{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  svcrdma: Fix pcl_for_each_segment for empty chunks  When a parsed chunk list contains a chunk whose ch_segcount is zero, pcl_for_each_segment computes its inclusive upper bound as \u0026chunk-\u003ech_segments[ch_segcount - 1]. ch_segcount is u32, so the subtraction wraps to 0xFFFFFFFF and the bound lands far past the ch_segments flex array. The loop body then walks unrelated memory at sizeof(struct svc_rdma_segment) stride until it faults.  A zero-segcount chunk is reachable from the wire: xdr_check_write_chunk() only rejects segcount values greater than rc_maxpages, and pcl_alloc_write() links a freshly allocated chunk onto rc_write_pcl/rc_reply_pcl before its segment-fill loop runs, so a Write or Reply chunk advertising zero segments leaves ch_segcount == 0 on the list. When the transport has negotiated Send-With-Invalidate, svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey() iterates all four PCLs with pcl_for_each_segment and dereferences segment-\u003ers_handle on each iteration, turning the underflow into an out-of-bounds read and a general protection fault.      xdr_check_write_list / xdr_check_reply_chunk       pcl_alloc_write()         chunk = pcl_alloc_chunk(...)  /* ch_segcount = 0 */         list_add_tail(\u0026chunk-\u003ech_list, \u0026pcl-\u003ecl_chunks)         /* fill loop iterates zero times for wire segcount 0 */      svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()       pcl_for_each_chunk(rc_write_pcl)         pcl_for_each_segment(segment, chunk)           pos \u003c= \u0026ch_segments[0u - 1u]  /* 0xFFFFFFFF */           segment-\u003ers_handle            /* OOB read -\u003e GPF */  Fix by switching the macro to a half-open upper bound that uses ch_segcount directly. For ch_segcount == 0 the loop start equals the loop end and the body is skipped; for ch_segcount \u003e 0 the iteration range is unchanged. All six existing call sites in net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_recvfrom.c and net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_rw.c remain correct under the new bound, so no caller changes are needed.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-89532",
  "modified": "2026-09-15T08:47:38.576559803Z",
  "published": "2026-09-11T20:19:36.117Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-89532"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-89532"
  ]
}