{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "urgency": "not yet assigned"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Debian:14",
        "name": "linux"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:  ntfs: validate usa_ofs before preserving the update sequence number  When ntfs_mft_record_alloc() reuses a free mft record it reads the old update sequence number straight from the on-disk record:       usn = *(__le16 *)((u8 *)m + le16_to_cpu(m-\u003eusa_ofs));  Here m points into the raw $MFT page-cache folio, which still holds unvalidated, MST-protected bytes: the folio is read by a plain iomap_read_folio() and neither post_read_mst_fixup() nor ntfs_mft_record_check() has run on it (both work on private copies). m-\u003eusa_ofs is therefore an untrusted u16, and a corrupted record can put it past the end of the record so the two-byte read lands outside the folio.  Reading such a record while creating a file gives, under KASAN:     BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ntfs_mft_record_alloc+...    Read of size 2 at addr ...     ntfs_mft_record_alloc -\u003e __ntfs_create -\u003e ntfs_create -\u003e path_openat  Only preserve the old update sequence number when usa_ofs is even and in range, mirroring the check ntfs_mft_record_check() already applies; otherwise leave usn zero, which the existing restore below skips.",
  "id": "DEBIAN-CVE-2026-90117",
  "modified": "2026-09-18T04:47:27.790270432Z",
  "published": "2026-09-17T17:17:03.857Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-90117"
    }
  ],
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-90117"
  ]
}