{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.1.187-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.1.13-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_novation_output()  snd_usbmidi_novation_output() lays out a two-byte header at transfer_buffer[0..1] and passes \u0026transfer_buffer[2] together with a length of ep-\u003emax_transfer - 2 to snd_rawmidi_transmit():  \tcount = snd_rawmidi_transmit(ep-\u003eports[0].substream, \t\t\t\t     \u0026transfer_buffer[2], \t\t\t\t     ep-\u003emax_transfer - 2);  ep-\u003emax_transfer comes from the output endpoint's wMaxPacketSize via usb_maxpacket(). A malformed or malicious device can advertise a bulk OUT endpoint with a wMaxPacketSize of 1 - the USB core only clamps this value downwards - so ep-\u003emax_transfer becomes 1 and the count argument becomes -1.  snd_rawmidi_transmit() passes the negative count on to __snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(), where \"if (count1 \u003e count) count1 = count\" leaves count1 negative; get_aligned_size() keeps it negative for a byte-stream substream, so the following memcpy(buffer, ..., count1) runs with a (size_t)-1 length and writes far past the transfer buffer, which was allocated with usb_alloc_coherent(ep-\u003emax_transfer).  This is the same class of bug that was fixed for snd_usbmidi_akai_output() in commit 0970274613fb (\"ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_akai_output()\"); the novation output routine was left unguarded. Bail out when the endpoint cannot hold the two-byte header plus at least one payload byte.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-80829",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T16:47:46.677021834Z",
  "published": "2026-09-04T16:18:10.997Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-80829"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-80829"
  ]
}