{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:12",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:13",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix race l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() vs. put_chan  For L2CAP sockets without owning sk-\u003esk_socket, reading l2cap_pi(sk)-\u003echan may race against concurrent l2cap_sock_kill() -\u003e l2cap_sock_put_chan().  This excludes simultaneous proto_ops callbacks, but access in l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() has unsafe lockless read.   [Task 1]                         [Task 2 (hdev-\u003eworkqueue)]  l2cap_sock_release(parent)       l2cap_disconn_cfm    l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen        l2cap_conn_del      bt_accept_dequeue                l2cap_chan_del        lock_sock(sk)                    l2cap_sock_teardown_cb        bt_accept_unlink          bt_sk(sk)-\u003eparent = NULL        release_sock(sk) ----------------\u003e lock_sock(sk)                                           parent = /* NULL */      lock_sock(sk) \u003c--------------------- release_sock(sk)                                           sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED)                                       l2cap_sock_close_cb                                         l2cap_sock_kill(sk)                                           l2cap_sock_put_chan      chan = READ l2cap_pi(sk)-\u003echan         l2cap_pi(sk)-\u003echan = NULL      l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero            l2cap_put_chan(chan)        kref_get_unless_zero(\u0026chan-\u003eref)  Task 1 may observe NULL which causes null-ptr-deref.  Fix the race by taking lock_sock() in l2cap_sock_kill() to synchronize with l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen().  hold_unless_zero() is not needed here, l2cap_pi(sk)-\u003echan owns reference if it is non-NULL.  Clarify code comments vs. locking.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-90091",
  "modified": "2026-09-18T04:47:38.857789431Z",
  "published": "2026-09-17T17:17:00.563Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-90091"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-90091"
  ]
}