{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read / stack overflow in rtw_get_wps_attr()  rtw_get_wps_attr() walks WPS attributes inside a WPS IE taken from a wireless management frame. For each candidate attribute it only checks that the fixed 4-byte attribute header (2-byte ID + 2-byte length) fits inside the IE:  \tif (attr_ptr + 4 \u003e wps_ie + wps_ielen) \t\tbreak; \tu16 attr_id = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr); \tu16 attr_data_len = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr + 2); \tu16 attr_len = attr_data_len + 4;  attr_data_len (and therefore attr_len) is read directly from the wire and is never checked against the remaining bytes in the IE before being used as the size of:  \tmemcpy(buf_attr, attr_ptr, attr_len);  Since attr_len is fully attacker controlled (0 to 65535+4), this is both a heap OOB read of wps_ie, and, more seriously, a stack buffer overflow at several call sites where buf_attr is a single-byte stack variable, e.g. rtw_get_wps_attr_content()'s callers passing WPS_ATTR_SELECTED_REGISTRAR into a stack \"u8 sr\"/\"u8 selected_registrar\" (drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c, drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c). A crafted WPS IE in a beacon or probe response processed during scanning can therefore smash the stack of the parsing thread.  rtw_get_wps_attr_content() itself has no independent length check and simply trusts the attr_len it gets back from rtw_get_wps_attr(), so fixing the bound here also fixes that caller.  The \"attr_ptr + 4 \u003e wps_ie + wps_ielen\" header check above was added by commit 1463ca3ec6601 (\"staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in rtw_get_sec_ie(), rtw_get_wapi_ie(), and rtw_get_wps_attr()\"), which bounded the fixed header but never extended the check to cover the variable-length attribute data that follows it. Add that missing check before attr_len is used as a memcpy() length or accepted as a match.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-90018",
  "modified": "2026-09-17T04:47:36.174909665Z",
  "published": "2026-09-16T11:17:14.647Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-90018"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-90018"
  ]
}