{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.1.12-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  futex/pi: Reject cross-mm private futex owners  A private futex key borrows the waiter's mm without taking an mm_users reference. Nevertheless, attach_to_pi_owner() currently accepts an owner from a different address space and copies the private key into the owner's PI state.  When that owner exits, exit_pi_state_list() uses the saved key to find the hash bucket and acquires a reference to the waiter's private hash. If the last user of the waiter's mm exits concurrently, futex_hash_free() frees the hash while the owner still uses its bucket and reference.  Prevent this by validating in attach_to_pi_owner() that, for private futexes, the owner mm and waiter mm are the same. Perform the check with the owner's pi_lock held and after validating owner::futex::state to serialize against a concurrent PI-state exit cleanup.  [ tglx: Amended comment ]",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-80778",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T16:47:44.566299535Z",
  "published": "2026-09-04T16:18:03.490Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-80778"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-80778"
  ]
}