{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  HID: bpf: serialize device reference release in struct_ops destroy path  __hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device() and hid_bpf_unreg() can race on the same registration reference, double-putting struct hid_device and freeing it while hid_destroy_device() still uses it.  Serialize the remove/NULL decision under hdev-\u003ebpf.prog_list_lock so exactly one path releases each registration reference: unreg re-checks ops-\u003ehdev under the lock and returns without putting when the destroy path already cleared it; all put_device() calls happen after the lock is dropped, which is safe because a concurrent unreg then observes ops-\u003ehdev == NULL under the lock.  Background: each successful attach (hid_bpf_ops_reg) acquires one device reference (hid_get_device()).  Two paths can release it:  - device destruction: hid_destroy_device() -\u003e hid_bpf_destroy_device()   -\u003e __hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device(), which walks hdev-\u003ebpf.prog_list   under rcu_read_lock() and drops one reference per attached program; - BPF link release: bpf map delete (no BPF_F_LINK) synchronously calls   st_ops-\u003eunreg() -\u003e hid_bpf_unreg(), which drops the reference for   its own registration.  The coordination handshake (e-\u003ehdev = NULL on the destroy side vs \"if (!hdev) return\" on the unreg side) is a TOCTOU check: the two paths run under different lock domains (rcu_read_lock vs prog_list_lock), so a concurrent unreg can read ops-\u003ehdev as non-NULL, block on prog_list_lock, and then proceed while the destroy traversal executes - both paths then drop the same reference.  The refcount reaches zero legitimately (each decrement is individually valid), so no refcount_t saturation fires: the device is simply freed while the transport is still inside hid_destroy_device(), and subsequent teardown touches freed memory.  The fix serializes the remove/NULL decision under prog_list_lock on both sides and moves the destroy-side puts outside the lock.  With the lock held, plain reads/writes of ops-\u003ehdev are sufficient; no READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE are added, keeping the patch minimal.  Unlocked-read safety: the unlocked read of ops-\u003ehdev at the top of hid_bpf_unreg() cannot touch a freed device, because the unreg path itself still holds this registration's reference (released only by its own hid_put_device() after the lock is dropped), and a destroy traversal that already cleared ops-\u003ehdev makes the lock-internal re-check return early without any put.  At most one of the two paths releases each registration reference.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-90001",
  "modified": "2026-09-17T04:47:37.671527703Z",
  "published": "2026-09-16T11:17:11.700Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-90001"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-90001"
  ]
}