{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  scsi: qla2xxx: Bound rsp_info_len to avoid OOB sense-data read  In qla2x00_status_entry(), the FWI2 status path advances sense_data and shrinks par_sense_len by rsp_info_len:  \tif (IS_FWI2_CAPABLE(ha)) { \t\tsense_data += rsp_info_len; \t\tpar_sense_len -= rsp_info_len; \t}  rsp_info_len is a 32-bit value taken directly from the target's FCP response (sf.rsp_data_len), while par_sense_len is the IOCB data area size (28 bytes for 24xx, 60 bytes for 29xx). A hostile or buggy target reporting an rsp_info_len larger than par_sense_len makes the unsigned subtraction underflow to a huge value and advances sense_data out of bounds.  The underflowed par_sense_len then defeats the cap in qla2x00_handle_sense():  \tif (sense_len \u003e par_sense_len) \t\tsense_len = par_sense_len; \tmemcpy(cp-\u003esense_buffer, sense_data, sense_len);  so the memcpy reads up to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE bytes from the out-of-bounds sense_data pointer, leaking adjacent response-ring/heap memory into the command's sense buffer.  Clamp rsp_info_len to par_sense_len before the subtraction so par_sense_len can never underflow and sense_data stays within the IOCB data area. The fix sits before the comp_status switch, covering both qla2x00_handle_sense() call sites.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-89846",
  "modified": "2026-09-17T04:47:33.092344754Z",
  "published": "2026-09-16T11:16:51.853Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-89846"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-89846"
  ]
}