IMU)\" input device, leaking driver-internal memory. data[0] and size are fully controlled by a malicious or spoofed Joy-Con/Pro Controller.  Receive buffers are sized to the maximum report length, so this is an over-read within the allocation rather than a slab OOB, but the decoded bytes still reach userspace.  The sibling subcmd path in joycon_ctlr_handle_event() already bounds the same cast correctly:  \tif (size \u003c sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) || \t    data[0] != JC_INPUT_SUBCMD_REPLY) \t\tbreak;  Use the same sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) bound here.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-80772",
  "modified": "2026-09-19T21:47:25.836971820Z",
  "published": "2026-09-04T16:18:02.743Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-80772"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-80772"
  ]
}